

INTRODUCTION

As in the previous series of volumes of this global representation of phenomenology, the naming of vast area called “Euro-Mediterranean” is ultimately inadequate. Containing mainly the countries bordering the Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea, the area has imprecise limits, especially when we consider its Eastern and Southern “borders.” The selection of the papers and of the topics might be representative neither for each country nor for each research direction or tendency. In spite of these ambiguities, however, there is one feature which gives a certain unity to the area and to the volume, but that unity stems not from predefined realities, but from our drive towards a unity which lies outside. More precisely, we tend to transcend the artificial distinction between Europe and non-Europe, including under the name “Mediterranean” countries which traditionally belong to Africa and the Middle East. A price for that is an artificial distinction between the “Northern” and the “Southern” Europe. Despite our efforts, however, this volume nevertheless contains very few papers by phenomenologists outside Europe. In fact, there are only two, one from Lebanon and another one from Israel. We must therefore concede that the “Euro-Mediterranean area” is rather a promise, that is to say, a kind of horizon that remains unfulfilled. But can see in the recent political events in the Arab world the signs of a change and nourish therefore legitimately the hope that in a not too distant future the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea will be equally represented. We would like therefore that this volume be seen, too, as an invitation to all

phenomenologists from the above mentioned area to join us, both in our research projects in the field of phenomenology and in our effort to make the phenomenological tradition more visible and to promote the values that it has defended for more than a century.

Freedom is a value that phenomenology explored over the decades in various ways. Some of the authors below are addressing it directly, for some others it is an operative concept, which helps us to clarify aspects or processes of the subjective or objective world. Investigating the relationship between nature and subjectivity is a traditional way to deal with the topic of freedom, but nonetheless one which provides us a solid ground. As *Andrea Altobrando* points out in his paper, the entire phenomenological enterprise is founded on freedom, since the phenomenological reduction is, according to Husserl himself, the result of an absolutely free act. Similarly what phenomenology brought forward was a specific type of analysis, which is difficult to be understood without in the absence of free action. In her paper, *Iris Aravot* explicitly associates freedom and phenomenological analysis. She shows that the architectural-making bridging the space of experience with the horizon of expectations, parallels the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, the free variations, the transcendental intuition of the essence, and description. Following the opening of an in-between, the space of experience is also a place where a breakthrough might occur. In the same line, *Pedro M. S. Alves* focuses on the difference between figurative consciousness and daydream consciousness. In exploring the later, he stresses the place of a free construction of the ego's own personal story, as well as the constraints that come from the passive and affective life of the ego. The phenomenological sense of subjectivity and passivity is further revised by *John David Barrientos Rodríguez*, while *Francisco Conde Soto* pays attention to another possible approach to consciousness, inspired by psychoanalysis. *Jad Hatem* speaks of the image which conceals in itself

life and of which Schelling attributed a kind of freedom. Taking into account the critique that Natorp directed towards Husserl's conception of phenomenology, *José Ruiz Fernández* points towards a methodological problem in the phenomenological endeavour, namely that the logos that gives an accurate account of immediate life, viz. the original phenomenological logos, has to take the form of a conceptual description. *Panos Theodorou* explains the sense in which the neo-Kantian philosophy of values formed a crucial constituent of Heidegger's inspiration and presents the difficulties that made the early attempt of Heidegger's phenomenology flawed and probably lead him to the new orientations of *Being and Time*.

The topic of corporeality is another important step in deepening the phenomenological understanding of freedom. *Xavier Escribano* provides an interpretation of the Merleau-Ponty's statement that the human body is "a general symbolism of the world." It is shown that this formula can refer to at least three complementary meanings: the body as a synergic system; the body as a capacity of sympathy or identification with the perceived world and, finally, the body as an endless capacity of meaning. *Urbano Mestre Sidoncha* shows that the mind-body connection has to be described from within, and not beyond, the field of transcendental phenomenology.

Understanding freedom requires understanding power. *Dean Komel* contests the idea that power over all is all and shows that a horizon from which we could even gaze into the future is lacking. The experience of this "not all" gives us an opportunity to speak differently about what is going on today and make room for a spontaneous consciousness of freedom speaking from within, which has always determined the contemporaneity of Europe.

Freedom is not only an "object" of the investigation, but also a "living telos". It is noteworthy therefore to underline that the phenomenological analyses are in fact pointing to existential issues. In his study consecrated to Paul Ricoeur's encounter with

Freud, *Domenico Jervolino* unearths the authentic sense of saying and acting, inviting us to liberate ourselves from the illusions of omnipotence and bring us back to the authentic awareness of the human condition, as a fight against what is painful or degrading to the humane character of humankind. *Daniel Marcelle* makes a defense of Gurwitsch's analyses of noema by showing that not only his perceptual noema is amenable to Gestalt organization, but that it is also conceptualizable and it meets thereby Føllesdal's challenging theses. After a brief genealogical discussion of the notion of universality, *Paul Marinescu* attempts to identify a new and profound meaning of universality related to temporality in Hans-Georg Gadamer's writing on the transcendental structure of the hermeneutical experience. Discussing Husserl's and Fink's conception of dreams, *Christian Ferencz-Flatz* addresses certain aspects in Husserl's interpretation of phantasy during the early 1920's that seem to offer grounds for a quite different approach to dreams. Focusing on the main categories that phenomenology has employed to describe physical pain, *Agustín Serrano de Haro* formulates the thesis that the three main categories of Husserlian analysis of intentionality—hyletic layer, noetic intention, and noematic kern—are needed in the basic description of pain experience, but they are required without any internal division. *Nicoleta Szabo* is extending the phenomenological analyses to the complicated matter of the meaning of the action, underlying two shortcomings with which Alfred Schütz struggled: the teleocratic character of the action's project and the "radical or vulgar" pragmatism, which represents the ordinary frame of reference for a pragmatic theory of action. *Maria-Luz Pintos* discusses how the current ecological crisis is confronted by phenomenology. Taking examples from Husserl and Gurwitsch, her essay pursues mainly the aim to found the necessity that we humans accept the great moral responsibility that is implicit in being rational. *Miguel García-Baró* reconsiders the philosophical, literary, theological, and aesthetic legacy of

Michel Henry in the light of major contemporary issues. *Dmitri Ginev* pleads both revising and supplementing the ethnomethodological description of everyday practices taking place in the “life-worlds” of scientific communities. The outcome of this revision/supplementation is a sort of “double hermeneutics”—interpretative studies of science’s interpretative practices.

The papers collected in this volume are altogether bringing to light the horizons of freedom: rationality, action, values, and normativity.

We are hoping therefore that this volume, as the entire five-volume series, will contribute not only to make phenomenological research more visible and more accessible to the readers in the entire world, but also to stimulate further investigations of the multi-dimensional phenomenon of freedom.

The Editor