My paper examines the status of philosophy at the beginning of Middle Ages. I did this analysis by commenting the work of Boethius Consolation of philosophy. While his contemporaries analyze new philosophical themes (the themes of Christian philosophy), Boethius (author of some theological treatises) returns to the ancient themes of philosophy in his last work, as mentioned above. This return occurs in distinct biographical circumstances, because he was the victim of several accusations - among them the accusation of sacrilege, which was supported by the fact that Boethius was a well-known philosopher. As a result, Boethius wrote a treatise to defend philosophy. The outcome is a philosophy about good and about the supremacy of good, about evil, and suffering, which are the consequences of ignorance. The philosophical knowledge is the way to goodness and happiness of a philosopher who suffers, because of the wickedness and injustice while in prison, and waiting for the death sentence. Consolation of philosophy shows the prejudices and the suspicions of the contemporaries of Boethius, regarding philosophy, that lead to the closing of the schools of philosophy; the last one, the School from Athens, was closed five years after the writing of this treatise and the death of Boethius.

Within the following paper I attempt to offer a preliminary analysis and a sketch of the foundations of the scholastic notion of the convertibility of Being and the good from the perspective of its roots within Aristotle and, in particular, in relation to the view expressed within the first book of the Nichomachean Ethics (see, i.1), that the good is that of which all things desire. The paper thus initiates with a brief examination of the scholastic notion of the relation of convertibility, and in particular, that expressed by Aquinas. There the relation is clearly recognized to find its roots within Aristotle’s notion of the good as above stated. Following analysis of this statement, I turn to consideration of the structure of desire. There three senses are identified, the third of which is found to correspond to Aristotle’s expression. From this, being and the good are shown to be reciprocally expressed.

In his biography on Augustine, Possidius writes: “His table was frugal and sparing, though indeed with the herbs and lentils he also had meats at times for the sake of his guests or for some of the weaker brethren”.1 Given the importance of friendship in Augustine’s life, it is not surprising that he ate meat for the sake of others and not for his own pleasures. However, Augustine spends much time in Book X of his Confessions obsessing over his delight in everyday activities, including eating2. Indeed, Augustine examines the relationship between desire and the object of desire throughout the Confessions, his ultimate focus being on the nature of our concupiscent hearts. In this paper, I will explore Augustine’s seemingly unhealthy relationship with food by discussing the place of food in his eschatology, his account of concupiscence and will, and his theory of interiority as given in the Confessions. Ultimately, for Augustine, there is a beauty to eating that is found in its relationship to the sensual experience of God.

My aim in this paper is to reconstruct a certain path of problems which arise, one after another, from an important range of discussions, which unfolded from the middle of the 13th century to the middle of the 14th century among authors writing in Latin, defenders of a hylomorphic description of the constitution of material entities. I will follow in particular John Duns Scotus’ texts on the dispute. Thereby we will find out how it is that in the background of a question apparently concerned solely with the description of the physical world lies a quite deep metaphysical quarrel.

The philosophy of Johannes Scottus Eriugena is normally identified with late antique/early medieval Platonism, which has a very distinctively emanationist cosmological model. The concept of causality, on the other hand, is generally identified with Aristotelianism, which was not at all common in the early medieval West, due, amongst other things, to the lack of most of Aristotle’s texts. However, causality is an important concept for Eriugena: it is the link via “creation”, which allows the creature to know the otherwise utterly transcendent God. This particular sense of causality as a structure of creation, distinct alike from specifically Aristotelian causality and Platonic emanation is something Eriugena inherited from Maximus the Confessor, who also uses it as a structure of participation. This paper examines the background to Eriugena’s use of causality, before examining particular structures of causality, i.e., God as the First and Final cause, the primordial causes as formal and efficient cause, and how they help Eriugena balance a very strong negative theology with a very strong model of participation, and concluding.

The distinction between active and passive mind has been discussed by recent Augustine scholars, mainly in connection to the question whether - and if so to what extent - the Augustinian mind could be said to be active given the doctrine of divine illumination. The doctrine has prompted some to emphasize the mainly passive nature of the human mind in attaining knowledge, while others have argued that the doctrine should not be so construed as to downplay the role the human mind plays in cognition. Of the latter, some have emphasized the role of the act of judgment, others the mind’s act of discovering within itself the standards of “eternal reasons”, and still others the role of the “created” as well as the “uncreated” light. While framing the discussion of the active and passive mind in this way, does help us clarify Augustine’s epistemological views, and at the same time fails to bring out the specific conception of the “active” mind that Augustine himself had and wished to emphasize. I explain what this conception is, then show that the distinction is put in use in his philosophy with a view that recent commentators have not emphasized in their interpretation of this distinction, as regards the role of the mind’s activity as a condition for non-empirical as well as empirical cognition.

This paper examines the influence of Platonism on the work of a twelfth-century philosopher, Achard of Saint-Victor. The development of the Plato’s doctrines, in particularly the theory of ideas, is scrutinized across the works of Latin authors that most influenced the reception of Platonic doctrine in the XIIth century (Seneca, Augustine, Erigena, and Boethius). Secondly, these are compared with the doctrine of Achard of Saint-Victor, which allows us to see the origin of some of key philosophical concepts in Achard’s writings such as eternal reasons, first form, idea and idos. The paper supplements previous research on XII century Platonism by Marie-Dominique, Chenu, John Marenbon, and Stephen Gersh.

The paper deals with issues concerning IX-XII centuries Central Asian scholars’ contribution to succession and correlation of Weltanschauung (philosophical world outlook) in the Middle Ages and Renaissance Europe in the light of the ancient Greek philosophical heritage. It is stated that each epoch had its own peculiar viewpoint, dependent on the level of knowledge and character of civilization and historical experience of the nation. The purpose of this paper is to discuss contribution ways of IX-XII centuries Central Asian philosophy to further development of Medieval and Renaissance Weltanschauung in Europe. The paper also tries to ground that both Central Asian and European philosophical complexes were inspired mostly and primarily by ancient Greek philosophy as part and parcel of the history of world philosophy. An attempt is made to show that the Middle Ages and Renaissance philosophy of Europe was inspired, first of all, greatly by rational philosophical ideas of Al-Farabi and Avicenna. In this article the author conveys his understanding on this complex phenomenon.

With the aim of strengthening the deep desire and the hope to find the truth, St. Augustine writes against the Academics, based on the Ciceronian formulation of the academic doctrine. Advocate of the probabilism of Carneades, Cicero confronted the opposite arguments to reach the probable, to find the closest to the truth. The probability is the real guide of life. According to St. Augustine, academics altered the concept of classical philosophy. The wise academic is an irrational and contradictory creature. He who does not admit anything as certain, nothing does, since without certainty no action is possible. The academics dissociated theory from practice, threatening the whole moral order. Neither have sense to hide behind the verisimilitude, approach the true or establish approximations to the truth as rules of action. How can man, who does not know the face of the truth, dare to talk about of the resemblance to this truth? But, since his conversion, his skepticism had been overcome. St. Augustine did not longer believe, as Cicero, that the truth was submerged in a deep hole, and man could not find it. In discussing the academic question, St. Augustine wanted to satisfy a personal desire: reach the truth.

In this paper, I discuss an anonymous Quaestiones super librum Ethicorum in the manuscripts of Worcester Cathedral Library (Q. 13) and the notion of felicitas (happiness) in this work. The question (commentary) has characteristics similar to those once called “Averroists’ commentaries”, i.e., the commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics written by Parisian masters of arts in the late 13th century. There are, however, elements peculiar to the Worcester commentary and others that resemble to aspects of the work written by John of Tytynsale, a contemporary Oxford master of arts. Like some of those Parisian commentaries, the Worcester text describes felicitas as “a conjunction with the first cause” (coniunctio primi principii). The anonymous author claims that the knowledge of divine essence obtained through this conjunction is non-demonstrative.

In my paper I will discuss the development of Meister Eckhart’s ideas from his early work i.e. Quaestio Parisiensis I to his latest sermons in German language that are his one of the latest writings. In the Meister Eckhart research the German sermons are mostly discussed as a mystical contribution of Eckhart. In my presentation I will try to ask the question if it is possible to find a development of a general idea uniting Eckhart’s early and latest works.

De coniecturis can be interpreted from the concepts of ‘nature’ and uti est. Cusanus uses ‘nature’ in more than one sense. As a philosophical species, ‘nature’ reveals the structure of this work as a physiology or explanation of the totality of existence based on a concept of nature. Uti est, in its turn, takes part in a definition of conjecture. The meaning of uti est overlaps with that of ‘nature’ in some instances. Both ‘nature’ and uti est converge in God.

The purpose of this essay is to show the importance of the Aquinas’s commentary to the Chapter XII, 7 of the Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle describes the notion of universal order, by a certain doctrine of participation. In this chapter appears the term συστοιχία, which is usually translated as the Pythagorean “series of opposites.” In his commentary Thomas Aquinas translates συστοιχία as coelementatio, which seems to affirm the meaning of an ordered theological series.

La presente comunicación tiene el objetivo de presentar uno de los elementos clave de la discusión acerca del proceso de recepción y asimilación de la física aristotélica en la Universidad de París del siglo XIII, a través del análisis de las nociones de creación y eternidad en el De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes de Tomás de Aquino. Hasta los primeros decenios del siglo XII, en el mundo latino se conocían del filósofo peripatético tan sólo dos obras: las Categorías y el De interpretatione. En el periodo que va entre 1150 y 1250 se inició una ingente labor de traducción gracias a la cual se completó la recuperación del corpus aristotélico. La llegada de estas obras fue el inicio de un intenso proceso de transformación a gran escala del pensamiento filosófico occidental, caracterizado por fuertes tensiones entre la ortodoxia cristiana y la cosmovisión aristotélica. La entrada de Aristóteles marcó, de esta forma, el comienzo de un proceso paralelo de estudio y condena, en el que contrastan los intentos de la Iglesia por frenar la entrada de los textos y el entusiasmo de los estudiantes y maestros de la Facultad de Artes de París por las teorías del Estagirita. La obra filosófica de Tomás de Aquino constituye un brillante ejemplo de la vía media de asimilación del sistema físico aristotélico, frente a los dos extremos opuestos de la batalla representados por los llamados averroístas latinos o aristotélicos radicales – que tendieron a aceptar aún en contra de la fe todo lo sostenido por el Estagirita- y los teólogos antiaristotélicos –que lucharon por refutar, desde posiciones de corte neoplatónico, el pensamiento filósofo griego ante los peligros que éste representaba para la fe.

God is a nuclear issue of the philosophical-theological system of Raymond Lull. Everything revolves around that Word. Its meaning includes first nine absolute attributes (goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory), names that are closer to the reality of God, which is not static but dynamic. The language of the correlatives, Lull thus talk that it would have been taken from the Arabic language, refers to that dynamism. Lull widely develops an affirmative language about God. His Theology is preferably affirmative. The author of this Paper also refers to the possible relation of the thought of Raymond Lull to the situation of our western culture at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Η χριστιανική ανθρωπολογία του Θωμά Ακινάτη, προϊόν της συμφιλίωσης θεολογίας και φιλοσοφίας, πίστης και λόγου, συνίσταται σε μία νέα θεώρηση του κόσμου και του ανθρώπου. Ο άνθρωπος, εκτός από ανθρώπινο όν το οποίο ανήκει στην ανθρώπινη φύση, δηλαδή την ανθρωπότητα, είναι και ατομική ύπαρξη, πρόσωπο εντός μίας βιωμένης ιστορίας. Η θεολογική επεξεργασία του προσώπου στη θωμιστική σκέψη συνοδεύεται από την αναγνώριση της «φύσης» των πραγμάτων και την οντολογική αναβάθμιση του αισθητού κόσμου, με συνέπεια την αναγνώριση της επί μέρους αυτόνομης ύπαρξης του ανθρώπου ως φυσικού ατόμου και τη σύλληψη της μεταφυσικής (φιλοσοφικής) έννοιας του προσώπου -- θέση αναμφισβήτητα κοσμοϊστορικής σημασίας για τη νεώτερη σκέψη. Στην ηθική διδασκαλία όμως του Ακινάτη εκδηλώνεται ο πρακτικός και κοινωνικός χαρακτήρας του προσώπου, κατ΄εξοχήν δε στο πεδίο των έννομων σχέσεων. Ο άνθρωπος ως φυσικό πρόσωπο είναι υποκείμενο «σχέσεων δικαιοσύνης» που κατ’ εξοχήν αφορούν την κοινωνική ζωή, εντός της οποίας το πρόσωπο είναι προϊόν μίας φυσικής νομιμότητας και ορίζεται από την σχεσιακότητά του. Το πρόσωπο εδώ έχει δύο όψεις: αυτήν που αφορά τη «γενική» δικαιοσύνη, δηλαδή τη δικαιοσύνη ως κοινωνική ηθική σύμφωνη με την κοινωνική ύπαρξη του προσώπου, και αυτήν που αφορά την «επί μέρους δικαιοσύνη», δηλαδή τη δικαιοσύνη που έχει ως αντικείμενό της το «δίκαιον», τη δικαιοσύνη ως δικαιική κατάσταση πραγμάτων και σχέσεων. Η δεύτερη αφορά τον άνθρωπο ως υποκείμενο έννομων σχέσεων που σχετίζονται με τα πράγματα, μέσω των οποίων συγκροτείται η νομική ύπαρξη του ανθρωπίνου όντος ως προσώπου, δηλαδή αποκτά τις έννομες ιδιότητες και τους «ρόλους» του. Αυτό είναι το πεδίο του δικαίου, εντός του οποίου τα πρόσωπα σχετίζονται απευθείας με τα αγαθά και μέσω αυτών μεταξύ τους. Ο υπερφυσικός προορισμός του προσώπου ως ανθρώπινου όντος συμπληρώνεται λοιπόν από τον πρακτικό, τον κοινωνικό χαρακτήρα του προσώπου, όπως εκδηλώνεται στο πεδίο των έννομων σχέσεων και του δικαίου. Στην αντίληψη αυτή η έννοια του προσώπου με το πνευματικό της καθώς και με το κοινωνικό-δικαιικό της περιεχόμενο καθίσταται προπομπός της νεωτερικής εποχής και προάγγελος των ανθρώπινων δικαιωμάτων, παραμένει όμως ενταγμένη στην παράδοση του κοινού αγαθού της αρχαιότητας και της μεσαιωνικής εποχής. Η μετριοπαθής «προσωποκρατία» του Ακινάτη μπορούμε να πούμε ότι εξασφαλίζει την ισορροπία ανάμεσα στην αρχαία απρόσωπη μεταφυσική και στον ατομικισμό της νεώτερης εποχής.

Η Πλατωνική θεολογία αποτελεί το κυριότερο φιλοσοφικό αριστούργημα του Marsilio Ficino, στο οποίο γίνεται αναφορά και στους προσωκρατικούς φιλοσόφους. Πρόκειται για έναν τρόπο που χρησιμοποιεί ο Φιτσίνο αφενός για να δώσει εγκυρότητα στα λόγια του, χρησιμοποιώντας το κύρος που διέθεταν οι προσωκρατικοί φιλόσοφοι, και αφετέρου για να αποδείξει ότι η αναφορά στους Προσωκρατικούς σήμαινε την καλή γνώση του αντικειμένου με το οποίο ασχολήθηκε. Μέσα από τη διεξαγωγή της ερευνητικής εργασίας διαπιστώνονται αρκετά σφάλματα, λάθη και παρανοήσεις, στα οποία υπέπεσε ο Φιτσίνο, αναφερόμενος στις θεωρίες (ρήσεις) των Προσωκρατικών.