Are there any morally expendable emotions? That is, are there any emotions that could ideally, from a moral point of view, be eradicated from human life? Aristotle may have subscribed to the view that there are no such emotions, and for that reason—though not only for that reason—it merits investigation. I first suggest certain revisions of the specifics of Aristotle’s non-expendability claim that render it less counter-intuitive. I then show that the plausibility of Aristotle’s claim turns largely on the question of how emotions are to be individuated. After probing that question in relation to contemporary theories of emotion, I explore how our emotions and moral virtues relate to distinct spheres of human experience, and how emotion concepts can best carve up the emotional landscape. I argue finally that there exist certain normative reasons for specifying emotion concepts such that Aristotle’s view holds good.

On the standard reading of Hume, the belief that the necessity associated with the causal relation is “an entirely mind-independent phenomenon” in the world isunjustified. For example, Jonathan Bennett writes that necessary connections of the sort that Hume allows are not “relations which hold objectively between the ‘objects’ or events which we take to be causally related.” Similarly, Barry Stroud writes that, according to Hume, we believe falsely “that necessity is something that ‘resides’ in the relation between objects or events in the objective world.” In this paper I argue that this reading of Hume is mistaken and that there is a sense of justification (viz., justification qua “proof”) according to which human beings are justified in holding the belief that the necessity associated with the causal relation is “an entirely mind-independent phenomenon” in the world.

This project is, in part, motivated by my contention that one cannot adequately answer the question regarding the proper justification for human rights until one has answered the metaphysical question regarding the fundamental nature of human rights and the ontological question regarding the proper status of human rights. I offer a sustained analysis of metaphysical, ontological, and justificatory questions regarding human rights with the purpose of illustrating the point that theories that fail to engage in such analyses are inadequate. In particular, this essay argues that Michael Ignatieff’s theory of human rights, as articulated in Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, is philosophically inadequate because it fails to connect his justificatory arguments for human rights with metaphysical and ontological conceptions of and arguments for human rights.

In “Sense-Certainty” Hegel establishes “the now that is many nows” as the form of experience. This has implications for the interpretation of later figures within the Phenomenology of Spirit: specifically, the thing (from chapter 2), the living body (from chapter 4), and the ethical community (from chapter 6) are each significantly different forms of such a “now” in which the way that past and future are held within the present differs. Comparing these changing “temporalities” allows us to defend Hegel’s distinction between nature and spirit, and his claim that only spirit has a history. This comparison also allows us to see how it is that phenomenological philosophy, and the “end of history” that it announces, is a stance of openness to the future.

In this paper I argue that the prohibition on desire in the orthodox Indian systems is not simply a prohibition on selfish desires. The word “selfish” is ambiguous. It can mean either “self-interested” or “excessively self-interested.” Since only excessively self-interested actions are prohibited, the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on all self-interested desires. But the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on excessively self-interested desires either, because this class of desires is too insignificant to explain the general preoccupation with the elimination of desire in the tradition. Finally, I argue that selfish desires are indeed prohibited, but only if by “selfish” one means “based on false beliefs about the self.” Even then, however, selfish desires do not exhaust the class of prohibited desires because some prohibited desires are based on false beliefs about things other than the self.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant grounds his postulate for the immortality of the soul on the presupposed practical necessity of the will’s endless progress toward complete conformity with the moral law. Given the important role that this postulate plays in Kant’s ethical and political philosophy, it is hard to understand why it has received relatively little attention. It is even more surprising considering the attention given to his other postulates of practical reason: the existence of God and freedom. The project of this paper is to examine Kant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul, examine critiques of this argument, and show why the argument succeeds in showing that belief in the moral law also obligates one to believe in the soul’s immortality.

Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) found phenomenology very helpful for the analysis of concrete human experience and for overcoming the ethical formalism ofKant. Phenomenology, he believed, could also enrich classical Thomism by exploring the lived experience of freedom, interiority, and self-governance. But phenomenology, in his opinion, needed to be supplemented by metaphysics in order to ground experiences such as the sense of duty in the real order. He criticized much modern philosophy for abandoning metaphysics and thus neglecting the sapiential dimension. Since his career as a professor was very short, he did not have time to complete his project of a personalist Thomism in which phenomenology and metaphysics would be harmoniously combined.