Very early on, the works and ideas of the French socialist P.J.-Proudhon were discussed in the circle of the German young Hegelians. Also, Max Stimer mentioned him several times in Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. His critique of Proudhon’s thoughts is very important for his own définition and confrontation with the concept of property. The article analyses the different levels of his examination with this concept.

Commonly known as Max Stimer, Johann Caspar Schmidt attained considerable recognition as pedagogue and culture critic, but most of all as a philosopher of the German Vormärz. However, it is a less known fact that Stimer was also a translator and publisher of important works in the domain of economy, an activity in which he distinguished himself for being a profound connoisseur of literature on economie theory of his own time.

Freedom of the press is one of the most visible comerstones of a Democratic State, as well as a consensual requisite for it. Nevertheless, for Max Stirner, this gesture of demanding so cherished by political liberalism is the very negation of freedom. Freedom is neither a gift nor a concession or permission granted by the State. Freedom of the press only becomes accessible through conquest and appropriation, becoming the individual ownership as it is claimed by him. Nowadays, everyone in the developed world has at his disposal the force and means to become the owner of the freedom of the press, as Max Stimer stated. More than two centuries after Stimer’s claim, Publishing in the interactive web meets the conditions established by him for a full exercise of the freedom of press.

A complex controversy, the debate between Max Stimer and Ludwig Feuerbach is certainly one of the most interesting in the history of Contemporary ideas and surpasses, by the fruitfulness contained therein, the short time period in which it unfolded. The article considers the controversy in a particular aspect: the understanding of the category of the individual, showing the incompatibility between Unique-individual (Stimer) and the individual as being in relation (Feuerbach).

In most of his published works, Georg Simmel dealt with themes which were also motives of concem for Stimer, such as the One and society, the individual and genre, social formations and domination, the problem of duty, egoism versus communism. Contradictions and parallelisms to Stimerian motifs can be found in Simmel’s thought since its early stages. Starting with an analysis of whether or not these are direct references to Stimer, this paper intends to show the relation between these thinkers and the possibility of a direct influence on Simmel by Stimer, namely in regards to their common idea of “individual law”.

Well before Friedrich Nietzsche had Max Stirner with great Gestus shouted (spelled) out the death of God and pulled away the veil of the realm of spirits. Religion critique after Stirner, which follows a clarified Enlightenment, can thereafter for all intents and purposes be only of two sorts: On the one hand, to explain how mankind (has) created its’ Religion and its’ Gods: Gunnar Heinsohn settles this. And on the other hand to point out: Which functional equivalents are themselves found as (religious) beliefs of humankind - freely adapted from Feuerbach: The truth of Religion is the need for it. The free self after Stirner, that knows rationally of the non-existence of God, chooses for itself its’ own respective God, or, it being strong enough, can leave it also as is.

Stimer and Feyerabend, despite being historically a hundred and fifty years apart, seem to have been of the same mind in revolting against the methodological explaining of what cannot methodologically be explained. Stirner attempted an explanation in a more intuitive version, Feyerabend in a more sophisticated one. For both thinkers it is obviously important to sustain dissent with the assumption that method is the one and only vital promoter of scientific progress. They equally voice the opinion that, despite science itself producing inconsistencies as well as results, its proceedings nonetheless follow a certain rationale. But to codify a definite approach to phenomena or matter i.e. to establish a definite method for taking a look into things turns science into religion and scientists into believers. As a resuit no new insights are to be gained.

Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics that pleasure accompanies the perfect activity, doing it more desirable, and that the activity of contemplation is the most divine and pleasurable. On the other hand, he says in the Metaphysics that God’s activity is the most pleasurable, because his activity is perfect. In this article I try to study the relation between pleasure and activity in contemplation and its relation with God’s activity, in order to understand intellectual pleasure: is it possible to speak about a “spiritual” pleasure? Are there sensations which do not depend on material organs?

The present paper aims to examine the development of Fichte transcendental idealism, studying particularly his notion of freedom, following the reading and comments of Fichte made by the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro. Issues to be discussed have a defined framework: first, it will be tried to shown Fabro’s interprétation of Fichte; second, it will be gave account of Fabro’s judgment about some particular points of Fichte idealism; and finally - but indirectly - it will be shown the influence of Fichte over Fabro him self notion of freedom.