Anecdotal pluralism (AP) is the claim that, when two individuals disagree on the truth of a religious belief, the right move to make is to engage in a communal epistemic process of evidence sharing and evaluation, motivated by the willingness to learn from each other, understand the adversary's views and how these challenge their own, and re-evaluate their own epistemic position in regards to external criticisms. What I will do in my paper is to provide a presentation of AP and give a few reasons in support. I will begin with showing how pluralism can be promoted by religious experiences inhering in any (historical) tradition. To this regard, my purpose is to analyse such experiences as conducive to the assumption of the two main principles defining any pluralist view. Subsequently, I will construe AP by seven claims, and I will focus my efforts on justifying its superiority both to exclusivism/inclusivism and other varieties of pluralism. My next and final move is to list a few reasons which support my view.

In this article, I argue that fallibilistic justification is insufficient for propositional knowledge if veritic luck is involved. I provide a thought experiment to demonstrate that even very strong non-factive evidence is insufficient for knowledge if veritic luck is present. I then distinguish between precise justification (PJ), which I suggest is required for knowledge in cases of veritic luck, and loose justification (LJ), which is sufficient for practical cases in which beliefs are reasonable to hold even if they fall short of being items of knowledge. In addition, I provide a reason for holding that PJ is required for all items of propositional knowledge, and not only for cases of veritic luck. Lastly, I propose that Gettier-style cases pertain to an ambiguity between PJ and LJ.

The idea that we have direct and infallible knowledge of appearances is still deeply entrenched; and even scholars who reject this idea often still presume that our normal awareness of the shape and size of objects includes awareness of something like the shape and size of the image it projects onto the retina. I show here how these ideas are undermined by some new empirical evidence regarding these features, as well as by some observations concerning the phenomenology of size, the familiar moon illusion, and the persistence of illusions more generally. These considerations further suggest a path for dealing with the phenomenology of appearance more broadly.

In this paper I carry out two tasks. First, I account for one of the distinctive uses of thought experiments in philosophy, namely, the fact that just a thought experiment is sufficient to confute a well-established theory. Secondly, I present three arguments to defend the claim that, at least in philosophy, we should remove thought experiments from our metaphilosophical toolkit. The central premise that motivates these arguments is the following: the very methodology of thought experiments permits to construct different scenarios in which philosophical theories are refuted ad infinitum.

Historiography is becoming more critical of the typology/ population dichotomy introduced by Ernst Mayr. Therefore, one should look again at the problem of species in non-Darwinian theories: neo-Lamarckism and orthogenesis, and consider the possibility that this problem was overly simplified. What can be seen in both of them is the existence of a tension between the idea of evolution and the essence of species. In neo-Lamarckism, this tension was resolved by recognizing species as static entities which changed only when triggered by external stimulus. In orthogenesis, evolution was seen as constant phenomena and species – as naturally changeable entities. However, orthogeneticists assumed that not only species, but also whole phyletic lines had essences that constrained their further evolution. Thus, in both cases we can see interpretation of species in tune with essentialism, but essentialism is widely differently integrated with each of these concepts of evolution.

Two objections are raised against Oliver and Smiley’s analysis of the collective–distributive opposition in their 2016 book: (1) They take it as a basic premise that the collective reading of ‘baked a cake’ corresponds to a predicate different from its distributive reading, and the same applies to all predicate expressions that admit both a collective and a distributive interpretation. At the same time, however, they argue that inflectional forms of the same lexeme (such as ‘is a man’ and ‘are men’) reveal a univocity that should be preserved in a formal representation of English. These two assumptions sit uneasily. (2) In developing their analysis, Oliver and Smiley come to the conclusion that even a singular predication such as ‘Tom baked a cake’ must be regarded as ambiguous between a collective and a distributive reading. This is so artificial that it hardly makes sense, and yet there seems to be no way out of the difficulty unless we are prepared to give up the basic premise just mentioned.

This paper is a constructive response to Peter Baumann’s comments concerning the argument from inconsistency and explosion that was originally introduced in “Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?” Specifically, this paper deals with Baumann’s two suggestions for how quasi-factivists might avoid this argument and it shows that they are both problematic. As such, his paper extends and strengthens the case against the view that knowledge is not factive, i.e. the view that knowledge implies that what is known is true or approximately true.