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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Eric Wiland How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?
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Most act-utilitarians now reject the direct utilitarianism of Bentham. They do so because they are convinced of what I call the paradox of utilitarianism -- the thought that one cannot maximize happiness if one is trying to maximize happiness. Instead, they adopt some form of indirect utilitarianism (IU), arguing that the optimal decision procedure may differ markedly from the criterion of rightness for actions. Here I distinguish between six different versions of indirect utilitarianism, arguing that the weaker versions of IU also fall prey to the paradox of utilitarianism, while the stronger versions of IU violate an overwhelmingly plausible moral principle, the principle that one ought to V only if one can V intentionally.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Aaron James Constructivism about Practical Reasons
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Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first-order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assurne constructive “norms of practical reasoning” which yield particular truths without assuming them. But philosophers often mistakenly assurne that only “formal” norms of reasoning could fulfill this role. The paper describes a further possibility: norms of reasoning can be “situation-specific” and yet retain truth-independent authority. Though we might doubt whether such norms can be independently defended, we should not doubt the possibility or coherence of constructivism about practical reasons.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Igor Douven A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox
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There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Ian Logan Whatever Happened to Kant’s Ontological Argument?
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
M. Oreste Fiocco Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge
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The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness of the imagination must broaden the idea of what it is to be imaginable. I argue that this required broadening renders the imagination idle (in this context). Consequently, I distinguish two different accounts of the evidential basis of modal knowledge and present a more general argument that concludes that the very notion of conceivability should be eschewed in modal epistemology.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Ram Neta, Duncan Pritchard McDowell and the New Evil Genius
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7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Thomas A. Blackson On Williamson’s Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument
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discussion
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Jennifer Hornsby On ‘Facts Revisited’
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Barry C. Smith Can We Say More about Factual Discourse?
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book symposium
10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Peter Lipton Précis of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd Edition
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Alexander Bird Inference to the Only Explanation
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Christopher Hitchcock The Lovely and the Probable
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Stathis Psillos The Fine Structure of Inference to the Best Explanation
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Peter Lipton Replies
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review essay
15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Richard Moran The Reasons of Love by Harry G. Frankfurt
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Stefan Linquist, Alex Rosenberg The Return of the Tabula Rasa by Kim Sterelny
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Michael R. Depaul, Stephen R. Grimm The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding by Jonathan Kvanvig
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critical notices
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Sanford Goldberg Anti-Individualism and Knowledge
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19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Amie L. Thomasson Real Natures and Familiar Objects
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 74 > Issue: 2
Christopher Knapp On Disgust
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