Pessimism about the stability of intra-personal relationships runs deeply in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. I begin by examining how this pessimism arises from Sartre’s ontology, particularly considering the attitude of love towards the Other. I then suggest that there may be space within Sartre’s philosophy for a defense of love as a positive relation to the Other which need not be destined to cycle into attitudes toward the Other such as hate or masochism.

This paper uses the lessons gathered from a brief consideration of the workings of substantive descriptive phrases to develop two objections to Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence. First, one’s understanding of the definition of God does not, as Anselm claims, guarantee that God exists in one’s understanding. Second, the proof depends on a flawed interpretation of the denial of God’s existence. The paper concludes by discussing the broader significance of this second objection.

Guy Claxton suggests that post-Industrial Revolution westerners are consumption addicts and argues that we must embrace a more frugal and environmentally considerate lifestyle. However, I argue that Claxton’s analysis and solution to consumption addiction does not penetrate far enough. Through Warren’s ecofeminist reasoning and Heidegger’s notion of technology, I show that the anthropocentric assumption inherent in western consumption engenders a destructive and oppressive worldview by creating the illusion that we are justified in subordinating non-human entities.

As early proponents of foundationalism, Aristotle and Epicurus share the view that all knowledge rests on indubitable foundations. For Aristotle, these foundations are intellectual first principles. But for Epicurus, sense perception is basic. If certainty is the criterion of knowledge, then, despite their different approaches, neither philosopher succeeds in providing a mechanism sufficient to certify knowledge claims. For the foundationalist wishing to avoid nihilism, therefore, Aristotle’s and Epicurus’ failures are instructive.

This paper focuses on Seng-Chao’s conception of motion and rest as two different ways to see the same phenomenon and the effect that this has on his understanding of ideas such as impermanence. I point out the parallels that can be made between motion and rest and samsara and nirvana and I argue that a strong Taoist background helps Seng-Chao clarify Indian ideas and make even deeper claims about the true nature of reality.

In this essay I defend Heidegger’s critique of technology against possible criticisms that he may be an anti-humanist and a mystic. This essay will show that Heidegger’s critique of technology is helpful in thinking about ecological questions; and his contributions to such questions is relevant and not radically separated from some of the work of other philosophers today including Karen Warren and Marilyn Frye.

In this paper I present an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s account of rulefollowing, including what implications he suggests this account has for philosophy. The account suggests that neither one’s interpretation nor the rule itself are criteria by which we may conclude a rule was followed correctly or not. Rather it is through training, regularity, habit and social expectation-in short, by the consequences of action-that an action is considered in accord with a rule. I argue that even if we accept Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following, certain philosophically important implications follow.

In this paper, I argue that the connection between experience and belief is far closer than we might first suppose. In defending a broadly representationalist theory of perception, I argue that purportedly irreducible, non-physical entities such as qualia do not pose an intractable problem for physicalist or functionalist accounts of mind.

This paper focuses on the metaphysical and conceptual structures of reality organization that exist currently in western culture. Taking a feminist perspective, this paper analyzes how some disfavored social groups actively have their identities manipulated and sometimes conceptually erased from the dominant conceptual scheme. Utilizing this analysis, it is concluded that this conceptual scheme perpetuates oppression; therefore, maintained loyalty to it is incompatible with the belief that all people should be treated as full persons.