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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 58
洪巳軒
Szu-Hsuan Hung
墨子對於「兼愛」之論理與實踐精神
Mozi’s Argumentation and Practical Spirit of “ JianAi”
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以西方倫理學理論為基礎,進而嘗試系統性地建構墨子關於兼愛的理論是許多研究者採用的研究方式。然而,本文發現墨子在面對批評兼愛者與認同兼愛者之時,採用了不同的論說方式。面對批評者,墨子以反證其論點不能成立的辯論手法促使其認同兼愛;面對認同者,則採用互利原則以增強其實踐兼愛的信念。不過,用以擊破反對者論點的辯論內容以及增強實踐信念的互利原則,仍不足以窺見兼愛的實踐精神。本文從墨子實踐兼愛的相關文獻中,揣摩其精神境界:發現在此實踐精神中,兼愛本身即為價值根源,兼愛的行為本身是義;而不論利己或利他的效益,都只是兼愛行為所產生的附加價值。以兼愛的價值認同所引發的實際行動本身就是義,因現實環境之限制所產生的利與不利,皆無損於兼愛的實踐精神。
Mozi’s theory of Jian Ai was reconstructed under the form of western philosophy by many scholars. However, I discover that Mozi used different kinds of argumentations to justify Jian Ai concerning different audience. When facing the opponent, Mozi justified Jian Ai by refuting arguments. And he encouraged supporter’s faith through publicizing the principle of reciprocity. However, the practical spirit of Jian Ai is not elucidated by the principle of refutation and reciprocity. This research tries to figure out the practical spirit of Jian Ai from Mozi. My conclusion is that to practice Jian Ai is the value itself. Regardless of any additional benefit, action of Jian Ai is morality. Moral practice is originated from Jian Ai. Although the realistic benefit is limited by causality the practical spirit of Jian Ai is intact.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 58
Foong-Ee Pong
馮鳳儀
The Affordance of the Graceful Fish Metaphor:
An Interdisciplinary Approach Exploring the Practical Dimension of the Zhuangzi
從「承給意義」論遊魚之喻
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This article explains Zhuangzi’s philosophy by analyzing the metaphor of the graceful fish. I argue that to discover the essence of the graceful fish metaphor, we have to look into the relationship between the fish and the water in which it dwells. The article consists of five sections. First, I start by a brief review of common readings of the metaphors of the water and the fish and their insufficiency to relate to the idea of Dao/daos in the Zhuangzi. Second, I propose an interdisciplinary approach based on the notion of “affordance”─a substitute for “value/meaning”─that enables us to unveil the underlying key element pertaining to the image of the graceful fish: the ground. Third, an analysis of the graceful fish metaphor is presented after the explanation of affordance. Forth, I draw on the concept of vulnerability to explain the natural ability we are born with but buried due to a dominant completed heart-mind. I explain how vulnerability steers our way by comparing two images found in the Zhuangzi: infants vs. Hundun. Fifth, I sum up my findings and conclude that the Zhuangzi provides pragmatic advices for individuals─especially those who now live in a modern society that embrace social plurality─to live their lives to the fullest within any given social context by constantly adapting to the situation and therefore creatively exploring the limitless possibilities in the social world.
本文透過遊魚之喻以解釋《莊子》哲學。我提出要掌握遊魚之喻的意義,必須要探討魚與水之間的關係。本文共分五節。首先,我就既有的解讀方法,也就是分別論魚與論水的譬喻作一概要說明,並指出此一進路在解釋莊書中「道」的概念上的不足。接著,我提出「承給(承擔、給予)意義」,一個替代「價值/意義」的語辭,來發掘遊魚之喻所隱涵的關鍵:立足之地。在第三節,我循承給意義來進行關於遊魚之喻的解讀。第四節透過「脆弱性」的概念,來解釋我們在成心主導下所失去的一種自然能力。我也透過討論莊書中嬰兒與渾沌這兩個對比形象,來說明脆弱性的導引作用。最後,我總結,莊書提供深具實踐意義的建議,讓人─尤其是身處涵蘊多元價值之現代社會的你我─在所處情境中不懈因應,在任一既定社會脈絡內展開充實的生活,採取具創造性的態度去發掘社會世界中的無限可能性。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 58
許從聖
Tsung-Sheng Hsu
氣相應、性偽合、參於天地─荀子的感通論建構
The Construction of Xunzi’s Correspondence Theory
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《周易•咸卦》彖辭對二氣交感的歷程描述,蘊含自然創造與人文化成的雙重意指。從男女之間相感、親悅到結合的嫁娶行動與事件,發展為生生化育、延續恆久的夫婦對待倫理,也暗示男女媾合的生命繁衍與萬物化生的創造歷程,兩端雖非同質且不對稱,卻有微妙的聯繫與呼應關係,此為感通論的基本內容框架。值得注意的是,《荀子•大略》強調「夫婦之道」於倫理關係中的奠基性地位,實可與《周易•咸卦》所述感通論旨趣相互發明。本文進而深究感通在荀子思想所具有的多向視域與建構進程,擴及〈非相〉、〈性惡〉、〈禮論〉、〈天論〉等重要文獻,梳理氣、性、情、偽、度、參、神明等與感通相涉的核心詞義及相互關係,構成三層動態連貫的感通論體系:一,從「性偽之分」到「性偽合」的發展序階變化,敘明「自我感通」的具體實現歷程與實踐工夫;二,從「度己以繩」到「接人用抴」的推擴實踐,闡發「人我感通」的共在聯繫感受與倫理義涵;三,從「明於天人之分」到「參於天地」的關係轉化與辯證哲思,解明天地自然對人類創建文化生活的方向指引與智慧啟發。
The description of the flow of Qi (氣) in Yi Jing (Book Of Changes)’s “Xian Gua” includes emphasizes not only natural creation but also human culture. From the courting and marriage between men and women, develop the everlasting ethics of the relationship between husband and wife, and at the same time implying that even though they are not one in the same, there is a relationship between the relationship between males and females and also reproduction and change in the universe. This is the basic framework that makes up the theory of correspondence. It is worth noting that Xunzi “Talueh” is the first none Chinese writing to put an emphasises on couple’s ethics and in actually this correspondence theory and the Yi Jing “Xian Gua” are complementary.This paper delves Xunzi’s multidirectional approach to correspondence in the writings of Xunzi, such as: “Fei Xiang” (〈非相〉), “Xing E” (〈性惡〉), “Li Lun” (〈禮論〉) and “Tian Lun” (〈天論〉), and also the interaltionship between corresponce and Qi (氣), human nature, emotion (qing 情), man-made (wei 偽), empathy (du 度), participate (can 參), shen-ming (神明) and so on. Forming a dynamic and coherent correspondence theory system consisting of three layers in sequence: First, explain the concrete realization course and practical work of auto-affection; Second, elucidate the common feeling and ethical significance implied in the process of self-induction with others; Third, to tell the real human experience and response to the nature, the universe, and the ultimate reality.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2019 >
Issue: 58
林薰香
Shing-Shang Lin
論海德格對康德「敬重」之詮釋─《現象學基本問題》:
和《康德與形上學問題》之研究
On Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’s Achtung
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康德於《單純理性限度內的宗教》(Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,1793)指出人格性本身(die Persönlichkeit selbst)乃伴隨與之不可分的敬重之道德法則理念,在《實踐理性批判》(Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,1788)說明敬重是對法則的敬重,是一種通過理智發揮效用的情感,源自純粹實踐理性。海德格對情感與敬重的,於存有論上闡釋道德情感與人格性(海德格稱之為人的本質、主體性)的關係。本文主要討論海德格在《康德與形上學問題》(Kant und das Problem derMetaphysik,1929)與《現象學基本問題》(Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie,1975)對康德的道德情感與敬重概念進行現象學式之詮釋,以瞭解海德格有關敬重的觀點,進而釐清海德格如何將敬重與人的本質建構關聯起來,藉以進一步瞭解敬重對人的本質與實際的自我之構成有何重要性。
In “Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason” (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793), Kant points out that personality itself (die Persönlichkeit selbst) always comes along with the idea of a moral law of respect (Achtung) which is intelligence affecting feeling caused only by pure practical. And Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of feeling and Achtung elucidates the ontological relation between moral feeling and personality (Heidegger calls this the essence of the human or subjectivity).This paper discusses Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik and Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie, specifically, the phenomenological interpretation of moral feeling and the concept of Achtung. The purpose of this paper is to understand how Heidegger relates Achtung to the essential constitution of being of the human, and thereby to grasp the significance of Achtung for the actual construction of the self.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2019 >
Issue: 58
Kok Yong Lee
李國揚
Knowledge and Pragmatic Factors
知識與實用因素
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The stakes-shifting cases suggest that pragmatic factors such as stakes play an important role in determining our intuitive judgments of whether or not S knows that p. This seems to be in conflict with intellectualism, according to which pragmatic factors in general should not be taken into account, when considering whether or not S knows that p. This paper develops a theory of judgments of knowledge status that reconciles intellectualism with our intuitive judgments regarding the stakes-shifting cases. I argue that pragmatic factors affect only our epistemic perspectives, i.e., the ways in which we evaluate S’s epistemic position. Therefore, pragmatic factors only have an indirect impact on our judgments of knowledge status.
在面對風險轉換案例的時候,一般人直覺上覺得,這些案例顯示,諸如風險這類的實用因素(pragmatic factors)對我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識,扮演非常重要的角色。這個觀察似乎會跟智性主義(intellectualism)的主張有所衝突。根據智性主義,當我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識的的時候,實用因素並不是需要考量的因素。這篇文章發展一個知識判斷理論,可以調和我們對風險轉換案例的直覺判斷跟智性主義的衝突。筆者將論證,實用因素不會直接影響我們的知識判斷,而只會通過影響我們的知性角度(epistemic perspective),間接地影響我們的知識判斷。
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