In philosophy of religion, when, if ever, is it better to philosophically engage one another as advocates of competing religions (or secular naturalism) as opposed to conducting a more detached philosophical investigation of each other’s actual religious convictions? We offer a narrative overview of a philosophy of religion seminar we participated in, highlighting questions about the possibility of even understanding persons of different religions and considering when, if ever, one’s own religious convictions should be put on exhibit in teaching philosophy of religion. We defend a “middle path,” advocating the permissibility of some disclosure of religious convictions, but with an openness to role play and a passionate commitment to impartiality in class discussion and grading. This middle path lies in between advocacy models (such as Peter Moser’s, Eleonore Stump’s, and Merold Westphal’s) and more strict neutrality models (such as Michael Rea’s).

Four years ago, I tried assigning blogs as homework to ensure that students came to class prepared for seminar discussions. From the start, it was clear that blogging was having a good effect, but I needed to make many refinements before I was satisfied that I was squeezing the greatest benefit from this device. In this paper, I summarize and explain the fully developed method on which I eventually settled. I first explain what I’m hoping will happen to students over the semester. Then, I list some guiding principles that have pushed me in certain directions as I refined the method. Next, I give a step-by-step account of how the method works, from the syllabus to the classroom. Finally, I consider drawbacks, advantages, and an important objection.

A course in symbolic logic belongs as a requirement in the undergraduate philosophy major. In this paper, which started life as a letter to my departmental colleagues, I consider and respond to several reasons one might have for excluding Logic from the core requirements. I then give several arguments in favor of keeping Logic. The central—and most important—argument is that the lack of a proper background in logic makes it very difficult to approach many relatively straightforward philosophical arguments, let alone the more technical subliteratures of philosophy. In developing this argument, I consider a few core texts and arguments (e.g., Gettier’s classic paper on the analysis of knowledge) and bring out how a student with some background in formal logic would be able to approach the texts and arguments with much greater ease than a student who lacks such a background.

Philosophy and joke telling do not share the same pedigree, but both can have an allied function and purpose. Philosophy and joke telling can help us to organize, interpret, possibly understand, or, at least, hopefully face and confront the fundamental issues of existence.Let me be more precise about what I mean by using humor and jokes in teaching philosophy. Humor, joke telling, can serve as a narrative playlet to metaphorically illuminate a complex philosophical concept. However, every class should not simply be played for laughs and comedic effect. Rather, through the judicious use of joke telling, the instructor needs to create an atmosphere of “respectful playfulness” which allows students an opportunity to comfortably address some of the complexities, confusions, and conundrums of the human condition.

This review article surveys five recent texts in the field of Asian philosophy. The reviewer looks at the practicability of each work for the classroom, as well as for scholars in the field. Strong points of each text are noted, as well as the intricacies of the introductions to each text supplied by the editor or translator of the respective books.The texts reviewed have as their subject China and Confucianism, with the exception of one work on Zen, though the link to China is present in consideration of the history of Zen.