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1. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2003 > Issue: 26
陳榮華 Wing-wah Chan
海德格〈存有與時間〉的Dasein是一個人本主義的概念 (humanistic concept) 嗎?
Is the Concept of Dasein in Heidegger's Being and Time a Humanistic Concept?

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本文要證明:海德格《存有與時間〉中的 Dasein 不是一個人本 主義的概念。我分三部份進行這個工作。首先,我根據〈柏拉圖的 真理理論〉一文,說明人本主義的意涵,它是指:人在思考時,不 以存有為基礎,而以人自己為基礎。然後,我分析〈存有與時間〉 中的方法論和Dasein的存有,指出當海德格說明 Dasein 時,是以事 實性為Dasein 的基礎,因此,雖然《存有與時間〉一書在分析 Dasein 時,是以 Dasein 為核心的,但並不因此是以 Dasein 為它自己的基礎。 由此可以證實, Dasein 不是一個人本主義的概念。最後我要指出,只有預設Dasein不是人本主義的概念,才能一致說明海德格後期哲 學的發展,由此,我更進一步證成Dasein不是人本主義的概念。
2. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2003 > Issue: 26
Francisco Calvo Garzón Francisco Calvo Garzón
Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories?
「簡單性」是否為語義理論所不可忘 者?

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Crispin Wright (1992) has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely ‘minimal' Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. The bulk of this paper will be devoted to showing that an argument involving minimalism about truth which Wright (1997) offersagainst the Inscrutability Thesis fails by reductio. By the end of the paper, we'll see how Wright's proposed frame of' discussion for Realism bears on themetaphysical status of Semantic Theories.
3. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2003 > Issue: 26
Szu-Ting Chen (陳思、廷) The Distinction between Causation and Invariance and Its Implications for the Philosophical Discussion of Economic Theorizing
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Recently, certain philosophers have argued that an explanatory relation is a causal relation that is fundamentally about the invariance of a relation betweenvariables of interest under intervention-i.e., about a manipulable invariant relation. This manipulative theory tends to reduce a causal relation to a manipulable invariant relation. By explicating a case from contemporary econometrics, this paper argues that a manipulable invariant relation can be obtained only when the causal chain or causal structure of the targeted relation is free from disturbing influences. In other words, a manipulable invariant relation can be regarded only as a special kind of causal relation, and so the notion of invariance can never replace the idea of causation. This paper also shows that the distinction between causation and invariance has methodological import concerning the philosophical discussion of economic theorizing and of economic theory development.1. Introduction2. Manipulation, Invariance, Superexogeneity, and Causal Structure2.1 The Manipulability Theory of Causation2.2 The Idea ofWeak Exogeneity2.3 The Idea of Invariance and Its Relation to the Idea of Superexogeneity2.4 Can We Equate a Causal Relation with an Invariant Relation?3. The Methodological Import of the Distinction between Causation and Invariance4. A Causal Structuralist Account of Economic Theorizing and Economic Theory Development5. Conclusion
其他 / other
4. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2003 > Issue: 26
國立臺灣大學哲學論評 1 -25 期論文目錄
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