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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
About Our Contributors
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
David Morris Hegel on the Life of the Understanding
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This article clarifies Hegel’s argument within “Force and the Understanding” in his Phenomenology of Spirit by developing Hegel’s underlying point through discussion of recent and ongoing issues concerning explanation in natural and psychological science. The latter proceeds by way of a critical discussion of the problem of other minds and the “theory theory of mind.” The article thereby shows how and why Hegel’s analysis of the understanding inaugurates a crucial transition in his Phenomenology, from consciousness toself-consciousness and life. Putting Hegel’s underlying points into conversation with recent science shows how his point—that scientific understanding is not abstract but embedded in human life—still speaks to science.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Christopher Tollefsen MacIntyre and the Moralization of Enquiry
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Are there moral norms or virtues, the application or exercise of which are necessary for successful progress in enquiry? This paper considers the work of one thinker who is convinced of an affi rmative answer to this question, Alasdair MacIntyre. For MacIntyre, the possibility of progress in enquiry depends, ultimately, on the way in which the virtues, and related normative requirements such as that demanding narrative unity to a life, shape and govern the context and practice of enquiry. Correlatively, MacIntyre has identified the role that moral failings can play in intellectual error and corrupted forms of enquiry.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
James W. Felt Second-Best Realism and Functional Pragmatism
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The functional pragmatism advocated by Nicholas Rescher derives from the conviction that we have no strict evidence for the existence of extramental reality and therefore must postulate it in order to make any sense of truth, communication, and scientific projects. This essay challenges Rescher’s starting point by arguing that the reason extramental reality cannot be argued to is because it is immediately evident. But then to claim that one must postulate it is to adopt only a second-best kind of realism.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Changchi Hao Wu-Wei and the Decentering of the Subject in Lao-Zhuang: An Alternative Approach in the Philosophy of Religion
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This essay attempts to provide an alternative approach to the philosophy of religion through a new interpretation of Daoist philosophy in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. I argue that Lao-Zhuang’s wu-wei should be understood as a reduction of our existential and conceptual beliefs about the reality of this world. In Lao-Zhuang, wu-wei is related to the theme of decentering of the subject. In order to be a true self, we have to make space at the core of our being for Dao to appear. The authentic selfhood is constituted in its correctrelation to Dao. In Daoist philosophy of religion, the center of gravity in the relation between Dao and the world (or worlds) is shifted from this world to Dao, and the problematic in the philosophy of religion is displaced from a truth-oriented issue to a receptivity issue.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Jeffrey Hause Aquinas on Non-voluntary Acts
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Aquinas argues that an agent’s act may be voluntary, involuntary, or even nonvoluntary. An agent performs a non-voluntary act on these conditions: (a) the agent does not know the act falls under a certain description D, (b) the act under D is not contrary to the agent’s will, and (c) if the agent had known that the act fell under D, the agent would still have performed it. Aquinas’s full account of non-voluntary acts is terse and ambiguous and seems to contradict his fuller, more articulate, and philosophically rich views on voluntary and involuntary acts. The appearance of inconsistency, however, is illusory. Once understood, his account of non-voluntary acts clarifies various aspects of his theory of responsibility that are hard to glean from other discussions and reveals just how strongly Aquinas is inclined to Augustinian internalism.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
John Arthos The Humanity of the Word: Personal Agency in Hermeneutics and Humanism
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Gadamer’s hermeneutic project is an effort to rejoin what he called the “unbroken tradition of rhetorical and humanist culture” to its own thought. My focus here is on the distinctive hermeneutic schematism of persons and culture in conjunction with the Renaissance doctrine of prudence. The complex hermeneutic understanding of human community requires a balancing act that privileges the agency of language and culture by denying the dominion of the sovereign self. Further, it employs a reflux or interanimation that refuses to diminish the dignity of the person. Classical and Christian humanism already had something of this complex notion of agency that served as a seedbed for the hermeneutic achievement. By reading that earlier conception through the lens of his own time, Gadamer’scomplex voicing of personhood expresses the dispersion and unity of human being as a unique balance of classical and modern insight.
feature book review
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Steven T. Kuhn Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers
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book reviews and notices
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Scott Berman Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Gary M. Gurtler Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life
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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Nicholas J. Moutafakis Sense, Reference, and Philosophy
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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Mary T. Clark The Augustinian Person
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13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Patrick H. Byrne Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes
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14. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Joseph W. Koterski Cooperation, Complicity, and Conscience: Problems in Healthcare, Science, Law and Public Policy
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15. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Christopher P. Buckels Notices
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16. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Books Received
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volume index
17. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Volume Index
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articles
18. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 3
Adrian Bardon The Aristotelian Prescription: Skepticism, Retortion, and Transcendental Arguments
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From a number of quarters have come attempts to answer some form of skepticism—about knowledge of the external world, freedom of the will, or moral reasons—by showing it to be performatively self-defeating. Examples of this strategy are subject to the criticism that they fail to shift the burden of proof from the anti-skeptical position, and so fail to establish the epistemic entitlement they seek. To these approaches I contrast one way of understanding Kant’s core anti-skeptical arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s goal is the more modest one of showing the applicability of the concepts of substance and cause to experience, against those who might call such application incoherent or a category mistake. I explain why this goal makes Kant’s approach more promising than those of neo-Kantian practitioners of otherwise structurally-similar strategies.
19. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 3
Firmin DeBranander Stoic Realpolitik
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Thanks to its doctrines of natural right and moral egalitarianism and to its prominent historical role in defying totalitarian government, Stoicism is often cited as a touchstone for liberal democracy. Less well known, however, is an alternate lineage, culminating in a Stoic Realpolitik that emerges in Justus Lipsius’s political writings. The foundation of this Realpolitik becomes increasingly clear in the progression of Stoic thought through Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Tracing this lineage reveals that the subject of politics isfundamentally problematic for Stoicism, especially since the denigration of politics is central to Stoic ethics. The Stoics ultimately arrive at a surprising moral pessimism, evidenced most prominently in Marcus’s Meditations. In Lipsius’s version of Stoic Realpolitik, the populace is characterized as being of inconstant behavior, and Stoicism is viewed as a resource for steeling the prince’s character against the masses, whose moral emendation is hopeless.
20. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 46 > Issue: 3
Jens Timmermann Kant on Conscience, “Indirect” Duty, and Moral Error
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Kant’s concept of conscience has been largely neglected by scholars and contemporary moral philosophers alike, as has his concept of “indirect” duty. Admittedly, neither of them is foundational within his ethical theory, but a correct account of both in their own right and in combination can shed some new light on Kant’s moral philosophy as a whole. In this paper, I first examine a key passage in which Kant systematically discusses the role of conscience, then give a systematic account of “indirect” duties and the function of hypothetical imperatives in the course of their generation. I then turn to the possibility of moral error and the part “indirect” duty can play in its prevention. In conclusion, I try to show how clarifying the concept of “indirect” duty can help us to shed light on the nature of Kantian ethics as a whole.