I call "material continuation" the fact of one material thing or event being followed by another in time. In this article, I address the question why material continuation obtains, as it seems to do. Johanna Seibt's theory of dynamism promises to explain material continuation by reference to Aristotle's concept of energeia. I argue that her account fails to explain how one thing at one time might be followed by another at another

The present article challenges the bifurcation of the world established by Kant, a bifurcation that continues to plague contemporary thinking about science, religion, and morality. This challenge is aided by Whitehead's alternative worldview.

I summarize here the recent scientific achievements exploring the causal chain of solar activity. Following the causal chain has led to a novel comprehensive picture, including system-level regulation of local processes, such as the mass fiows in the solar interior I call attention to some crucial aspects of solar activity and present a series of facts that demand a revision of the old picture, according to which the Sun is a mere "hot ball of gas." For example, the magnetic changes of solar activity are accelerated more than a billion times faster in comparison to theoretical expectations. The closer aspects of the comprehensive picture show that the mass fiows accelerating magnetic changes deviate significantly from their physically prescribed behavior corresponding to the given physical conditions of the solar interior. I argue that they must be orchestrated in a highly sophisticated manner. Another novel aspect that has been found is that the dynamo process is not enough to give an account of the magnetic cycle, since a regulative factor is needed to make the dynamo a machine. I show that the existence of a machine within the Sun introduces novel conceptual issues transcending the conceptualframework of physics. The novel problems have guided my search for the ultimate causes of solar activity toward biology. I present arguments showing the difference between the thermodynamic behavior of far-from-equilibrium open systems and the non-physical behavior of solar activity initiated by biological causes determining and organizing quantum uncertainties. Remarkably, the results fit adequately with the Whiteheadean view of organizational duality and show that the Sun can be regarded as a compound individual

Theodicy wrestles with suffering and pain, while seeking to understand God's engagement with these realities. Cancer raises similar questions, while focusing on specific aspects of those questions. Cancer appears to challenge many aspects of Christian doctrine, in particular issues regarding the origin of sin, Christology, and ultimately ones doctrine of God. This article explores how my own personal diagnosis of colon cancer has led to an exploration and re-evaluation of these traditional doctrines and their relevance for my own faith journey. The realities of cancer, and random cell mutation as an evolutionary driver, appear to call into question traditional understandings of the origin of suffering and sin, and, I would argue, the very role of Jesus. A process theology that redefines core features of the nature of God is proposed as one way of addressing these doctrines and their impact for faith. These features will note the limited nature of God with regard to power and knowledge as well as the nature of a God who truly risks.

The current ecological and global crises call us to reexamine our understanding of ourselves, our relationships, and the world in which we live together as well as the values that shape and determine our mutual participation within this shared world process. This article engages the dynamic relationship between the thought and writings of C. G. Jung and A. N. Whitehead, two insightful contemplative visionaries, exploring the philosophical and spiritual vision that arises from this interaction, with special attention to the emergence of principles and values that might serve as guides for reflection, evolution, and mutual understanding.

In this article I argue against the claim that "actual entity" and "actual occasion" are synonymous in Whitehead. My examination of these terms will help to illuminate the role of "society" in Whitehead's philosophy and to prepare the way for a fruitful comparison of process thought and contemporary systems theory in the sciences.

This article is an exploration of the problem of identity in Whitehead. Both the Platonic and the nominalistic tendencies in Whitehead are analyzed. His theory of eternal objects is criticized and a process view of identity based on tropes is defended.

In this article, I discuss two recent accounts of potential philosophical links between Whitehead and Wittgenstein, one by Jerry H. Gill (Process Studies 43.1) and a response to it by Richard McDonough (Process Studies 45.2). I argue that Gill and McDonough fail to do full justice to the views of Whitehead and Wittgenstein on language and the nature of philosophy. I also argue that they miss an obvious link between Whitehead and Wittgenstein that would have made the engagement with their works more productive. Borrowing a metaphor from Wittgenstein, I argue that Gill and McDonough not only fail to see what is open to view regarding the views of Whitehead and Wittgenstein on language and philosophy, but also regarding their agreement on the transcendent nature of values as such.

This is the second installment in a series that reports on the progress of some of the more interesting discoveries emerging from ongoing work on the new and comprehensive critical edition of Whitehead being published by Edinburgh University Press. This installment deals, as the subtitle indicates, with the emergence of Whitehead’s metaphysics from 1925 until 1929. The first installment appeared in Process Studies 45.1.

Bergson imputes the generation of false problems in philosophy to the idea of nothingness and negative concepts. Yet, all his books are fraught with oppositional thinking, such as the oppositions between space and time, quantity and quality, life and matter. Understandably, this apparent discrepancy has led a philosopher like Merleau-Ponty to speak of inconsistency, while Jankélévitch and others counter the charge of inconsistency by arguing that Bergsonism embraces operational opposition as opposed to substantial opposition. This article disagrees with both interpretations and proposes a solution based on the need to distinguish between the level of intuitive vision of the unity of nature and the level of representative analysis whose defining feature is that it operates by means of opposing concepts. The progression from representation to intuition transcends opposition and unites life and matter in the vision of a self-surpassing effort or élan.

Whitehead’s understanding of efficient causation is developed in reaction against the prevailing worldview of his scientific and philosophical predecessors’ material abstraction, bodily sensationalism, subject-object bifurcation, and partial subjectivism. Whitehead believed these ideas precluded the development of any satisfactory account of causal relation and connectivity. His response is to offer a forensic account of the nature of subjective experience within which causal efficacy could be accommodated. Yet Whitehead’s position has its own problems. In response, this article argues for a primordial basis to causal connectivity and for understanding physical causation in terms of conceptual realization.

This article explores the ontological status of trees from a Whiteheadian panexperientialist viewpoint; it also explores how our relationship with trees affects who we are as human beings.

This article compares research in neuroscience regarding the right and left hemispheres of the brain, particularly in the work of Iain McGilchrist and Robert Ornstein, with Whitehead’s perception in the mode of causal efficacy and in the mode of presentational immediacy, respectively.