Salazar had always been opposed to the Human Rights such as the French Revolution, in 1789, realized them. On the contrary, Opposition has always revindicated them requiring their replacement and denunciating their constant violation by the regimen. We would expected the regimen should take avantage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) approval to denunciate, once more, the horrors of that Revolution, the abstract ballast of the Human Rights comitted in it and the recent disorders of our I Republica; we would expect Opposition to make the most of this opportunity in order to denunciate the violence of the regimen forces and the abolishment of freedom. Neither the Government nor the Opposition assumed their positions. Because of political-strategical reasons: Government didn’t want to affront the U.S.A. and England which promised to support the regimen and the “Empire”; Opposition because of its compromises towards the unitary policy of MUD (Movimento de Unidade Democrática) and the disillusion that the Allies support to the Estado Novo caused. Both, reduced to silence whats divided them essentially - The Human Rights - in order to preserve the secondary.

Da ns cet article, en jou ant, en un certain sens, Kant contre Heidegger, on a essayé de penser les droits d e l’homme a partir de l’instance qui les fonde, celle du rapport. On a montré de quelle façon l’émergence de la société civile, avec les temps modernes, rend caduc tout essai (comme ceux qu’on a connu sous le romantisme) de récupérer le modèle grec de la polis, en tant que modèle de la pure sociabilité. Pour finir, on remarque que la seule voie d’accès à cette question qui soit à la hauteur des problèmes posés par notre temps, nous contraint à abandonner toute pensée du “propre” ou de la “propriété” (qui est encore celle de Heidegger), à la faveur d ’une pensée de l’autre.

Caractériser la rationalité qui fond les Droits de l’Homme dans la Modernité, en vue d’identifier l’élément de fragilité qui aura permis la rupture totalitaire avec la tradition humaniste de l’Occident et le conséquent génocide de groupes humains “superflus” et “décartables”, est le seuil de not re réfléxion. L’exercice réflexif sur “l’expérience limite” de privation de tous les droits est l’expression d’un éffort ayant pour but échapper au piège de la généricité abstraite qui caractérise l’utilisation “rhétorique” des Droits de l’Homme. Surmonter ce vide formel, aussi bien qu’un concept d'universalité, marqué idéologiquement par les doctrines fonctionalistes et le subjectivisme radical, est l’objet final de ce travail qui transforme en complices et en complémentair es les éfforts de Hannah Arendt et Chaïm Perelman, dans l’entreprise de “réconstruction” des Droits de l’Homme.

This paper has the purpose of showing the way the concept of narrative identity, suggested by Ricoeur, enables us to re-evaluate the paradoxes resulting from the two classic criteria (“body” and “memory”) used to solve the problem of personal identity.

This paper tries to show that psychiatric patients must be considered as moral persons and not just as individuals whose mental health needs to be cared for. To do that, it analyses the various senses of the word person in its moral, social and juridical dimensions and relates them with the two main ethic principles: the principle of autonomy and the principle of beneficence, arriving to the conclusion that the first one must be fully respected by means of an “informed consent” or at least an “assent” given by the patient in case new treatments are required or when being subject to medical experimentation.

Dans cet essai, on analyse le célèbre opuscule où Kant, dans sa réponse à Benjamin Constant, refuse, comme étant moralement et juridiquement indéfensable, le droit de mentir, même s’il est fondé sur des motivations philantropiques. Le caractère inacceptable du mensonge, si frequemment cité pour caractériser le rigorisme éthique du philosophe de Königsberg, vient ici abordé en liaison avec d’autres topiques de la pensée éthique et politique de Kant, soit le concept d’impératif catégorique, soit le refus d’admettre le droit de résistance.

Education plays a very special role in Dewey’s System of thought. And according to Dewey, science, being knowledge at its best, has an unsurpassable educational value which every genuine democracy must take seriously. Here I try to show how and why Dewey developed this point of view. I start by considering how, in Dewey’s System, education is seen as a form of experience deeply significant to philosophy. Then I try to stress the most inte resting points concerning Dewey’s view of education as a social process. This leds me to explain why Dewey thought that the best kind of education should occur in a democratic environment and what does he mean by that. At this point it becomes possible (I hope) to effectively understand where Dewey saw the educational value of scientific knowledge and how, according to him, should that value be promoted. Since the superiority of scientific knowledge lies in its method, Dewey argued, science becomes deprived of all its educational value whenever is taught, as ususal, as a mere ready-made subject-matter.

En partant des derniers paragraphes de la cinquième parti du Discours de la Méthode, on a reconstitué la formulation cartésienne de la perception d’un autre moi. Les critères de l’usage du langage et de la plasticité du comportement ont été analysés à la lumière de l’idée d’une machine universelle et du test de Turing. On conclut de la faiblesse de l’argument cartésien sur l’irréductibilité de la pensée à un dispositif machinal. En tant qu’issue de la difficulté, on propose une révision de la façon cartésienne de caractérisation de la pensée à partir du concept d’expérience, tout en abandonnant le thème d’une perception interne incommunicable et intémoignable.

The aim of this paper is to investigate a crucial period in the development of the young Hegel (Jena, 1801-1803). Watching the decline and fall of the Holy German-Roman Empire and the Napoleonic Wars, Hegel laid a first theoretical foundation of the modern State through an allegorical interpretation of Orestes' myth (Eumenides, Aeschylus) as a sort of study-case of the "tragedy in the ethical life". Hegel atempts in this way to overcome the decomposition of the old classical ideals, which takes place at the time of the emerging egoism of the bourgeois capitalism. The proposed solution by Hegel in 1803 is the last attempt to build a new religion on the basis of the reconciliation of the People with their own destiny.

The present work intends to show that Maurice Blondel's philosophy follows a triadic structure made up by the undissociable bond between thought, being and action, which is not just the resuit of the evolution achieved in the Trilogy but that was already present since L'Action (1893). Firstly we briefly outline the itinerary from L'Action (1893) to the Trilogy, underlining the continuity that Blondel ascribes to his progress coming later to make evident the unity of his philosophical project. Secondly we will consider the aspects revealing a triadic structure in the philosophy of action: the sense of action as mediation, the dialectics of action and the logic of action. Finally we will show how blondelian philosophy, in its characteristic structure, corresponds, quoting the author, to an "unitarian trinity".

In this paper the philosophical foundations of the first Portuguese Constitution are submitted to critical analysis. Drafted in the aftermath of the 1820 Revolution, the Constitution of 1822 is deeply determined by contradictory tensions and forces. We may see in it the trace of the freedom trends developed in the Enlightenment period and led to practical terms in the dramatic battleground of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Constitution of 1822 reflect also the energetic resistance from the conservative sectors and values of the Portuguese society and also the coming influence of the Restoration Age political philosophy, aimed to fight the rationalistic paradigm of natural right constitutional theories.

Ce texte cherch e à comprendre les rapports entre la philosophie et la poésie dans la pensée de Maria Zambrano. De ce fait, il exploitera le concept de raison poétique comme une façon d'essayer une expression de la réalité qui soit à la fois écoute et parole, ou bien ouverture et réponse. Pour María Zambrano la poésie sait comment y réussir et, à son avis, la philosophie le pourra aussi réaliser, si elle renonce à un discours autarcique et tout à fait éthique. Ainsi elle l'a essayé en choisissant la penumbra tocada de alegría.

Any analysis of the Hippocratic anthropology must begin by taking a stand on two quite different issues. On the one hand, it must ascertain a precise and definite meaning of the word ‘Hippocratic’ in such a context, considering the historical problems surrounding the 'real' Hippocrates and the doctrinal heterogeneity of the Hippocratic collection. On the other hand, it must justify the very possibility of an anthropology within the Hippocratic tradition, by accommodating it with the obvious animadversion that its most representative works show towards any philosophical or speculative inquiry. The first problem can be solved by purely historical means, viz. by restricting the object of analysis to the texts that admittedly represent the views of the Hippocratic school. Not so with the second one, which constitutes the truesignificant problem from a philosophical point of view and with which the present article is therefore concerned. After discussing the texts where the question on the nature of man is posed (Ancient Medicine XX, On the Nature of Man I-IV), a general survey of the Hippocratic conception of the theoretical and scientific foundations of clinical practice is given, in order to understand the Statement according to which it is to medicine, and not to philosophy, that an answer to such a question truly belongs. From such a survey a thesis arises: that, according to the Hippocratic perspective, the appropriate answer to the question on the nature of man is not the one that seeks to determine what man is, even by means of the empirical methods of medicine, but the one that reshapes the question itself, thereby replacing the philosophical focus on the knowing of man, for the sake of knowledge, by the clinical focus on the caring of man, for the sake of man himself.

La synthèse est la question cruciale qui met en marche la perspectivation transcendentale de Kant - une logique de la synthèse - dont les apories, qui se manifestent clairement dès 1789, ont déclenché la naissance de l’Idéalisme Allemand. Celui-ci poursuivra, dans de différentes directions, le but de les intégrer et de les résoudre de façon systématique. Le plus ancien Programme... condense l'effervescence productive autour du thème et resserre les motifs directeurs des positions de Hölderlin, de Hegel et de Schelling - auteurs qui se rejoignent dans l'affirmation de la nature dialectique de la synthèse paradigmatique de l'identité et de la différence. Ils élèvent la catégorie de la relation à concept nucléaire d'une philosophie de l'esprit, axe d'une résolution polysémique du problème de la synthèse.

Die griechiesche Definition des Menschenwesens ist Heidegger nach die des Sophokles in das erste Stasimon der Antigone, wo es durch das Wort deinón charakterisiert wird. Nachdem Hölderlin davon zwei Versionen hintergelassen hat, hat auch Heidegger zweimal (1935 und 1943) versucht, diesen Chor ins Deutsch zu übersetzen. Vorliegende Arbeit versucht die Entwicklung der heideggerschen Ontologie des Menschen aus seiner Interpretation des Sophokles und der Übersetzungen Hölderlins und durch eine Vergleichung seiner beiden Versionen herauszuheben.

This paper is part of an on-going study of Hume's place in the genesis of liberal political thought. An analysis of his so-called "economic" essays makes use of Adam Smith’s construction of "mercantilism" to pinpoint Hume's new conceptualisation of work, consumption ("luxury") and culture, as main categories in the analysis of modern "commercial society" in its opposition to ancient "republican" concepts of moral and political life. An attempt is made to relate Hume's new concept of individuality with the main thrust of his epistemology and metaphysics.