論 著 / articles |
1.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 46
丁 福 寧
Paschal Fu-Ning Ting
斯多噶學派的視為己有(Oikeiōsis)
Stoics on Oikeiōsis
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
視為己有(oikeiōsis)概念是斯多噶學派倫理學的特色。這一概念在它 的泛神物質一元論的本體基礎建立上,宇宙是由神、人和自然世界共同組成 的一個完整的神聖實體。神聖理性掌握和管理宇宙整體。物質是唯一真實 的。人是由靈魂與身體結構起的有組織的整全個體。視為己有具有發展的歷 程。在第一階段,所有具有靈魂的動物,當依照自然生活,將自己自然狀態 中所有的視為己有,努力地保存自己。這是來自動物的本能。人在出生之始,如同動物依照本能生活,及至成年,理性方發展出來。在第二階段人的依照 自然生活當是依照理性生活。第二階段的視為己有是人當意識和認識到依自身的自然狀態的生活亦即追求至善和渡德行的生活。在第三階段,鑒於所有的人具有相同的理性,同屬於一個人類大家族,oikeiōsis 因而具有社會面 向,人要將他人的善視為己有。人對他者有責任,要愛人如己。本論文旨在論證斯多噶學派的視為己有之所以建立在泛神物質一元 論,因它反對任何形式的二元論,特別是柏拉圖的二元論;非物質世界和物 質世界之間的二元對立,及人的靈魂與身體之間的二元對立,甚至理性與非 理性之間的二元對立。斯多噶學派的視為己有概念不僅從宇宙是一整體,且 從人是有組織的整全個體探討人與自己,與他人,與自然世界的關係。這種 整全的概念正是柏拉圖否認的。
The concept of oikeiōsis is the characteristic of Stoic ethics. The ontological foundation of the oikeiōsis is based on its pantheistic material monism. Thecosmos is constituted by god (gods), humans and natural world as a complete divine substance. The whole cosmos is controlled and directed by the divinelogos. For the stoics, matter is the only true reality. Man is joined by soul and body as a structured wholistic self. The oikeiōsis is in developing processes.Living in accordance with nature and making all those belong to oneself as one’s own is the first stage of oikeiōsis at the moment of the birth of all the animals,including humans. At this stage animals attain their oikeiōsis by their instincts. At the beginning of its birth, a baby lives in agreement with its nature just as theway animals do. When it grows up, as its reason develops, living in accordance with nature turns out to be living in accordance with reason. The second stage ofoikeiōsis is then to attain summum bonum, leading a virtuous life, since man as rational being is capable of recognizing what his constitution is. Because allmen possess the same reason and belong to the same human family, oikeiōsis by nature has social dimension. At the third stage, a man should take intoaccount of his fellow’s well-being as his own oikeiōsis. A man should love the others as he loves himself.This paper tries to argue why the Stoics’ oikeiōsis concept based on its pantheistic material monism. The reason is its objection to any forms of dualism, especially the Platonic dualism; the dualistic opposition between the immaterial and material worlds, that of the psyche and body, and even that of rational and irrational. The Stoics’ oikeiōsis is not only based on its idea of the wholistic cosmos, but also found on that of the structured wholistic self; i.e. the psychophysical whole and the relations between a human being with itself, with the others, and with the natural world. This kind of wholistic ideas of the cosmos and of humans are what Plato denied.
|
|
|
2.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 46
王文 方
Wen-Fang Wang
抽象與具體事物的區分
Concrete Objects Distinction
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
大多數當代哲學家認為,這個世界裡的事物可以被互相排斥而又共同窮 舉地區分成兩個類:一類是具體的事物類,另一類則是抽象的事物類。問題 在於:這兩類事物之間的區別究竟何在?Hoffman 與Rosenkrantz(2003)曾 經論證說,常見的、對於抽象/具體事物的區分方式存在著一些明顯的問 題,而他們主張以一種新穎的、在他們看來沒有問題的方式去作出這兩類事 物之間的區別。本論文旨在以他們批評其它區分時所使用的策略與標準而去 反對他們所提出的區分,並從而論證兩個要點。首先,本文論證說,抽象/ 具體事物之所以不容易(甚至不可能)找到一個可信的區分方式,原因相當 可能在於:我們對該區分所擁有的任何直覺都是許多不等價與/或混含的區 分互相混淆的結果。其次,本文論證說,抽象/具體事物的區分本身其實不 具有任何哲學上的重要性,因而是一個可以不必深究的問題。
Most contemporary philosophers believe that things in the world can be exhaustively and exclusively divided into two categories: abstract objects and concrete ones, and a main “problem” about this division is where exactly the line between these two categories should be drawn? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2003) argued that every ordinary distinction between these two categories was subject to some serious problems and counterexamples, and they therefore proposed a novel distinction that they believed to be completely unproblematic. This paper argues against their proposal by appealing to the same strategy and criterion that they set up for other proposals. This paper also argues for two other points. First, it argues that the fundamental reason why it is so hard (even impossible) to find “the right” distinction between abstract and concrete objects is that philosophers’ “intuition” about the distinction is nothing but the result of conflation and confusion of several non-equivalent and/or vague distinctions. Second, it argues that the problem of the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is of no philosophical significance; it is, therefore, a pseudo problem that need not be investigated at all.
|
|
|
3.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 46
鄭喜 恆
Hsi-Heng Cheng
社群與個體:比較裴爾士早期與詹姆士的 實用主義真理觀與實在觀
The Community and the Individual: A Comparative Study of Peirce's Early and James's Pragmatic Views of Truth and Reality
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
裴爾士與詹姆士通常被並列為實用主義的共同創建者,但是兩人的實用 主義哲學實有相當的差異。本文從「個人探究」與「社群探究」這兩個層次 的區分入手來比較裴爾士早期與詹姆士的實用主義實在觀與真理觀、以及兩 人對於經驗探究方法的刻畫,並且指出裴爾士認為「真理」、「實在」與「經 驗探究方法」必須在社群探究層次上才能獲得恰當的闡釋,然而詹姆士堅持 從個人探究層次來闡釋這些觀念,這也可以解釋為何詹姆士的實用主義真理 觀曾經遭受到如此多的質疑與誤解。
Peirce and James have been regarded as co-founders of pragmatism, but their pragmatisms differ significantly. This paper examines and compares, onthe basis of the distinction between the levels of community and individual inquiry, Peirce’s early and James’s pragmatic views of truth, reality, and methodof inquiry; and points out that Peirce argues that these three notions could be satisfactorily explicated only on the level of community inquiry, whereas Jamesinsists on characterizing them on the level of individual inquiry─this can explain why James’s pragmatic view of truth has suffered severe objections and misunderstandings.
|
|
|
4.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 46
蔡龍 九
Lung-Chiu Tsai
王陽明「知行合一」的再研議
A Revaluation of Wang Yang Ming’s “Zhi Hsin He Yi”
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
本文欲釐清王陽明論述「知行合一」時的細部可議之處。當代前輩學者 們曾針對此「知行合一」問題提出多種看法,包含留意到「一念發動處」是 否適用於「知行合一」的教法。陳來先生針對此處提出「重行」之說,而李 明輝先生則以「意念屬行」的方式來解消此糾葛……等。針對前輩學者們的 研究成果,筆者欲補充說明有關「知行合一」與「意念」細部關聯,並在陽 明所認同的「知行合一」架構下,重新論說「善念」、「惡念」是否屬「行」 的問題,並針對前述兩位前輩學者的看法做出調和,且回歸陽明論說「知行合一」時的主要涵義。
I will focus upon the arguments of Wang Yang Ming’s theory of “Zhi Hsin He Yi”(知行合一) in this paper. Concerning this issue, scholars have proposed various interpretations, pondering whether “Yi Nian Fa Dong Chu” (一念發動處) is applicable to “Zhi Hsin He Yi.” For instance, Chen Lai accentuates “Chong Hsin” (重行) and argues that “Yi Nian Fa Dong Chu” is not applicable to “Zhi Hang He Yi.” Besides Li Ming Hui suggests that “Yi Nian”(意念) is also an “act” in “Zhi Hsin He Yi” so as to solve the entanglement. Inspired by these researches, I intend to analyze the intricate relationship between “Zhi Hang He Yi” and “Yi Nian.” Furthermore, I will reevaluate whether “Shan Nian”(善念) and “Er Nian”(惡念) can be categorized as an “act” in Wang Yang Ming’s theoretical framework. Finally, I attempt toassimilate the arguments proposed by Chen Lai and Li Ming Hui while returning to the core principle of Wang Yang Ming’s “Zhi Hsin He Yi.”
|
|
|
5.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 46
陳平 坤
Ping-Kun Chen
聖嚴禪教之安心法門─「看話禪」與「無住」 思想是融貫的嗎?
The Dharma Approach for Pacifying the Mind in the Chan Teachings of Sheng Yen: Is the Chan Practice of “Huatou” Consistent with the Thought of “Non-Abiding”?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
「看話禪」是中華禪門的著名禪修方法,而「無住」則為《六祖壇經》 的根本思想。本論文參酌聖嚴法師所教授的看話禪法,嘗試探討「看話禪」 與「無住」思想是否融貫一致的問題,藉以針對看話禪法提出若干省思。本論文認為,看話禪法在義理上所預設的,是《楞伽經》中認為妄念可 斷而且應當斷除淨盡的思想,而不是《六祖壇經》中所說妄念不可斷而且不 應該起心動念要將它們斷除淨盡的思想。換言之,真正與看話禪法相融貫 的,是主張「捨念清淨」的如來藏心常住思想,而不是宣說「念念不住」的 般若法空無住思想;亦即是北宗禪思想,而不是南宗禪思想。因此,「看話 禪」作為一種禪修方法,在思想和方法一貫的意義下,更準確地說,乃是屬 於北宗禪修之道,而不是屬於南宗禪修之道。雖然「看話禪」也是解脫成佛 的方便法門之一,但是如果根據慧能在《六祖壇經》中所教禪法來看,則它 並不是貫徹始終能讓人究竟「安心」的修行法門;除非採取聖嚴教授看話禪 法時的類似辦法,亦即借助一些來自《六祖壇經》乃至般若經典的觀念,扣 緊「無住」思想而把它導入能夠發揮究竟安心效果的「念念不住」之禪觀實 踐活動中。
“Kanhua Chan”, normally known as the Chan practice of huatou, is a famous method in the Chinese Chan tradition, while “non-abiding” is a fundamental thought in the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch. Based on the Chan method of huatou taught by Master Sheng Yen, this thesis tries to investigate whether there is consistence between the Chan practice of huatou and the thought of “non-abiding”, so as to put forward some critical comments on the Chan method of huatou. This thesis points out that the Chan practice of huatou presupposes the thought of Lankavatara Sutra that deluded thoughts can and should be eliminatedcompletely, rather than the thought as expressed by Huineng the Sixth Patriarch in the Platform Sutra that deluded thoughts need not be eliminated and thatone should not give rise to the thought of eliminating them completely. In other words, what is consistent with the Chan practice of huatou is the thoughtof ever-abiding mind of tathagata-garbha that advocates “the complete elimination of deluded thoughts,” rather than the prajna thought of non-abiding that advocates “non-abiding from one thought-moment to another,” so it is a method that follows the Chan principle of Northern School, rather than that of Southern School.Precisely speaking, therefore, the Chan method of huatou is, judged by the characteristics of its method, a Chan approach pertaining to the Northern School, not the Southern School. Although it is also one of the expedient Dharma methods for achieving liberation and buddhahood, it is, from the perspective of Huineng’s Chan teaching, not a method of practice that can truly help people pacify their mind ultimately, unless one adopts the manner Master Sheng Yen used in teaching the Chan practice of huatou, a manner that, based on some concepts derived from the prajna sutras and the Platform Sutra, strictly adheres to the thought of “non-abiding,” guiding it to the method of Chan practice that can ultimately bring about the effect of pacifying the mind.
|
|
|
6.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 45
孫雲 平
Yun-Ping Sun
歷史與人生─尼采於《不合時宜之觀察》 對歷史方法論與目的論之批判
History and Life: Nietzsche’s Criticism of Historical Methodology and Teleology in Unfashionable Observations
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
本文嘗試釐清尼采於〈歷史對人生之利弊〉一文中對於歷史的觀點以及 其對歷史跟人生關係的主張。其中主要說明尼采於本篇論文如何批判「歷史」 目的論及歷史書寫的方法論:尼采認為人類活動以及歷史本身沒有終極目 的、歷史書寫不可能達至客觀的要求。換言之,追求客觀性目標的歷史書寫 將因為作為純粹的理論性知識而成為人類生活與行動的阻礙、使人類的生命 萎縮與僵化。歷史知識以及記憶在尼采的眼中,成為人類生命之自主性創造 與實踐的絆腳石。藉此尼采展示人類個體的生命特徵:生命不僅不可能永恆 不朽、甚至並非實體性的存在、同時不必然是合乎理性、道德的與正義的。生命是必朽的、是一個不斷流變的、及難以理性掌握的現象。通過對歷史與歷史書寫態度的分析,尼采強調生命必須不斷地透過自主的抉擇、行動與實 踐來自我實現與自我超越。
This paper tries to elucidate what Nietzsche’s view of history and his thesis about the relationship between history and life would be in his essay On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for the Life. It is above all to explain how Nietzsche criticizes the teleology of history and the methodology of historiography in this article: Nietzsche claims that there would be no ultimate destination of human activities and the history itself, and that historical writing could not fulfill the objective standard. In another words, the historical writing which runs after the goal of objectivity would, as purely theoretical knowledge, become an obstacle of human life and action, and would then wither and ossify the human life. Historical knowledge and memory would be, in the sight of Nietzsche, a stone of stumbling to autonomous creativity and practice of human life. By this Nietzsche demonstrates the characteristics of human individual life: Neither can life be eternal and immortal, nor would it even be a substantial being; at the same time, it would not necessarily be rational, moral and just. Life is mortal and is a perpetually changing and unfathomable phenomenon. By analyzing the attitude toward history and historical writing, Nietzsche lays the emphasis that life would have to realize itself and surpass itself by the autonomous determination, action and practice.
|
|
|
7.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 45
沈享 民
Hsiang-Min Shen
朱熹批判「觀過知仁」與「知覺為仁」之 探討─對比於程明道與謝上蔡的詮釋進路
Zhu Xi’s Critique of the Hu Xiang Scholars’ Understanding of “Humaneness”: An Analysis of How Zhu Xi’s View Differs from Hsieh Liang-Tso’s as Contrasted with Cheng Hao’s Interpretation
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
本文研究朱熹與湖湘學者的兩個辯論:「觀過知仁」與「知覺為仁」,並 論證朱熹對謝良佐與湖湘諸學者的義理之理解並非無據。首先,本文檢視由 朱熹書信與相關文獻所保存下來的論辯內容,並討論朱熹之所以反對湖湘學 者以「知覺」定義「仁」的理據。朱熹認為仁不是一種高妙玄虛的知覺,仁 雖不是知覺本身,但有仁德的人必有知覺。依朱熹,仁專指心之德,即心靈 的卓越品質;有仁德的人以義理為知覺內容,而非只是知覺;知覺本身屬於 智而不是仁。進一步,本文論證:湖湘學者之所以認定知覺為仁,其理由在 於繼受了謝良佐所表述「仁」的內涵,後者遺落了程顥彰顯仁的生動明澈所 善用的類比或譬喻;相對地,謝良佐的表述幾乎接近以定義的方式呈現。是以,即便是朱熹錯解了湖湘學者的義理,在表述方式上,其實事出有因。
This paper focuses on two famous debates concerning “humaneness” between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars. Based on the survey of literature, this paper tries to justify, at least partly, what Zhu Xi comprehends about the philosophical position of Hu Xiang School. According to Zhu Xi’s philosophy, “humaneness” specifically labels the complete virtue of mind which exemplifies excellent qualities. On the one hand, Zhu Xi objects to the claim of those Hu Xiang scholars that“humaneness” can be defined as “vivid perception”; on the other hand, he argued that perception is by nature attributed to the intellectual virtue, although the humane person certainly possesses the competence of perception. As a matter of fact, the key point of the two debates between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars is how to treat Hsieh Liang-Tso’s interpretation of humaneness.Furthermore, this paper argues that Cheng Hao, Hsieh’s teacher, illustrated distinctively the concept of humaneness in his own analogical or metaphorical way, but Hsieh’s formulation of it is akin to definition of a certain kind. This missed link or the rhetorical nuance is the reason why the Hu Xiang scholars follow Hsieh’s approach to humaneness and Zhu Xi has to argue against their ideas of humaneness.
|
|
|
8.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 45
楊植 勝
Chih-Sheng Yang
辯證法與現象學—黑格爾 《精神現象學》的方法論問題
Dialectic and Phenomenology: Reflections on the Methodology of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
黑格爾的哲學方法向來說是辯證法,而辯證法則向來說是「正-反-合」 的形式。本文首先批評這兩種說法,接著依據《精神現象學》的文本,說明 黑格爾在作品裡明白表述的方法是現象學的方法,而不是辯證法的方法。本 文亦檢討其他的詮釋說法。至於辯證法,本文依據文本的分析,論證它並非 黑格爾使用的方法,而是他的形上學。
It is said that Hegel’s method is dialectic, while the dialectical method is said to be the form of ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’. This paper argues that both these sayings are legends which lack support from the text. It then studies the text of Phenomenology of Spirit and advocates that what Hegel talks about in his work is the method of phenomenology. It also surveys and criticizes the other interpretations. As for dialectic, this paper proposes in accordance with the text to ascribe it to Hegel’s metaphysics rather than his method.
|
|
|
9.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 45
王榮 麟
Rong-Lin Wang
論羅森堡的達爾文式化約論
On Rosenberg’s Darwinian Reductionism
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
羅森堡(2006)主張生物學化約論。但他所鼓吹的化約論是「達爾文式 的」,這指的是達爾文所發現的天擇在決定生物學化約論應該採取什麼形 式,以及化約能夠進行到的最低層級為何等問題上,都發揮了舉足輕重的關 鍵作用。由於目前大多數的生物學哲學家皆為反化約論者,所以羅森堡在論 證時先針對他們的三項考量作出診斷:第一,內格爾(Nagel)的化約模型 無法應用在生物學上。第二,麥爾(Mayr)在臨近說明(proximate explanation) 和終極說明(ultimate explanation)之間所作出的區分。第三,杜布然斯基 (Dobzhansky)的名言:除非從演化來看,否則生物學中沒有任何一件事情 說得通。在這篇論文中,我將批判地檢視羅森堡的達爾文式化約論是否成立。我會先說明並且分析羅森堡如何藉著重新檢討上述的三項考量,而得出 達爾文式化約論的主張。之後,我將論證達爾文式的化約論隱含有內在的張 力:它既是達爾文式的,也是內格爾式的。在如此之張力的局限之下,第一、 它很難說服如同麥爾一樣主張生物學享有完全自主性與獨特性的生命科學 家們。第二、它也無法追求理想的內格爾式的科學化約圖像;它甚至也無法 交代為什麼在理化科學的所有定律之中,天擇原理會如此與眾不同。第三、 它會使得天擇原理無法與物理主義相吻合。我的結論會是:在探討生物學的 說明或化約模式時,不應該比照理化科學從定律取向來進行,而是應該更顧 及生物學之獨特的學科特性。
Rosenberg (2006) argues for reductionism in biology, and he has a special name for the position he adopts: Darwinian Reductionism (DR). The reason why it is dubbed Darwinian is that natural selection plays a key role in answering questions as to what form reductionism should take and what is the lowest level that biological explanations can be reduced to. Given that most contemporary philosophers of biology are anti-reductionists, Rosenberg begins his argument with a diagnosis of why they have been led to embrace the antireductionism: (1) the inapplicability of Nagelian account of reduction to biological sciences; (2) Mayr’s distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations; and (3) the literal truth of Dobzhansky’s dictum that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. In this paper, I will critically examine Rosenberg’s DR. I will begin with an analysis of how Rosenberg responds to the anti-reductionists’ considerations, and how he is led step by step to DR. Then I will argue that an internal intension is implicit in DR, for it turns out to be not only Darwinian, but also Nagelian. Such an intension, as I will argue, brings some troubles to DR: (1) DR has difficulties convincing biologists who agree with Mayr that biology, as a discipline, is unique and autonomous. (2) DR is forced to abandon the ideal unification of all physical sciences, based on the Nagelian account of reductionism. In addition, DR has difficulties explaining why the principle of natural selection, among all laws in the physical sciences, turns out to be the only one law in its kind. (3) Ironically and to Rosenberg’s surprise, DR has difficulties rendering the principle of natural selection compatible with the physicalism. The critical examination of DR leads me to the conclusion: if we aim to figure out how explanation and reduction in biology proceed, instead of confining ourselves to the law-based account, which is modeled on the physical sciences, we should pay more attention to how biology is distinct from the physical sciences.
|
|
|
10.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2013 >
Issue: 45
劉保 禧
Po Hei, Lau
智的直覺與想像力 ─牟宗三與海德格論有限性
Intellectual Intuition and Imagination: Mou Zongsan and Heidegger on Finitude
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
牟宗三的康德詮釋重視「智的直覺」,海德格的康德詮釋則重視「想像 力」,兩者看似互不相干,其實隱藏著一場有限與無限的角力。海德格在《康 德與形而上學問題》指出認知一般之本質在於直觀,而感性直觀的接受性正 是人類認知有限性的根源。概括來說,就是以下兩個命題:(1)人只有感性 直觀;(2)人是有限的。牟宗三在《智的直覺與中國哲學》譯述了《康德書》 的相關內容,並且宣稱兩個對反於海德格的命題:(1)人可有智的直覺;(2) 人雖有限而可無限。牟宗三企圖突破海德格劃下的界線,肯定人有「智的直 覺」,可以創造「物自身」。在本文的分析下,這個看來沿襲康德術語的說法, 不過是說一種「心」與「物」的關係:心表現為覺潤之情,可以賦予事物以 價值。不過,即使如此,亦無法說明人有無限性,牟宗三的宣稱無疑是誇大其 辭。海德格會批評,牟宗三將存在論設置於「時間」範圍以外,企圖以一個 無限的本體為憑藉,活出不朽的意義,這注定是虛妄。海德格在《康德書》 標舉想像力,目的在於揭示人是感性與知性兼具的存在者,無時空性的概念 必須經過想像力的作用─「圖式化」─為概念注入時空元素,才具備認 牟宗三的康德詮釋重視「智的直覺」,海德格的康德詮釋則重視「想像 力」,兩者看似互不相干,其實隱藏著一場有限與無限的角力。海德格在《康德與形而上學問題》指出認知一般之本質在於直觀,而感性直觀的接受性正 是人類認知有限性的根源。概括來說,就是以下兩個命題:(1)人只有感性 直觀;(2)人是有限的。牟宗三在《智的直覺與中國哲學》譯述了《康德書》 的相關內容,並且宣稱兩個對反於海德格的命題:(1)人可有智的直覺;(2) 人雖有限而可無限。牟宗三企圖突破海德格劃下的界線,肯定人有「智的直 覺」,可以創造「物自身」。在本文的分析下,這個看來沿襲康德術語的說法,不過是說一種「心」與「物」的關係:心表現為覺潤之情,可以賦予事物以 價值。
At the first glance, Mou Zongsan's and Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant seem to be irrelevant to each other. The former focuses on “intellectual intuition” while the latter on “imagination”. In fact, the nexus between them may be more complicated. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the essence of cognition in general is intuition and the receptivity of sensible intuition is the root of human finitude. We can conclude his thought into the following theses: (1) Human beings have only sensible intuition; (2) Human beings are finite. In his Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhewue, Mou translates §16 and §25 of Kantbook and he claims the following theses in contrast to Heidegger: (1) Human beings can have intellectual intuition; (2) Human beings are finite and yet they can be infinite. Mou is determined to go beyond the line delimited by Heidegger. Therefore, Mou thinks that human beings should have “intellectual intuition” and thus they are able to create “thing-in-itself”. In this paper, I try to argue that Mou’s doctrine is not a reformulation of Kant’s philosophy, but an illustration of a relation between “heart-mind” and “thing”: Heart-mind is an ability to bestow value on other things.Despite Mou’s doctrine is not as radical as we may think, we can still consider that he exaggerates the status of human beings. Mou puts his ontology out of time and he regards an infinite noumenon as the ground of his ontology. In Heidegger’s opinion, this is doomed to failure. In Kantbook, Heidegger highlights the concept of imagination in order to show that human beings are both sensible and intellectual. Any concept is worth to be cognized only if it goes through a procedure by imagination─schematized─and then they have spatial-temporal elements. In this sense, there is not a separation between understanding and sensibility, spontaneity and receptivity. All in all, human capacity to reason cannot separated from finitude. Under Heidegger’s challenge, Mou’s radical claim on “infinite heart-mind” seems not possible to stand firm.
|
|
|