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1. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 4
Martha C. Nussbaum Four Paradigms of Philosophical Politics
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2. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 4
Richard Flathman Self Against and for Itself: Montaigne and Sextus Empiricus on Freedom, Discipline and Resistance
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3. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 4
Richard Shusterman Somaesthetics and Care of the Self: The Case of Foucault
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4. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 4
Steven G. Affeldt Society as a Way of Life: Perfectibility, Self-Transformation, and the Origination of Society in Rousseau
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5. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 4
Joseph Sen On Slowness in Philosophy
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6. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 4
Scope of Forthcoming Issues
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7. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 4
Books Received
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8. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Achille C. Varzi Foreword
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9. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Yuri Balashov Persistence and Space-Time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn
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Although considerations based on contemporary space-time theories, such as special and general relativity, seem highly relevant to the debate about persistence, their significance has not been duly appreciated. My goal in this paper is twofold: (1) to reformulate the rival positions in the debate (i.e., endurantism [three-dimensionalism] and perdurantism [four-dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts]) in the framework of special relativistic space-time; and (2) to argue that, when so reformulated, perdurantism exhibits explanatory advantages over endurantism. The argument builds on the fact that four-dimensional entities extended in space as well as time are relativistically invariant in a way three-dimensional entities are not.
10. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Berit Brogaard Presentist Four-Dimensionalism
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11. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Kit Fine A Counter-Example to Locke’s Thesis
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12. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Mark Heller Temporal Overlap is Not Coincidence
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13. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Robin Le Poidevin Continuants and Continuity
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14. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Josh Parsons Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?
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15. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Peter Simons How to Exist at a Time When You Have No Temporal Parts
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16. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Peter van Inwagen Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time
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17. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 3
Books Recened
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18. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Frank Arntzenius Are There Really Instantaneous Velocities?
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Zeno argued that since at any instant an arrow does not change its location, the arrow does not move at any time, and hence motion is impossible. I discuss the following three views that one could take in view of Zeno's argument:(i) the "at-at" theory, according to which there is no such thing as instantaneous velocity, while motion in the sense of the occupation of different locations at different times is possible,(ii) the "impetus" theory, according to which instantaneous velocities do exist but these are only contingently and causally related to the temporal developments of positions,(iii) the "no instants" theory, according to which instants in time do not exist, and hence instantaneous velocities do not exist, while motion, in the sense of different areas occupied during different time intervals, is possible.I argue that, despite the fact that there have been interesting and relevant developments in mathematics and physics since the time of Zeno, each of these views still has serious drawbacks.
19. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Jody Azzouni Applying Mathematics: An Attempt to Design a Philosophical Problem
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20. The Monist: Volume > 83 > Issue: 2
Robert W. Batterman A ‘Modern’ (=Victorian?) Attitude Towards Scientific Understanding
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