Cover of The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy
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Displaying: 1-13 of 13 documents


1. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Robert W. Adams Nishida Kitarô’s Studies of the Good and the Debate Concerning Universal Truth in Early Twentieth-Century Japan
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When Nishida Kitarô wrote Studies of the Good, he was a high school teacher in Kanazawa far from Tokyo, the center of Japanese scholarship. While he was praised for his intellectual effort, there was no substantive agreement about the content of his ideas. Critics disagreed with the way he conceived of reality and of truth as contained in reality. Taken together, I believe that the responses to Nishida's early work give us a window on the state of Japanese philosophy in the early twentieth century. In what follows, I give evidence for the existence of such a debate about the nature of truth and reality. After a sketch of Nishida's position (in which scientific truth is made subordinate to an all-encompassing divine truth), I outline the positions of two other contemporary thinkers: Katô Hiroyuki and Takahashi Satomi. With respect to Nishida, they offer markedly different takes on the question of universal truth: Katô favors an antireligious, scientific positivism while Takahashi accepts an existentialist notion of radical human finitude, in which human access to any certainty is denied. I conclude that one is confronted with a lively debate by Japanese philosophers inside Japan about the definition of truth and consequently about the nature of reality.
2. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Douglas L. Berger Illocution, No-Theory and Practice in Nagarjuna’s Skepticism: Reflections on the Vigrahavyavartani
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In verse nine of the Vigrahavyavartani, Nagarjuna gives a defense of his skepticism by insisting that he makes no proposition (pratijna) concerning the nature of reality. B. K. Matilal has argued that this position is not an untenable one for a skeptic to hold, using as an explanatory model Searle’s distinction between a propositional and an illocutionary negation. The argument runs that Nagarjuna does not refute rival philosophical positions by simply refuting whatever positive claims those positions might make, but rather he refuses the very act of making an assertion. From this kind of illocutionary negation, however, a certain paradoxicality arises: for in the negating the act of assertion, the skeptic is barred from asserting his or her own position, for under this condition, if he or she asserts that position, it is falsified! I want to argue that there are certain senses in which it seems that Nagarjuna’s resorting to the illocution we find in the Vigrahavyavartani may not have been necessary for the maintenance of his skeptical position, for he has recourse to prasanga counter-arguments which can always offset the metaphysical and epistemological claims of the Hindu and Buddhist philosophers whom he confronts. There are also places in the Karika itself, where certain pramanas seem to be employed, that give one the impression that this kind of skepticism and the pramanas are only inimical to one another insofar as the latter may lead to the metaphysical, essentialist extremes criticized by the Buddhists. Nagarjuna’s illocution in this light seems an attempt to radicalize his difference from a developing Nyaya extensionalist theory of the pramanas, a theory in which the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas are closer than anywhere else.
3. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Purushottama Bilimoria Professor Matilal’s Nåvya-Naive Realism vis-a-vis Dummett-Putnam-Mimamsa Anti-Realisms: Some Metaphysical Worries
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The vexed issue of the precise connection between words and things (or objects) has been a major preoccupation over the centuries summoning the resources of metaphysics, philosophy of language, linguistics, ontology and increasingly semiological analysis. Philosophy in India produced a number of different and often conflicting solutions, only to be rivalled by an equally bewildering variety witnessed in the ancient and modern West. I want to bring to the foreground the late Professor Bimal K. Matilal’s development of Nyaya-Vaisesika realist approach to the aporia, and interject the analysis with dissident voices, especially of Mimamsakas and Buddhists. Significantly, it will be the living ghosts of Putnam and Dummett that I will invoke to haunt Matilal’s variation on metaphysical realism (after Davidson). Matilal veered closer to a realist metaphysic, which is inflected in his own formulation of a theory of language appropriate to this ontology, this despite his idealized attraction to phenomenalist-constructivism (especially Buddhist); his flirtations with Bhartrharian holism (even Saussurean semiology) and lately with Derridean deconstruction (after G. C. Spivak) in his epiloquia. But my critique focuses on his famous earlier analysis of Jnana or cognition and his defence of a particular linguistic-ontology within a narrowly circumscribed naturalized epistemology (after Navya-nyaya).
4. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Leonardo D. de Castro Debts of Good Will and Interpersonal Justice
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A debt of good will (utang na loob in Filipino) is incurred when a person becomes the beneficiary of significant assistance or favor given by another. Usually, the beneficiary is in acute need of the assistance given or favor granted. This provides an opportunity for the giving of help to serve as a vehicle for the expression of sympathy or concern. The debt could then be appreciated as one of good will because, by catering to another person's pressing need, the benefactor is able to express positive dispositions towards the beneficiary. It is not merely the receipt of the assistance or favor that puts the recipient in a position of indebtedness. The indebtedness is created by the benefactor's kagandahang loob (good will). An act can be considered to convey kagandahang loob only if it is done out of kusang loob (roughly, free will); and can only be considered to have been done out of kusang loob if the agent (1) is not acting under external compulsion, (2) is motivated by positive feelings (e.g. charity, love or sympathy) towards the beneficiary, and (3) is not motivated by the anticipation of reward. These conditions entail debt-of-goodwill relationships where the benefactor has no right to demand reciprocity but the beneficiary has a "self-imposed" obligation to repay kagandahang loob with kagandahang loob. Debts of good will are about some forms of justice. But we should not reduce all talk about debts of good will to talk about justice.
5. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Deepti Dutta Enlightenment and its Attainment: Samkhya-Yoga and Buddhist Perspectives
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Enlightenment is the value par excellence in all Indian philosophical systems except Carvaka. This paper attempts to elucidate some moral and esoteric aspects of enlightenment in the context of Samkhya-Yoga and Buddhism. Analysis of moral aspects of Samkhya-Yoga and Buddhist concepts necessarily refers to various steps and stages of Enlightenment and their affinity. That Yama (the first step of eightfold Yoga of Patanjali comprising Truth, Non-Violence, etc.) is accepted by Jainas, Buddhists and Vedantins irrespective of their creed, is universally agreed upon. Here an analysis is given as to the details of the cultivation of these virtues and the meeting point of the Samkhya-Yogi and the Buddhist Sadhaka. Consideration of ontological and spiritual aspects of Enlightenment also reveals some interesting analogies. In treading the path of Vipassana meditation (of the truth), the Buddhist develops Nirveda (non-attachment) and the Yogi, by unfaltering habitual concentration on the true nature of the matter and spirit, attains supreme detachment (Parama Vasikara) and contrives an effective tool to develop insight at the experiential level.
6. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Rolf Elberfeld Resonanz als Grundmotiv ostasiatischer Ethik
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Fuer Platon ist die Musik ein wesentliches Element in der ethischen Erziehung des Menschen. Auch im klassischen China spielt die Musik eine ueberragende Rolle fuer die ethische Erziehung. Bei Platon soll die Musik eine Uebereinstimmung des Menschen mit dem Logos erbringen in china hingegen werden der Naturzusammenhang und auch die menschlichen Beziehungen als ein Zusammenklingen verstanden, das durch eine gelungene gegenseitige „Resonanz" (ying) gut wird im Sinne des Ethischen. Im Vortrag werden verschiedene chinesische Text als Beispiele herangezogen. Die Resonanzethik is aber nicht nur in China ein Grundmotiv, sondern findet sich auch in Japan z.B. bei dem bekannten Philosophen Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), der in seinem Text Ich und Du (watashi to nanji) auf das Resonanzmotiv zurueckgreift. Der Vortrag versucht unter Heranziehung einschlaegiger Texte ein Grundmotive ostasiatischer Ethik herauszuarbeiten, dass mit dem chinesischen Wort „ying" (Resonanz, Antwort, Sollen) exemplarisch zum Ausdruck gebracht werden kann. Es soll somit das Thema Erziehung und Ethik in interkultureller Perspektive philosophisch bearbeitet werden.
7. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Raghunath Ghosh Tatparya and its role in verbal understanding
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I examine the concept of intention (tatparya) and its role in the phenomenon of verbal comprehension (sabdabodha) with special reference to Navya Nyaya, followed by some critical and evaluative remarks. An effort has been made to give an account of the apprehension of intention (tatparya) in four types of sentences: a) the ambiguous sentence b) the non-ambiguous sentence c) the vedic sentence and d) the sentence uttered by a parrot.
8. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Galib A. Khan Philosophy in the South Asian Subcontinent: A Unity in Maladjustment
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Philosophy in the south Asian subcontinent differs from Western philosophy in the following three ways: (1) it is based upon religion; (2) love of tradition becomes an obstacle for philosophical development; and (3) authority is accepted as a source of knowledge. I argue that future philosophical development demands that the above three differences be removed. Furthermore, philosophers from the subcontinent must concentrate on contemporary issues.
9. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
V. V. Mantatov, O. V. Dorzhigushaeva Philosophical Foundation of Ecological Ethics
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Principles of Buddhist philosophy central to the formation of an ecological paradigm of mentality include a dynamic vision of the world, a system of relative truth apart from dogmas, a moral foundation for scientific knowledge, an emphasis on nonviolence and the absence of repressive scientific methods, and the progressive movement of the intellect to Universal Consciousness which postulates the unity of microcosm and macrocosm. The comparative analysis of laws and principles of modern ecological science and basic Buddhist thought points to their common intentional direction. Buddhist philosophy declares the creative participation of humankind in the united world synergistic process and forms to be the foundation of an altruistically marked ecological ethics.
10. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Maja Milcinski Impermanence and Death in Sino-Japanese Philosophical Context
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This paper discusses the notions of impermanence and death as treated in the Chinese and Japanese philosophical traditions, particularly in connection with the Buddhist concept of emptiness and void and the original Daoist answers to the problem. Methodological problems are mentioned and two ways of approaching the theme are proposed: the logically discursive and the meditative mystical one, with the two symbols of each, Uroboros and the open circle. The switch of consciousness is suggested as an essential condition for liberation of the Ego and its illusions. Rational logic as well as the sophisticated meditative ways of selflessness and detachment are suggested when treating the Chinese and Japanese philosophical notions, and examples of the discussed topics from the texts given. The instructive seventh chapter of the classical Daoist work, Lie Zi, is analyzed in detail and put into contrast with the answers given to that problem in the Greco-Judeo-Christian tradition.
11. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Masato Mitsuda Zen Buddhist Perspectives on Modern Education
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Many articles and books on Buddhism have been published in recent years, but publications dealing with Buddhist educational views are rarely available. In this paper, I wish to expound on Zen Buddhist perspectives on modern education. The history of Buddhist education is long and complex. In early centuries (400 BCE- 800 CE), Buddhist monasteries in India and China functioned as educational centers where vinaya, sutras and other subjects were taught. Many men and women were refugees from social injustice and the sangha provided them with education, security and dignity. Spirituality and pedantry were always combined in Buddhist education. But from a Zen perspective, modern education has become an occupational training program to promote financial interest. Capitalism, science and technology have formed a new world view; to wit, occupational training has become more essential to one's way of living than the spiritual quest. Today, most students are concerned with finding financial stability and material gain. Against this trend, Zen education encourages students to seek spiritual stability. Because of Buddha nature, this is a natural human inclination, while not everyone is talented to become a computer specialist or an investment banker. Zen education guides students to grasp the "twist and turn" of the samsaric world, teaching them to be compassionate, understanding, patient listeners and well-balanced individuals.
12. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
S. K. Wertz Averting Arguments: Nagarjuna’s Verse 29
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I examine Nagarjuna’s averting an opponent’s argument (Verse 29 of Averting the Arguments), Paul Sagal’s general interpretation of Nagarjuna and especially Sagal’s conception of "averting" an argument. Following Matilal, a distinction is drawn between locutionary negation and illocationary negation in order to avoid errant interpretations of verse 29 ("If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error. But I do not make a proposition; therefore, I am not in error.") The argument is treated as representing an ampliative or inductive inference rather than a deductive one. As Nagarjuna says in verse 30: "That [denial] of mine [in verse 29] is a non-apprehension of non-things" and non-apprehension is the averting of arguments or "the relinquishing of all views." "Not making a proposition P" would be not speaking P or silence with regard to P (where P is some opposing view) and, as Sagal argues, not meaning a global linguistic silence (where P stands for any proposition whatsoever). Such an interpretation would lead to attributing wholesale irrationalism to Nagarjuna-something I wish to avoid.
13. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Wong Yew Leong Li and Change
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In this paper I ask the question of how change is effected in the li practices of a fundamentally conservative society. I begin with a description of how li functions in society ideally and actually, arguing that they play a crucial role in society as the medium through which the Confucian objectives (the perfection of the self, the establishment of order within one’s family, and the restoration and preservation of social order) are realized. The character of li suggests that li practices be evaluated in terms of their efficacy in realizing the Confucian objectives, for which participation in li is both necessary and sufficient. Yet, these objectives transcend li practices, allowing individuals to evaluate li practices in terms of their efficacy in realizing Confucian objectives in the face of changing concerns and circumstances, and thereby affect the relevant changes in li practices. It is an adequate understanding of what the Confucian objectives entail and the structure of the situations one finds oneself in that inform evaluation of existing li practices. However, changes in li practices take place vis-a-vis a conservative attitude towards inherited social conventions, and it is this conservative attitude that provides stability and continuity despite flux. Changes in li practices are therefore gradual, and do not disrupt social order.