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Displaying: 1-15 of 15 documents


articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Thomas P. Flint ‘A DEATH HE FREELY ACCEPTED’: MOLINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE INCARNATION
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Traditional Christians face a puzzle concerning the freedom and perfection of Christ. Jesus the man, it seems, must have possessed significant freedom forhim to serve as a moral example for us and for his death to have been truly meritorious. Yet Jesus the Son of God must be incapable of sinning if he is trulydivine. So if Jesus is both human and divine, one of these two attributes - significant freedom or moral perfection - apparently needs to be surrendered. In thisessay, it is argued that if (and perhaps only if) a Molinist approach to divine providence is embraced, one can plausibly affirm both the freedom of the manand the impeccability of the Son.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Wes Morriston EXPLANATORY PRIORITY AND THE COUNTERFACTUALS OF FREEDOM
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On a Molinist account of creation and providence, not only is there is a complete set of truths about what every possible person would freely do in any possible set of circumstances, but these conditional truths are part of the very explanation of our existence. Robert Adams has recently argued that the explanatory priority of these conditionals undermines libertarian freedom. In the present essay, I take at close look at Adams’ argument and at the Molinist response of Thomas Flint. After showing that Flint’s response is inadequate, I develop what I believe to be a more successful Molinist response to Adams’ argument. Along the way, I seek to provide some insight into the nature of libertarian freedom and the proper interpretation of the much discussed “principle of alternate possibilities.”
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
William P. Alston RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND VALUES
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Receptivity to Christian or other religious proclamations is powerfully influenced by one’s value orientations. I distinguish five contrasts in such orientations that illustrate this point. 1. Finding “worldly” values most deeply satisfying vs. a sense that something that transcends those would be most fulfilling. 2. Extreme stress on human autonomy vs. a positive evaluation of deference to God, if such there be. 3. A sense of thorough sinfulness vs. a thoroughly positive self image. 4. A willingness to accept outside help to transform oneself vs. a sense of the unworthiness of such dependence. 5. A readiness to treat others’ well being as important as one’s own vs. an exclusive focus on looking out for number one. The above reflects the deeper fact that value commihnents are an essential part of Christian belief, treatments of which must take account of this.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Thomas Sullivan, Russell Pannier GETTING A GRIP ON THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THOMAS AQUINAS: A DEFENSE OF SYSTEMATIC RECONSTRUCTION
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Because many of Aquinas’s most distinctive philosophical claims are embedded in theological works, in order to see what his philosophy comes to it is necessary to do a great deal of extracting and reconstructing. A major school of interpretation, however, cautions that such efforts are misguided, since Aquinas’ philosophy and theology are inextricably bound together. We respond that some versions of this inseparability thesis are too strong to be true and the remainder too weak to stand in the way of renewed efforts to identify Aquinas’ pure philosophical systems. Nonetheless, a good deal is to be learned about Aquinas (and about other religious philosophers) by pondering the inseparablist challenge to rational reconstruction.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Jerome I. Gellmann FEAR AND TREMBLING: KIERKEGAARD’S CHRISTIAN WORK
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The purpose of this paper is to show that the various layers of meaning in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling are embedded in a hidden, new Christian communication. I trace the traditional Christian understanding of the “sacrifice of Isaac,” in which Isaac is the prefiguration of Jesus, and then argue that Kierkegaard departed from this traditional teaching to make Abraham the Christ-figure of the story. To Kierkegaard, Abraham is the true sacrifice of the story.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Douglas V. Henry DOES REASONABLE NONBELIEF EXIST?
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J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason claims that the existence of reflective persons who long to solve the problem of God’s existencebut cannot do so constitutes an evil rendering God’s existence improbable. In this essay, I present Schellenberg’s argument and argue that the kind of reasonable nonbelief Schellenberg needs for his argument to succeed is unlikely to exist. Since Schellenberg’s argument is an inductive-style version of the problem of evil, the empirical improbability of the premise I challenge renders the conclusions derived from it empirically improbable as well.
discussion
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Stewart Goetz STUMP ON LIBERTARIANISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
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Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility requires the freedom to act otherwise.
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Thomas Talbott UNIVERSALISM AND THE SUPPOSED ODDITY OF OUR EARTHLY LIFE: REPLY TO MICHAEL MURRAY
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In “Three Versions of Universalism,” Michael Murray asks what purpose our earthly life might serve if universalism is true; and in this brief response, I suggesta possible answer.
9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Hugh J. McCann SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM: A REPLY TO ROWE
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I have defended the view that God’s complete sovereignty over the universe, which requires that he be creatively responsible for our decisions, is compatible with libertarian free will. William Rowe interprets me as holding that this is entirely owing to God’s being timelessly eternal, and argues that God’s decisions as creator would still be determining in a way that destroys freedom. His argument overlooks an important part of my view-an account of creation according to which God’s will as creator does not stand as an independent determining condition of our own. I try here to clarify that account, and to show that Rowe’s criticisms leave it untouched.
reviews
10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Terence Cuneo Timothy P. Jackson: LOVE DISCONSOLED: MEDITATIONS ON CHRISTIAN CHARITY
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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
David B. Burrell Barry Miller: A MOST UNLIKELY GOD AND FROM EXISTENCE TO GOD
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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Patrick Lee John I. Jenkins: KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH IN THOMAS AQUINAS
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13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Sandra Menssen Paul Helm: FAITH AND UNDERSTANDING
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14. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Charles C. Taliaferro Mark Wynn: God and Goodness
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notes and news
15. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Notes and News
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