From among numerous anniversaries celebrated in 1980 and relating to Medieval culture the 1000th anniversary of Avicenna’s birthday and the 700th anniversary of St Albert’s death aroused most interest. The UNESCO commemorated Avicenna’s millenium with a special medal and organized the „Colloque International sur l’Islam” in Paris in July 1981. The world’s attention was focused on St Albert’s anniversary owing to John Paul II’s pilgrimage to St Albert’s tomb in Köln. Also the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) participated in the celebrations on account of the fact that St Albert is the patron saint of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at KUL. The writings of St Albert are of a great value as source-works mainly because they were based on comparatively early Latin translations of Aristotle’s works and include references to unknown or little known works and authors (eg. David of Dinant, „Quaestiones Nicolai Peripate- tici”). St Albert’s paraphrases are particularly interesting. The fact that he chose that type of commentary as the means of expression proves that he was more interested in the reconstruction of Aristotle’s writings and in his doctrine than in its interpretation. He, himself, used to stress the following: „I am faithful to the words of Aristotle and Peripatetics’ thought and never add a word from myself”. Many historians, among them Gilson and Bohner, concluded that St Albert’s own thought should be reconstructed on the basis of his independent writings like „Summae” (Handbooks) and the „Commentary on the Four Books of Lombard’s Sentences”. In the light of the latter writing St Albert appears to be much more of a Platonian or Neoplatonian than Aristotelian. Aristotelism in St Albert’s thought was strongly underlined by M. Grabmann who called St Albert the originator of Christian aristotelism and a man „who first looked in the face of aristotelism”.What was the reason which inclined St Albert to be preoccupied with Peripatetic philosophy throughout his life starting with his „Summae Parisiensis” and till the „Handbook of Theology”? As early as during his stay Paris he came to the conclusion that the injunction of 1210 (renewed later many times) demanding that Aristotle’s „Metaphysics” and other natural writings were not read at the University of Paris was inconsiderate, unnecessary and even detrimental not only to the development of natural sciences and philosophy but also to theology. He came to such a conclusion after he became acquainted with the „Liber David Dinanthensis per theologos factus qui totus est haereticus”, a collection of excerpts from David’s „Quaternuli” prepared for the Synod in Paris in 1210 by Parisian theologians. On the basis of that document St Albert claimed that there are no, or nearly no, grounds to charge Aristotle with David’s charges. However, the injunction did not restrain the spread of heterodoxal aristotelism but rather favoured it instead; the „Quartier latin” of true Aristotle, which could have over come soreading pseudo-aristotelism, being prohibited- In addition, the injunctions suggested implicite that true Aristotle was r#t variance with Christian faith. St Albert’s paraphrases aimed at convincing the authorities that the writings on natural science and the „Metaphysics” did not constitute any threat to Christian faith. Their aim was also to convince heterodoxal Aristotelians that the Aristotle interpreted historically ie. in the light of his own or well rendered texts and in the light of Peripatetics’ thought is different from that they popularized.For St Albert authentic Aristotelism was the aristotelism of Aristotle and Peripatetics, particularly of Avicenna.

The philosophy of René Descartes (and the idealistic error connected with it) finds its foundation in a two-fold way. The transition from sensory perception to the plane of reflection and the ultimate establishing of the „cogito” form one foundation. The „cogito” and particularly its structure and its existential - reflectional character form the other. The present paper aims at explicating the above theses and classifying the epistemological meaning of the term cogito.The first part of the paper presents an epistemological - linguistic analysis of the stages in reasoning which led Descartes to the formula cogito ergo sum. It also contains an analysis of the assumptions of Descartes’s philosophical inquiry and of the consequences resulting from the establishment of a new sphere of the indubitable ie. „cogito”. The analysis includes Cartesian rules of doubt, the transition from the level of perception to the level of reflection, the formula (habeo cogitationes ergo) cogito, ergo sum and the consequences of making the cogito a starting point of the inquiry.From among the consequences, which are epistemological or ontological in character, the problem connected with the formulae res cogitans, res sunt and with Descartes’s conception of existence are especially worth noting.The second part of the paper presents an analysis of various aspects of the structure of the „cogito” carried out according to Cartesian, analytical, Thomistic, and phenomenologistic constructions. In the light of the above, analyses two oppositions become most controversial with regard to the „cogito”: one, logical — inference vs. identity of the „cogito” and sum, and the other, gnosiologi- cal — direct vs. indirect construction. On the basis of the results of the analyses the author declares for the latter part of the two dichotomies. Cognition, which is the starting point in Descartes’s philosophy and which defines the „cogito”, is characterized as reflectional construction in which accompanying reflection plays a significant part. Cartesian obliteration of epistemological (and epistemic) difference between reflection and direct cognition (reflection made intuitive) and also his failure to realize the important dissimilarities of the structure and, in particular, of the strength of assertion of cognition directed towards being resulted in specific kind of angelization of human cognition and in idealistic consequents in Cartesian model of philosophy.The final part of the paper includes a typology of Cartesian influence on modern philosophy with particular attention paid to Noethomism.

The paper is devoted to the following issue: Can one construct metaphysics, conceived of in a classical manner, on the basis of a subjective starting point (description of acts of human consciousness).Intentional acts of human consciousness are the initial object of the research in metaphysics developed according to the transcendental method (reflectional). Its final object is a most general and necessary structure of being as being and beings of distinguished categories. The starting point of this metaphysics comprises sentences describing intentional acts which appear in the form revealed by the consciousness of self.If the aim of metaphysics is indubitable cognition of most general and necessary structure of being, its starting point must 1) be principally indubitable, 2) facilitate cognition of beings of all kinds, 3) facilitate cognition of extra - phenomenal structure of reality.The starting point meets the 1st condition, however, if it does so in the case of the 2nd and 3rd ones is debatable. The crities of the reflectional method (E. Gilson and others) claim that basing on the analysis of consciousness’ acts it is possible to reach transcendental idealism but never the theory of actual being. Advocates of this method, however, state that they construct a theory of being which covers the subject matter of classical metaphysics (A. Marc, J. B. Lotz, E. Coreth, B. J. F. Lonergan and others). Thier lectures on general and specific metaphysics are to prove that.The author is of the opinion that the decisive arguments in the discussion on the utility of the reflectional method in metaphysics can be given only by a detailed analysis of the method’s application. An attempt to present such an analysis will be made in the author’s next paper.

The paper contrasts two opinions regarding the way in which concepts being are created; one by Rev. Prof. K. Kłósak, the other by Fr. Prof. M. A. Krąpiec. Prof. Kłósak adopts a specific process of abstraction and arrives at an abstract concept of being while Prof. Krąpiec comes to concretist concept of being through the so- ~called process of separation.The analysis of the above concepts has led to the formulation of the following theses:1. The concept of being is in some measure an abstract one. It does not assert the existence of anything but is only a separation of the aspects of being — the something that actually exists. In contrast to other abstract concepts of being it has ist own designata only in the beings which actually exist.2. The concept of being, though abstract to some extent, is created by means of the process of separation.3. The essence of the concept of being includes existence only. That guarantees extensional and intensional transcendentality to the concept of being.Finały, an attempt is made to point out the reasons why the above theses do not violate the realism of metaphysics and do not drift to monism.

The author is concerned with the history of the formation of logical semiotics. The problem pertaining to this discipline first occurred in antiquity with relation to philosophical terminology and later with relation to linguistics and rhetorics. Semiotics flourished in the 13th and 14th centuries, however, until the 17th century when the idea of formal scientific language originated, its decline is recorded. The popular inclination to develop the theory of knowledge and psychology in linguistic studies did not facilitate the development of logical semiotics. G. Frege (1879), whose works were not immediately understood, was the originator of logical semiotics. The reception of Frege’s writings started with B. Russell and continued after the 2nd world war especially (R. Carnap, A. Church). Soon appeared some general theories of semiotics (Ch. Peirce, and later Ch. Morris). The discipline was later closely connected with the developing structural linguistics (F. de Saussure, N. Chomsky) and with analytic philosophy (G. H. Gadamer, P. Ricoeur). Above all, however, semiotics evolved in the domain of mathematics (D. Hilbert, K. Gödel, A. Tarski, W. V. Quine) and in the methodology of scientific language (R. Carnap. K. Ajdukiewicz, R. Montague, P. Lorenzen, J. Hintikka). Apart from semantics and syntax formal pragmatics spread out.

In the present paper the author deals with the issue on change in philosophy and natural science and analyses the character of change considered on the basis of modern physics. So far no system of the logic of change in natural science has been constructed and therefore, there is a need to construct one.The author presents a brief survey of research into the problem of matter and change carried out by the philosophers of ancient Greece (where the roots of modern science are) and by some modern scholars. This is done in order to work out some wording in the problem of change, which is indespensable to the construction of an appropriate logical system.Some major tasks of the logic of change are presented in the second part of the paper. The author shows how dependent on the solutions concerning the subject matter of modern physics a logic of this kind must be, which, in fact, is an outline of the way of constructing the logic of change.

In the introductory part of the present paper logic of change in natural science is placed among the logics of empirical sciences. An outline of the main tasks of such logics is presented. Next, the author discusses the principle according to which the criteria of adequacy of the systems of the logic physics are selected.In the final part of the paper gnosiological and ontological assumptions of physics are discussed in order to determine the characteristics of the above criteria and to determine the functor whose formal characteristics should be examined in the logic of change. It is agreed that the statement-forming functor of the argument „it changes that...” should be characterized by the methods of modern logic. Several possible systems with that functor are mentioned as well. The laws of the logic of change will be true in every non-empty set of energetistic occurrences which can change.In the paper, the author’s attention is also focused on the factors which determine the form in non-classical logics, including the logic of change.

L’article traite de la conception de la philosophie de G. Marcel. Il se compose de trois parties. La première présente la genèse, l’objet et le but de la philosophie mar- celienne. D’après Marcel la philosophie prendre sa source de l’inquiétude intérieure. Au centre de considerations marceliennes se trouve l’homme — non l’homme abstrait, mais l’homme concret. Pour Marcel, cet homme est un mystère qui se développe devant nous.La deuxième partie traite des méthodes de la philosophie de G. Marcel. Dans ces méthodes joue le rôle principal l’expérience intérieure et la seconde réflexion.La troisième partie a pour le but de montrer les traits caractéristiques du langage de Marcel. Le penseur français a rejeté le langage scolastique. Ce langage est apparu corne un langage incapable à exprimer la richesse intérieure de l’homme. L’auteur a proposé un nouveau langage celui de la métaphore, de la comparaison, de l’exemple. On a constaté qu’un tel langage est plus adéquat à une meilleure pénétration du mystère de l’homme.

L’article a pour le but de montrer le problème du point de départ dans l’anthropologie philosophique de saint Thomas d’Aquin et de Gabriel Marcel. Il se compose de trois parties. La première nous donne un aperçu général de l’objet de l’anthropologie de saint Thomas. On présente ici le problème de l’expérience de ’homme et le problème de „donneés existentielles”, qui sont réveleés par cette expérience. Grâce à cette expérience, l’homme connaît son existence et ses différentes actions.La deuxième partie évoque le même problème chez Gabriel Marcel. On constate ici que dans l’anthropologie de G. Marcel le rôle principal joue l’expérience in térieure, vecue. Elle nous donne l’accès au mystère de l’homme. Grâce à cette expérience l’homme peut approfondir toute la richesse intérieure de l’homme.La troisième partie de l’article présente la comparaison de ces théories de l’homme dans le domaine du point de pépart chez les deux philosophes en question.En conclusion finale on constate que ces deux théories de l’homme sont complémentaires.