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Displaying: 1-20 of 27 documents


presidential address
1. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Timothy B. Noone Nature, Freedom, and Will: Sources of Philosophical Reflection
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2. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Alexander Pruss Presentation of the Aquinas Medal
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aquinas medalist’s address
3. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Nicholas Rescher Aquinas and the Principle of Epistemic Disparity
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The Principle of Epistemic Disparity has it that a mind of lesser power cannot adequately comprehend the ways of a more powerful intellect. The paperconsiders the role of this principle in the thought of St. Thomas and also offers some commentary on its wider implications.
plenary sessions
4. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Daniel O. Dahlstrom The Development of Freedom: A Phenomenological Approach
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This paper elaborates four asymmetrical, developmental stages of the phenomenon of human freedom, starting with a rudimentary sort of freedom, thebasic experience of a relatively unencumbered power to act in alternative ways. The paper argues that structural elements of this rudimentary form of freedomare demonstrable in three distinct, supervening forms of freedom: instrumental freedom, the experience of the self-reflective ability to pursue certain aims, perfectionist freedom, the experience of the capacity to master oneself according to some ideal, and, finally, interpersonal freedom, the experience of empowerment and alternatives only available through commitments to others.
5. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
John Rist Freedom and Nature among the Greeks
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session 1
6. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
John J. Davenport Augustine on Liberty of the Higher-Order Will: Answers to Hunt and Stump
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I have argued that like Harry Frankfurt, Augustine implicitly distinguishes between first-order desires and higher-order volitions; yet unlike Frankfurt, Augustineheld that the liberty to form different possible volitional identifications is essential to responsibility for our character. Like Frankfurt, Augustine recognizes that we can sometimes be responsible for the desires on which we act without being able to do or desire otherwise; but for Augustine, this is true only because such responsibility for inevitable desires and actions traces (at least in part) to responsibility for our volitional identifications, which in turn has leeway-libertarianconditions. However, David Hunt has interpreted Augustine’s account of divine foreknowledge as implying a type of source-incompatibilism that does not require alternative possible actions or intentions. Moreover, while Eleonore Stump’s account of Augustine on sanctification supports my interpretation, Augustine’s position on predestination in his latest writings may be incompatible with liberty of the higher-order will. I will argue against Hunt’s interpretation but admit that the leeway-libertarian has to reject the ‘no autonomy’ model in some of Augustine’s late writings.
7. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Gregory B. Sadler Freedom, Inclinations of the Will, and Virtue in Anselm’s Moral Th eory
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Freedom, justice, and inclinations of the will have significant roles in St. Anselm’s moral theory, as does, I argue, virtues and vices, which can be understoodin relation to freedom and justice and as inclinations of the will. The first section of the paper discusses the relationship between freedom, justice, and the will inAnselm’s works. The second part explores Anselm’s distinctions between different aspects of the human will, as will-as-instrument, will-as-use, and will-as-inclination, then examines his further distinction of the latter into the will-for-justice and will-for-benefit. The third part then argues that the will-as-inclination-for-justice takes determinate forms as virtues, which may be understood as ways of properly using and preserving human freedom.
session 2
8. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Michael Rota Infinite Causal Chains and Explanation
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Many cosmological arguments for the existence of a first cause or a necessary being rely on a premise which denies the possibility of an infinite regress ofsome particular sort. Adequate and satisfying support for this premise, however, is not always provided. In this paper I attempt to address this gap in the literature. After discussing the notion of a causal explanation (section I), I formulate three principles which govern any successful causal explanation (section II). I then introduce the notions of a caused being, a causal network, and a causal chain, and argue that (roughly) an infinite causal chain cannot be explained merely by reference to the causal activities of the members of that chain (section III). In a sequel to the present paper, I employ this result to construct two closely related arguments for the existence of a necessary being.
9. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Sharon Kaye William of Ockham and the Unlikely Connection between Transubstantiation and Free Will
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William of Ockham was tried for heresy due to his assertion that certain qualities can exist independently of substances. Scholars have assumed he made thisstrange assertion in order to account for the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. I argue, however, that the assertion was philosophically rather than theologically motivated. Ockham develops a nominalist substance ontology, according to which most changes can be explained as the result of local motion. Knowledge and virtue are changes in human beings that cannot be so explained, however, because they are not entirely passive processes. In fact, knowledge and virtue require free will, which could not be considered truly free if it were not an independently existing quality. In this paper, I explain Ockham’s nominalist substance ontology and show how it functions as the sine qua non foundation for his uncompromising commitment to metaphysical libertarianism.
session 3
10. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Kevin White Aquinas on Purpose
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Starting from Summa Theologiae 1.2.3.obj.2, I consider some aspects of the term propositum as it occurs in his works. The objection divides “everything thatappears in the world” into what is natural and what is a proposito, and argues that each of these can be accounted for by causes other than God. I suggest that what is a proposito be called “the purposed,” and I try to clarify Aquinas’s understanding of purpose in relation to other notions in his writings, in particular nature, fortune, and above all deliberation or “counsel,” which is the prelude to choice. After some reflection on the theme of “deliberated will” and on the contrast between deliberating and being deliberate, I return to Aquinas’s reply to the objection I began with, then conclude with reference to a recent discussion of the difference between ends and purposes.
11. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Andrew Jaspers Intentio and Praeter Intentionem in the Constitution of the Moral Object in Thomas Aquinas
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As one of the three sources of the moral act in Aquinas’s philosophy, intention is fundamental to the understanding of his ethics. And while intention’spsychological and linguistic dimensions have been appreciated recently, after the appearance of Anscombe’s Intention, the Aristotelian physical framework ofAquinas’s thought on the issue has been neglected. Taking only the end of the agent into account in intentional analysis has led to incorrect interpretations of moral action, particularly among new natural law theorists. In this paper, I propose an understanding of intentio and praeter intentionem in Aquinas that elucidates his distinctions regarding justified killing, as well the bearing of intention in intentional action and moral acts.
session 4
12. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Luis Xavier López-Farjeat Determinism and Free Will in Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Arabic Tradition
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The Arabic tradition knew Alexander’s treatises On Fate and On Providence. Alexander criticizes the Stoic determinism with some peripatetic arguments. In those treatises we can find, at least, two positions: the peripatetic and “libertarian” position represented by Alexander, and Stoic determinism. A very similar discussion can be found in Islamic tradition. As S. Van den Bergh has insisted, Islamic theological schools had some Stoic influences. One of the issues in which we can find some common views is, precisely, the problem of determinism and free will. The aim of this paper is to show that the kasb (acquisition)doctrine of the Islamic theologians Asharites is very similar to Stoic determinism in its compatibilist version: both, Stoics and Asharites, conceive a causal network established by the fate or the providence. From this point of view we have to discuss which is the true agent of the natural and human acts that happen in this world. If the providence guides every act, the natural causality and the free will should be denied. On the one hand, I will present some arguments from the most representative Asharite theologian, al-Ghazali, to support a kind of compatibilist determinism; from the other hand, I will evaluate Averroes peripatetic arguments against determinism. Is Averroes more consistent than Alexander or do we have to conclude that al-Ghazali and the Asharites have stronger arguments in order to support the kasb doctrine?
13. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Shalahudin Kafrawi What Makes the Efficient Cause Efficient?: The Notion of Will in Ibn Sīnā’s Emanative Scheme
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The Aristotelian Ibn Sīnā places Necessary Being as the world’s Efficient Cause. Unlike “the standard” Muslim cosmogony of ex nihilo creation, however,his emanative scheme does not seem to grant Necessary Being freedom the exercise of which may cause the world to exist or not to exist. This paper will focus on Ibn Sīnā’s conception of the efficacy of Necessary Being in his emanative cosmogony. If Necessary Being does not have freedom, how does Ibn Sīnā maintain the causal explanation of the contingent being’s (be)coming into being?
session 5
14. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Mark K. Spencer Full Human Flourishing: The Place of the Various Virtues in the Quest for Happiness in Aristotle’s Ethics
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Human ability to freely choose requires knowledge of human nature and the final end of man. For Aristotle, this end is happiness or full flourishing, whichinvolves various virtues. Modern scholarship has led to debate over which virtues are absolutely necessary. Taking into account the hierarchical nature of the soul and the fact that relationships with the divine and with others are necessary for human flourishing, it can be seen that human flourishing requires contemplation, phronesis and all the moral virtues, as perfections of the various parts of the soul. The truly happy person has actualized all of his faculties and potential relationships. Rather than taking one of the standard exclusivist or inclusivist viewpoints on this ‘problem of the two lives,’ this paper argues that a holistic reading of Aristotle’s ethical works requires a hierarchical and relational view of the virtues, with all of them necessary for human flourishing.
15. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
James L. Wood Freedom in the Philebus
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This paper explores a possible Platonic grounding of human freedom in the Philebus. The Philebus presents a particularly intruiging account of the humangood and freedom alike in terms of the right relation of nous and pleasure. Through a close analysis of key passages in this dialogue I show how Plato conceives of freedom in terms of the intellect’s ordering and directing of desire and pleasure to genuinely fulfilling ends. The greatest fulfillment of desire comes together with the purest pleasure in the highest actualization of reason in lifelong philosophic activity: the mixed life and good life for human beings.
session 6
16. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Cruz González-Ayesta Scotus’s Interpretation of Metaphysics 9.2: On the Distinction between Nature and Will
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The aim of this paper is to explain Scotus’s transformation of the Aristotelian view on the difference between rational and irrational potencies. In Metaphysics 9, 2 Aristotle establishes the distinction between rational and nonrational powers and explains their difference in terms of their being ad opposita and ad unum, respectively. In his interpretation Scotus concludes that the most basic division between active principles is the difference between nature and will, rather than the difference between univocal and equivocal agents. Thus, the Aristotelian distinction between rational and non-rational powers has now become a distinction between nature and will. And the criterion for such a difference no longer lies in the contrast between ad unum and ad opposita, but rather is based on the twofold way the potencies can elicit their acts. Therefore, according to Scotus, the key difference between nature and will is the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy.
17. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Denis F. Sullivan Anscombe on Freedom, Animals, and the Ability to Do Otherwise
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It is commonly assumed that human beings are free because they have minds and, since they are the only creatures we have encountered that have minds, itis further assumed that they are the only creatures that are free. Elizabeth Anscombe, on the other hand, maintains that freedom, in the sense in which it is identified with the ability to do otherwise, is required for intentional action and, since even thoughtless beasts perform intentional actions, these beasts are also free. She does not deny that humans exercise this freedom in a unique way. But by situating human freedom in a broader context and detaching it from any robust concept of mind she makes the claim that human beings are free that much easier to defend.
session 7
18. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Kalynne Hackney Pudner What’s So Bad about Self-Sacrifice?: Immolation, Abnegation, Effacement, and Donation in Ethics
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A persistent worry in the ethical literature on care and empathy is that the agent is prone to self-sacrifice by the requisite state of engrossment in or engagement of the other. Addressing this worry particularly as expressed in feminist philosophy, I argue that the standard conceptions of self-sacrifice conflate four distinct relations of the self to its autonomous will: self-immolation (destroying one’s own autonomy), self-abnegation (disowning one’s autonomy), self-effacement (devaluing one’s autonomy) and self-donation (dedicating one’s autonomy). The latter, far from being vicious, is from an ethical standpoint the highest realization of autonomy; this claim finds echoes in Robin Dillon’s work on self-respect as well as the personalist philosophy of John Paul II. Self-immolation, self-abnegation, and self-effacement, on the other hand, are characterized by detachment from responsibility, corruption of the boundaries between self and other, and suppression of self-understanding.
19. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Yoshihisa Yamamoto Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Amicitia: Unio and Communicatio
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The purpose of this paper is to highlight the ontological character of amicitia in Aquinas. The originality of Aquinas’s theory is found in the ontological foundation expressed by Neoplatonic concepts (unio, unitas, communicatio). By integrating such Neoplatonic concepts with his analysis on the transcendentals (aliquid, unum), I made a new ontological foundation to the theory of amicitia.In order that a man is a one (unum), he must establish himself as something different (aliud quid) in the midst of the relationship with others and then has to return to himself. So long as he stays self-contained without moving outward, he cannot constitute himself as an independent being which is different from other beings (aliquid). The ontological oneness (unitas) as an independent rational substance makes it possible for a man to form the mutual relationship of unity (unio) without losing himself in the midst of the deep relationship with someone else.
session 8
20. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 81
Robert Allen Self-Forming Actions: The Genesis of a Free Will
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The following is a now popular argument for free will skepticism:1. If free will exists, then people make themselves.2. People do not make themselves.3. Thus, free will does not exist.It would make no sense to hold someone responsible, either for what he’s like or what he’s done, unless he has made himself. But no one makes himself. A person’s character is imposed upon him by Nature and others. To rebut, I intend to lean on common usage, according to which 2 is false: the vernacular provides a clear sense in which we do make ourselves. It is the sense in which we speak of a cake being made from ingredients or a statue out of clay.Self-formation sufficient for a free will occurs along these lines. I shall discuss a Compatibilist and a Libertarian version of this project.