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1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Ilya T. Kasavin Илья Теодорович Касавин
Cosmos: A Big Challenge and a Global Project
Космос: большой вызов и глобальный проект

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Space is a cross-cutting philosophical theme: an unattainable dream coming from the depths of centuries, and at the same time a source of religious faith and high science. Therefore, space is not limited to specific space projects and the conquest of celestial space. In contrast to this, space is a starting point for a global problematization of politics, economics and culture. It demonstrates its archetypal significance for the history of all human culture. At the same time, space as a project and a subject matter of imagination needs today a new humanistic definition, in which the role of philosophy cannot be underestimated. It is necessary to find and theoretically justify a balance between the task of economic efficiency of space research and the results of space exploration, on the one hand, and their use for creative human development, designing a safe and fair society and forming a scientific picture of the world.
panel discussion
2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Kirill A. Rodin Кирилл Александрович Родин
Wittgenstein on Intention and Action in the Perspective of Contemporary Approaches in Social Theory
Заметки Л. Витгенштейна о намерении и действии в контексте социальной теории

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A sequential reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s notes on action and intention (presented in this article) aims to stimulate a further discussion of the productivity of using Wittgenstein’s notes on action theory within social theory (and within research in moral philosophy and philosophy of law). It provides as an illustration of Wittgenstein’s consistent commitment to the principle of contextualism (suggesting an inextricable bond of social and philosophical concepts and their inclusion into various forms of life and linguistic practices). In terms of the principle of contextualism, the article examines numerous attempts to incorporate the philosophy of the late Wittgenstein into social and related research (Albert Ogien, Chantal Mouffe, ethnomethodology, Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, the sociology of color).
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Valery A. Surovtsev Валерий Александрович Суровцев
Intention, Subject of Will, and Social Theory
Намерение, субъект воли и социальная теория

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The article contains some considerations on K.A. Rodin’s reconstruction of the theory of action in works of later L. Wittgenstein. His apophatic approach to descriptions of will, volition, subject of will is analyzed. This approach is compared with approaches to Husserl’s definition of a transcendental subject. It is argued that the apophatic approach to the description of volition as a foundation of social theory is doubtful.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Vitaly V. Ogleznev Виталий Васильевич Оглезнев
Intention and Intentional Action in Philosophy of Law: What Does Wittgenstein Have to Do with It?
Намерение и намеренное действие в философии права

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The article examines K.A. Rodin’s thesis on the possibility of including Wittgenstein’s remarks on intention and action in the context of legal philosophy research. It is shown that although the concepts of intention and intentional action are relevant to the philosophy of law, Wittgenstein’s own ideas did not have a significant impact on their relevance (and some of them did not have it at all). This influence is confined to the fact that, like Wittgenstein, many jurists and legal theorists, mainly those who were influenced by the ideas of H.L.A. Hart, also objected to the causal theory of action. However, the influence is limited to this approach.
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Alexander A. Sanzhenakov Александр Афанасьевич Санженаков
Wittgenstein as a “Fellow Traveler” of Contextualist Sociology
Витгенштейн как «попутчик» контекстуалистской социологии

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The article attempts to criticize the concept of language games, as well as the hypothesis of K.A. Rodin on Wittgenstein’s influence on social science through the introduction of “contextualism”. Wittgenstein proposed to place language games in the first place in relation to the feelings and inner experience of individuals participating in common practices. The author of the article puts forward the following argument against it: indirect awareness of the rules and norms in which the individual does not participate or to which s/he does not obey suggests that the meaningfulness of actions stems not only from the context, but also from internal reflective understanding. In the final part of the article, the author refers to the work of E. Durkheim “Suicide: A Study in Sociology” in order to show that contextualism, as K. Rodin understands it, may have its own roots in sociology.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Denis K. Maslov Денис Константинович Маслов
The Notions of Will and Action: Hegel and Wittgenstein against Metaphysics of Will
Витгенштейн и Гегель

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In his response, D. Maslov (1) presents a sketch of a comparative analysis of the notion of ‘will’ in Wittgenstein and Hegel as a response to the initial article by K. Rodin. Despite apparent (but in some ways only seeming) differences, both philosophers show similar anti-metaphysical attitude in their respective analysis. Both regard will not as a metaphysical entity, but in its concrete expression in actions and intentions and conclude that acts of will and intentions can be understood by other people. (2) On this ground and the argument of universality of language, we argue, against K. Rodin, against anti-universalist and contextualist readings of Wittgenstein’s texts.
epistemology & cognition
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Louis Vervoort, Alexander A. Shevchenko Луи Вервурт
Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem: Insights from Philosophy of Science
Эпистемический релятивизм и проблема Геттиера: идеи из философии науки

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The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.
8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Tatiana D. Sokolova Татьяна Дмитриевна Соколова
A Priori in the Classical Model of Science
A priori в классической модели науки

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The paper is devoted to the concept of a priori and a priori knowledge within the framework of the classical model of science proposed for conducting research on the history of concepts, and in particular, the concept of “science” by digital humanities [de Jong, Betti, 2010]. In the first part of the article, I refer to the concept of model and (1) consider the classical model of science in terms of its heuristic potential for philosophical (and in particular, epistemological) research, and (2) define the main structural parts of the model for studying the concept a priori. In the second part, I consider the theoretical aspects of the classical model science in the context of a priori functional and historical concepts and the possibility of its adaptation to the analysis of the a priori in the history of science In the third part I propose a possible model for research of a priori in the classical model of science in two aspects: (1) a priori as universal principles underlying all sciences and (2) a priori as a set of propositions for a specific scientific discipline.
language & mind
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Olga A. Kozyreva Ольга Александровна Козырева
Criticism of Cartesian Account of Self-Knowledge in English-speaking Analytic Philosophy: Overview of the Main Strategies
Критика картезианской концепции знания о себе в англоязычной аналитической философии

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The article presents an overview of the main strategies of criticizing the Cartesian account of self-knowledge in English-speaking analytic philosophy. First, I distinguish four basic aspects of the Cartesian account of self-knowledge: metaphysical, methodological, semantic, and epistemic ones. The first aspect deals with the justification of distinctive features of self-knowledge; the second aspect concerns the way the agent gains self-knowledge; the third aspect is about the content of mental states, and the last one is about formal principles of self-knowledge. Second, I examine four critical strategies. The criticism on the metaphysical aspect consists in denying the privacy of mental states thesis; the criticism on the methodological aspect refutes the perceptual model for introspection; the criticism on the semantic aspect rejects the internalism, i.e., the external factors do not determine the content of mental states; the criticism on the epistemic aspect involves the KK-principle failure. Finally, I briefly assess the efficiency of these critical strategies.
10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Valentin A. Bazhanov Валентин Александрович Бажанов
Political Ideologies through the Lens of Modern Neuroscience
Политические идеологии в свете современной нейронауки

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The article presents the standpoint that naturalistic tendencies in modern science, which are especially expressed in neuroscience, push up social knowledge toward the need to revise its attitudes and norms, which consist in consistent sociocentrism and biophobia, and, hence, a simplified understanding of the phenomenon of “genetic reductionism”. We show that the application of the methods of natural science to social disciplines often marked visible progress and even conceptual breakthroughs in their development. Achievements of modern neuroscience affect a traditional area of social and humanitarian knowledge as political science, which leads to the formation of an independent area of research – political neuroscience. Through the optics of this research, cognitive styles characteristic of individuals and social groups with different value orientations imply the dominance of certain ideological sympathies and antipathies, which attributed to the opposite poles of the ideological scale – liberalism and conservatism. Considerable empirical material allows us to conclude that these ideological positions are exist due to differences in their ontogenetic “foundations”, which allows us to develop I. Kant's ideas about a priorism and transcendentalism in the context of the Kantian research program in contemporary neuroscience. The result of the implementation of this program to the political sphere was the discovery of the genesis of political views, and the demonstration of the peculiarities of their dynamics. They are based on the difference in the activity of certain neural sets, which in their turn are influenced by culture and society, forming an integral system “brain – culture – society”, where each component of which affects other components. Features and changes in the socio-cultural context of the development of an individual or a group of people may have an effect upon the architectonics of the brain and shift, due to its plasticity, of the political views along the scale of ideologies “liberalism – conservatism”. At the same time, carriers of different cognitive styles and, therefore, with a sufficient degree of probability of ideological views, percept the world in which they live in differently, and evaluate its past and possible future in diverse ways.
11. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Elena V. Bryzgalina, Anastasiya N. Gumarova Елена Владимировна Брызгалина
Neuroethics: Discussions about the Subject
Нейроэтика: дискуссии о предмете

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The term “neuroethics” emerged in the 1970s denoting medical ethics in neuroscience. The development of neuro-turn in philosophical studies, beginning of wide empirical research in neurobiology and cognitive science and rise of public interest in brain studies in the first decade of the 21st century caused the emergence of neuroethics as an independent research field. The questions of definition the subject area, methodology, priority directions and conceptual foundations of neuroethics still remain as the subjects of discussions nowadays. The main modern approaches to understanding the subject of neuroethics are reported in the article. The authors of the article propose to interpret neuroethics as a metadiscipline and highlight four approaches of it. A. Roskies divides neuroethics into two fields of study: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. This approach is refined in modern research. The article reveals that neuroethics can be understood as a description of the neural correlates of moral action; as an assessment of the ethics of research and therapeutic interventions in the brain; as a critical understanding of social practices based on knowledge of brain functioning or the usage of neurotechnology; as an analysis of the social consequences of the neurotechnologies development. The authors note that neuroethics still has a status of an “emerging field”, which makes the analysis of its development an independent research task.
case-studies – science studies
12. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Kirill A. Petrov Кирилл Алексеевич Петров
Intimate Technology and Alien Science: Scientists and tDCS-users Trade’s Specific at
Своя техника и чужая наука

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The article presents the results of a study of the interaction between tDCS-users and scientists on The forum observation and interviewing of the most active members of the Internet community were conducted during 2020–2021 by the methods of digital ethnography. The obtained results are intended to deepen the understanding both the exchange processes between scientists and non-professional, and the space in which such coordination takes place. A suitable tool for such work is the “trading zone” concept, which is defined by the lack of consensus on a scientific fact; the presence of local subcultures separated by disciplinary or practice boundaries; pidginization or creolization of language occurring on the basis of non-monetary exchange forms, without mutual values insight. TDCS is a technology with unproven effectiveness, and therefore scientific discussions are still being held around it. Unlike scientists, users present an alternative approach to the effectiveness of these devices, which analysis allows considering tDCS-technology as a “boundary object”. The central element of interaction at the “trading zone” is the exchange of “anecdotal data”, which determines the features of the emerging pidgin, aimed at describing the individual perception of a user’s experience. The forum interaction, involving the exchange of anecdotal data, leads to the formation of skill to discriminate a variety of tDCS-types, as well as types of scientific expertise. The ability for discrimination becomes the basis of interactional expertise. The user’s right to undertake expertise arise not from the basis of formal membership in scientific institutions, or personal contribution to the development of a scientific discipline, but on the property of “interactional experience”. The article notes that the attempts of users to extend interactional expertise beyond the boundaries of the trading zones, as well as the participation of academic scientists in the activities of the forum, may be associated with risks for scientific research.
interdisciplinary studies
13. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Olga B. Koshovets Ольга Борисовна Кошовец
Economic Knowledge and Power: From Scientific Objectivity to Technologies of Impersonality and Social Design
Экономическое знание и власть

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The main claim of the study is that technocratic public administration based on knowledge as a key element of power, significantly affects the idea of what is objective and what is objectivity. I explore how scientific objectivity as part of a scientific ethos has been evolving on the example of economic knowledge. A key institutional feature of economic knowledge is that it includes in fact two relatively autonomous epistemic cultures: academic one, connected to the production of knowledge in academia and expert-administrative one developing in public and corporate governance systems. The peculiarity of knowledge demanded and functioning in public administration is instrumentality (a possibility to be transformed into technology) and an exeptional focus on quantification. As a result ‘governing by number’ becomes a key social technology and at the same time numbers seem to embody objectivity. I show that economic knowledge in public administration involves an inevitable and deepening ontological gap with ‘objective reality’. The state needs not true but effective knowledge: the task of administrating does not presuppose a realistic representation of the administrated object, but rather seeks to simplify it, to plan it, or even to construct. Thus, unlike scientific knowledge, the objectivity of knowledge in administrative practices has almost nothing to do with the object (in sense of truthfulness, representation). Meanwhile, ongoing need for academic economic knowledge to be used into the state administration and its further development in a fundamentally alien sphere leads to a significant deformation of scientific ethos, which is a crucial regulatory element in the scientific knowledge production. Erosion affects both aspects of objectivity as an ontological principle and as an ‘epistemic virtue’. Against this background, objectivity as an ‘epistemic virtue’ has been transformed into the ‘technique of distancing’ and the principle of technical impersonality, which imply eventually the replacement of the ‘knowledge self’ by a technical system.
14. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Galina V. Vdovina Галина Владимировна Вдовина
Brentano and Scholasticism: Searching for Lost Origins
Брентано и схоластика

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The article deals with the problem of scholastic sources of Brentano’s concept of intentionality. The subject matter of the discussion is the so-called thesis on intentionality as formulated by Brentano in his 1874 book “Psychology from an Empirical Point of View”. The search for Brentano's specific scholastic sources has been going on for decades, but even today the problem is still relevant. The objectives of the article are, firstly, to identify the main positions on the issue and to reveal the reasons for their failure, and, secondly, to suggest our own hypothesis providing arguments in its favor. On the basis of the existing publications the following positions are briefly formulated: 1) hypothesis of borrowing from Thomas Aquinas; 2) hypothesis of borrowing from Aristotle; 3) hypothesis of borrowing from the 14th century scholastics. The inconsistency of these hypotheses, each on its own grounds, is shown. The first hypothesis proceeds from false assumptions, the second one is obviously reductionist, the third one correctly identifies the points of similarity between Brentano and the scholastics, but underestimates the differences between them. The author’s hypothesis is that the most precise parallel to Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality is found in the early modern scholasticism. It is supported from two sides. First, on the basis of Brentano’s biographical and reading history, arguments are formulated in favor of the validity of this assumption. It is shown that Brentano was able to reach the scholastics of Descartes’ epoch through his reading of the works of German neoscholastics of the mid-nineteenth century. Brentano’s and baroque scholasticism’s main points about intentionality are then formulated: 1) distinction between intentional and physical phenomena as a core of intentional philosophy; 2) intentionality as a property of all, not only intellectual, mental acts; 3) notion of intentional object and its variations; 4) objective being; 5) reality of mental acts and irreality of their contents. The comparison shows that they are similar in both traditions not only substantively, but also functionally.
new trends
15. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Yuri K. Volkov Юрий Константинович Волков
Technoscience, Humanity and Man: In Search for a Formula of Coexistence
Технонаука, человечество и человек

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This article is a reflection on some conceptual ideas of the book “Humanity and Technos: the philosophy of coevolution” related to negative assessments of the socio-anthropological consequences of the development of technoscience. It is noted that the author’s criticism of novationist interpretations of scientific and technological progress is subordinated to the main idea of the book about the incompatibility of the principles of convergence and coevolution in the relationship between man and technology. It is shown that the book examines not only the external challenges of technoscience, but also the areas of scientific research that threatens the world of traditional man. Based on the results of the analysis of the book's content the following main conclusions are made. 1. Despite the presence of a large group of social problems generated by the fourth technological order the authors of the book are most concerned about the consequences of the development of digital technologies that can change the man's generic nature. 2. Rhetorical theory of number considering in the book as a worldview paradigm of the digital revolution actually has a narrower subject specificity. 3. The assumption that exist a parallel evolution of technology independent of human is contradicting the original premise about the artificial nature of artifacts. 4. Conclusion about the presence of animal traits in humans that were lost during technological revolution is requires specification. 5. The problem of an existential crisis caused by the appearance of a new class of technical artifacts and also the theme of the deficit of freedom in the virtual space has not been its developed. 6. The project of the ideology of left conservatism positioned as the most consistent variant of the philosophy of resistance to the “technogenic degradation of mankind” seems to contradict the dialectical-revolutionary essence of classical Marxism. In conclusion the ideological sense of the main goal for humanity proposed by the authors and the relativity of the ideology of conservatism are shown.
16. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Artur R. Karimov Артур Равилевич Каримов
Through Virtues to Knowledge: On the Foundations of Aretaic Approach in Epistemology
К знанию через добродетели

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By all accounts, virtue epistemology is making a value turn in contemporary analytic epistemology. In this article, this twist is explicated through the transformation of the understanding of epistemic values and the value of the epistemic. In the first sense, we are talking about how the view has changed on what determines the epistemic value of such categories as truth, knowledge, understanding, etc. In the second sense, we are talking about the value of our epistemic concepts (the value of the epistemic): what is true belief, knowledge, etc. for? It is shown how the causal link between our beliefs and intellectual virtues allows us to explain the nature and value of knowledge as a central category of epistemology. The author reveals the difference between the main types of virtue epistemology through the prism of two different approaches to the justification of values: value internalism and value externalism. Value externalism assumes that a state/motive/action gains value from something outside of a person's consciousness. In contrast, value internalism holds that the conditions that determine value are internal to consciousness. For reliabilism, the value of cognitive success lies in its causal connection with the reliable competences of the subject, for responsibilism – with virtuous motives of cognitive activity. Common to reliabilism and responsibilism is that they shift the focus from the value of an effect (truth) to its relationship with the value of a cause – an ability or excellent trait of intellectual character. The main approaches to substantiating the fundamental value of knowledge in virtue epistemology are analyzed. If for reliabilism the highest epistemic value is truth as cognitive achievement, then for responsibilism the value of epistemic categories is primarily in their moral significance – the achievement of a good life and happiness (eudaimonia). In conclusion, the problematic aspects of virtue epistemology are formulated and promising directions for its further development are shown.
panel discussion
17. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Duncan Pritchard Данкан Притчард
In Defense of Veritism
В защиту веритизма

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It used to be taken as a given in epistemology that the fundamental good from a purely epistemic point of view is truth. Such veritism is a given no longer, with some commentators advocating epistemic value pluralism, whereby truth is at most one of several irreducible epistemic goods, while others are attracted to an epistemic value monism that is centred on something other than truth, such as knowledge or understanding. It is claimed that it was premature to reject veritism. In particular, it is argued that the kinds of motivations that are offered for rejecting this proposal are weak on closer inspection, as they trade on a dubious reading of veritism that is independently implausible. The attraction of this implausible way of thinking about veritism lies in the difficulty of offering any coherent alternative. A solution to this conundrum is proposed, whereby we unpack the veritist proposal in terms of the explanatorily prior notion of an intellectually virtuous inquirer.
18. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Ernest Sosa Эрнест Соса
On Veritism. Pritchard’s Defense
О веритизме: позиция Д. Притчарда

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This time Pritchard is on a rescue mission. Veritism is besieged and he rises to defend it. I do agree with much in his Veritism, but I demur when he adds: “So, the goodness of all epistemic goods is understood instrumentally with regard to whether they promote truth”. If Big Brother brainwashes us to believe the full contents of The Encyclopedia Britannica, then even if we suppose those contents to be true without exception, that would not make what they do an unalloyed good thing, not even epistemically. But it does seem to promote truth. What might then diminish Big Brother’s action so much, so as to make it so deplorable epistemically after all, despite how powerfully it does instrumentally promote truth. At a minimum we need to say more about the relations between epistemic goods and truth, so as to better understand how it is that the epistemic good is made so good by what specific relation to the truth. I lay out a way to understand Veritism so that it can say more about the relations between epistemic goods and truth, thus enhancing our understanding of epistemic normativity. And in a second part I lay out a solution to Linda Zagzebski’s Swamping problem for reliabilism. I argue that it is a problem for process reliabilism, but not for a virtue epistemology that accepts a kind of reliabilism, but in an agential telic framework, and not in a process framework. So, I lay out one way to be a “veritist”, by defending explicitly its Axiological side, and by implication its Conceptual side as well. I have raised questions for Pritchard’s own defense and have offered in each case an alternative defense that I believe fits the words of his formulations, and is in their spirit as well.
19. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
John Greco Джон Греко
Pritchard’s Case for Veritism
Веритизм в интерпретации Д. Причарда

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In his “In Defense of Veritism”, Duncan Pritchard reconsiders the case for epistemic value truth monism, or the thesis that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic good. I begin by clarifying Pritchard’s thesis, and then turn to an evaluation of Pritchard’s defense. By way of clarification, Pritchard understands “fundamental” value to be non-instrumental value. Accordingly, Pritchard’s veritism turns out to be the thesis that truth is the sole epistemic good with non-instrumental epistemic value, all other epistemic goods being valuable in virtue of their instrumental relation to truth. By way of evaluation, I argue that the case for veritism has not been made. The central point is this: Even if all epistemic value involves some or other relation to the truth, there are multiple relations to truth in addition to instrumental relations. Moreover, some of these seem capable of grounding further, fundamental (i.e., non-instrumental) epistemic goods. For example, knowledge has a constitutive relation to truth, and knowledge seems to be epistemically valuable for its own sake. Likewise, justified belief has an intentional relation to truth, and justified belief seems to be epistemically valuable for its own sake. Finally, I argue that, contra Pritchard, this central point seems confirmed rather than undermined by looking to the notion of an intellectually virtuous inquirer. Plausibly, a virtuous inquirer values such goods as justified belief and knowledge for their own sake qua epistemic goods, and not merely for their instrumental value for attaining truth.
20. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 58 > Issue: 4
Sergei M. Levin Сергей Михайлович Левин
Intellectually Virtuous Inquirer and the Practical Value of Truth
Интеллектуально добродетельный исследователь и практическая ценность истины

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Veritism is the thesis that the truth is the fundamental epistemic good. According to Duncan Pritchard, the most pressing objections to veritism are the trivial truths objection and the trivial inquiry problem. The former states that veritism entails that trivial truths are as important as deep and important truths. The latter is a problem that a veritist must prefer trivial inquiry that generates many trivial truths to the serious inquiry with the hope but no guarantee to discover some deep and important truth. Both objections arise from the inability of veritism prima facie to properly rate the different types of truths. Pritchard's solution is to approach the truth from the perspective of the intellectually virtuous inquirer who would prefer weighty truth over trivial truth. In my commentary, I criticise the proposed solution as circular reasoning. The necessary virtue for an intellectually virtuous inquirer is that they would prefer the weighty truth over the trivial one and at the same time, the weighty truth is superior because it is the goal for intellectually virtuous inquirer. I suggest another path to substantiate veritism in the face of the two sibling objections. I argue that truth is the fundamental epistemic good as it makes the epistemic realm practically valuable more than any other epistemic good. The weighty truths are preferable to the trivial ones because the practical value of the deep and important truths is usually higher. The suggested path goes away from the attempts to prove the epistemic value of truth only within the epistemic realm, yet I argue it does not compel the intellectually virtuous inquirer to seek the truth only for the sake of practical reasons.