1. The incarnation of Christ is the deep root, the sound foundation and the ultimate apex of Christian humanism. God was made man. In the fact of the Incarnation is the supreme and universal reason for new humanity, for what humanity is, what humanity wants to be in its noblest wishes and what it will be. The single truth about man revealed by Jesus Christ, ‘the way, the truth and the life’ (Jn 14:6), and the ‘eldest – born among many brethren’ (Rm 8:29) – makes the dignity of the human being, created in the image and likeness of God (por. Gen 1:26), shine forth in its fullness.2. The Holy Father John Paul II, often recognised as Defensor hominis, has appreciated and developed in a forceful way the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas in the spirit of Vatican Council II (OT 16, GE 10). He himself gave the Angelic Doctor the new title of Doctor Humanitatis, a title added to Doctor Divinitatis and Doctor Communis Ecclesiae. As a philosopher of the person, the Pope had already drawn up his philosophical approach which was deeply rooted in Thomistic metaphisics and anthropology, from which arises the need for ethics and aesthetics. In the encyclical letter Fides et Ratio (43-45), the perennial newness of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas is offered at the dawn of the third millennium as a proven path of Catholic philosophy and theology.3. St. Thomas Aquinas demonstrated humanism to us as a philosopher and even more as a theologian; as a man, as a Christian, and as a religious. The concept of the ‘person’ in Thomistic doctrine reflected one of the fundamental new features of Christian thought. In addition, by specifying the relations that exist between philosophy and teology, St. Thomas also provided the principle for the solution to the problem of Christian humanism. Basing the mystery of man in the actus essendi, and recognising his natural capacity to know truth, he embraced the mystery of integral humanity in its opening to transcendence and the absolute, in its theological being, capax Dei.4. At the dawn of the third millennium the need urgently presents itself for the promotion of genuine Thomism, open to dialogue with the world and able to engage in a discussion with today’s various philosophical currents; a Thomism that in its recta ratio is directly nourished by the gospel spirit of the Holy Angelic Doctor. The spirit of Thomistic balance should be promoted, on a pilgrimage amongst the peoples of the earth and participating in the new evangelisation.

The paper consists of two parts. In the first one the author proposes his own formulation of the metaphysical proof of God’s existence. The point of departure in this proof is the affirmation of the existence of many different beings (things). The second part is devoted to a more detailed metaphysical determination of the nature of God.

The publication of Sir Isaac Newton’s Principia led not only to a revolution in physics, but also gave rise to a new set of directions in natural theology. The mechanistic image of the physical universe that arose from Newton’s physics was best explained, according to Newton’s contemporaries and followers in the 18th and early 19th centuries, by an appeal to the powerful hand of a wise designing God. Despite critiques by Hume and Kant, that natural theology held broad appeal among scientifically minded people until the work of Charles Darwin proposed a new type of explanatory mechanism that radically undercut the fundamental directions of Newtonian natural theology.

Prior to the twentieth century, religious thinkers developed their understandings of the relationship between natural science and theology in contexts in which natural science presented a theoretically unified account of nature − first, for example, the Aristotelian account of nature that so powerfully influenced the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas; and later the Newtonian account of nature that influenced numerous directions in religious thought following the seventeenth century. The twentieth century, and now the twenty-first century has come to accept understandings of physical nature without a requirement of theoretical unification. This lack of theoretical unification within the natural sciences must lead religious thinkers to engage their theologies with natural science in a manner more piece-meal than in earlier times. This presents both opportunities and challenges for theological development. The nominalist tradition may be in this context seen as a source for this development.

The author argues that a historical hypothesis h is probable in so far as it is intrinsically a simple hypothesis and (1) the posterior historical evidence is such as probably would occur if h is true, but not otherwise, (2) the general background evidence makes it probable that h is to be expected under certain conditions, and not otherwise, (3) there is evidence, the prior historical evidence’ such as probably would occur if these conditions were satisfied, but not otherwise. By the ‘posterior historical evidence’ is meant the testimony of witnesses and physical traces caused by what happened at the time in question. In the case of the resurrection of Jesus the general background evidence which makes it probable that there is a God of the traditional kind who has good reason to become incarnate in order to provide atonement, to identify with us in our suffering, and to reveal teaching. The prior historical evidence that there was prophet who led the kind of life that incarnate God would need to lead if he had become incarnate for these reason. He will need to show us when some prophet has led the right sort of life that God has lived it, and that can be achieved by his life being culminated by a super-miracle such as the resurrection. The posterior historical evidence is the evidence of witnesses to the empty tomb and the appearances of Jesus. The stronger is the general background evidence, and the stronger is the prior historical evidence showing that one and only one prophet (Jesus) led the right sort of life, the less our need of posterior historical evidence. Given some modest values for (1), (2), (3), there is a very high probability that the resurrection occurred. This is illustrated by feeding some artificially precise values for these probabilities into the relevant theorem of the probability calculus, Bayes’ Theorem.

Feminism is a movement that tends to change the unfavourable cultural, social, and political relations on behalf of women.The feministic movement has developed in our cultural circle since the 18th century and has taken on various forms. One should mention here the following: feminism as a right strife conducted by women to recognise their dignity, make them equal with respect to citizen rights, ensure equal (with men) access to education that would enable them to obtain a job and enlarge their opportunities in economical, social, political, and religious life – always taking into account their different sex and preserving their vocation as wives and mothers. This is true feminism, which is now defined as a new or Christian feminism, feminism – as an ideology stemming from radical liberalism, socialism, freudism, and post-modernism − strikes woman’s identity and in the most radical manifestations it regards sex as a cultural category, and advocates absolute freedom. Thus understood feminism leads to deformation in social life by undermining familial ties and the right to live for the unborn children (abortion). This is false feminism, such that undermines women's identity and dignity.

In Section 2 of his paper (which follows the introductory section) Gary Malinas „summarises three arguments that have been advanced in recent discussions of free agency and responsibility. The first concludes that free agency and responsibility are incompatible with determinism. The second concludes that free agency and responsibility are incompatible with indeterminism. The third concludes that the concept of a free and responsible agent is incoherent. Taken collectively, they entail the conclusion of the practical sceptic: No one acts freely and responsibly. If the summary case can be filled out so that it is sound, it undercuts a number of the commitments of the thick conception of persons the fulfilment of which, arguably, is required for free and responsible action. I believe that the summary case can be filled out so that it is sound. I will adopt this belief as an unargued assumption. It entails that no one acts freely and is truly responsible for their actions. I also believe that it is true that people act freely and responsibly. Once the case for practical scepticism has been put, I devote the remainder of this paper to the vindication of this latter belief. My claim is that practical scepticism is sound, yet nevertheless, it is also true that people act freely and responsibly. The onus of the vindication will be to disarm what appears to be an explicit contradiction. Section 3 proposes a definition of free and responsible action in terms of the concept of exculpation. It argues that judgements concerning agents’ responsibility for their actions are often true under the presuppositions which are in place in the settings in which the judgements are made. Those presuppositions restrict the domains over which the judgements are semantically evaluated. The practical sceptic contests those presuppositions and thereby alters the domain of semantic evaluation. Under the influence of sceptical argumentation, possibilities of exculpation which had been properly ignored can no longer be ignored. Section 4 sketches an account of presupposing and when exculpatory possibilities are properly ignored. Section 5 considers the question of whether I have conceded too much to the practical sceptic”.

The notion of fundamentalism refers mainly to religious attitudes, worldview, ideological and political tenets. It is an attitude that enforces certain social, or even individual, behaviours, and does not respect the subject-orientation in man. It is often referred to the ways of philosophising in which one tends to grasp the fundamental principles of the existence of the world and of man’s action. This manner of philosophising is set in opposition to any kind of free choice and relativism. It cannot be treated as „fundamentalism” if amongst the principles of action there is a principle of freedom, subject-orientation, that is, there is room for human conscience; or, when it is approved that human reason that discovers the principles of the world and action – as being contingent and limited – is not infallible. One should also bear in mind the difference between the practical attitude, including the social way of behaviour, and the theoretical attitude, one that is determined by the methodological and systemic principles of philosophy.