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articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Bruce Langtry God and the Best
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The paper reaches two main conclusions: Firstly, even if there are one or more possible worlds than which there are none better, God cannot actualise any of them. Secondly, if there are possible worlds which God can actualise, and than which God can actualise none better, then God must actualise one of them. The paper is neutral between compatibilist and libertarian views of creaturely freedom.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Theodore Gulesarian Can God Change His Mind?
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A temporal perfect being is best conceived of as having essentially the power to change his mind-even from doing a morally right act to doing one that is morally wrong. For, this power allows him to increase his moral worth by constantly refraining from changing his intentions to do the right thing. Such a being could not possess the power to form an unalterable intention to do the right thing. Could an omnipotent, omniscient being have this power to change his mind and yet know what his future intentions will be? Four arguments that imply a negative answer are considered and rebutted.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
David W. Aiken Kierkegaard’s “Three Stages”: A Pilgrim’s Regress?
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The purpose of this paper is to explore an hypothesis rather than draw any unassailable conclusions. I argue that there is a fundamental tension between the sub-Christian account of the “Three Stages” presented in the earlier pseudonymous writings and the explicitly Christian account presented in the Anti-Climacean and later acknowledged writings. The earlier version is that of a progress from spiritless “immediacy” toward more complete integrations of the self, culminating in authentic religious faith; while the later is that of a regress from lesser to ever greater forms of spiritual peril, culminating in a disordered religiosity that vainly seeks to overthrow the established ecclesiastical order. Tracing the conflict between these two perspectives also enhances our understanding of the purpose underlying Kierkegaard’s project by suggesting the possibility that the authorship constitutes a literary confession of Kierkegaard’s own spiritual regress.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Alvin Plantinga Science: Augustinian or Duhemian
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This paper is a continuation of a discussion with Ernan McMullin; its topic is the question how theists (in particular, Christian theists) should think about modern science---the whole range of modern science, including economics, psychology, sociobiology and so on. Should they follow Augustine in thinking that many large scale scientific projects as well as intellectual projects generally are in the service of one or the other of the civitates? Or should they follow Duhem, who (at least in the case of physics) held that proper science is independent of metaphysical, theological or (broadly) religious concerns? The focus of the discussion is biology; I support the Augustinian line of thought, while McMullin is more inclined to the Duhemian. I conclude by defending the idea that the epistemic probability of the Grand Evolutionary Scenario on Christian theism together with the empirical evidence is somewhat less than 1/2.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
David P. Hunt Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate
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One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt’s famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For those who endorse this line, “Frankfurt counterexamples” are supposed to show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the foreknowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this journal via a pair of articles by David Widerker and John Martin Fischer. I suggest that this debate can be avoided: divine foreknowledge is itself aparadigmatic counterexample to PAP, requiring no support from suspect Frankfurt counterexamples.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Roderick M. Chisholm, Dean W. Zimmerman On the Logic of Intentional Help: Some Metaphysical Questions
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In this note, we explore certain aspects of “the logic of helping”; offer an account of the metaphysics of helping God; and suggest a way in which God’s help differs from human help.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann An Objection to Swinburne’s Argument for Dualism
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Richard Swinburne Reply to Stump and Kretzmann
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Stump and Kretzmann object to my argument for substance dualism on the ground that its statement involves an implausibly stringent understanding of a hard fact about a time as one whose truth conditions lie solely at that time. I am however entitled to my own definitions, and there is a simple reason why the “standard examples” of hard facts which they provide do not satisfy my definition - they all concern instants and not periods of time.
9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
David Widerker, Charlotte Katzoff Avoidability and Libertarianism: A Response to Fischer
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Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s first response is unconvincing and undermines Molinism itself; (ii) the version of libertarianism he presents is fallacious, and (iii) even on the version of libertarianism he proposes, avoid ability remains a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Frances Howard-Snyder, Daniel Howard-Snyder The Real Problem of No Best World
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Jove, an essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient and morally good being, faced with a choice of which world to create (where for any he might create there is a better) randomly selects no. 777. Is he, therefore, morally surpassable? William Rowe says “yes”. For Thor, an essentially omnipotent and essentially omniscient being in Jove’s predicament who does not randomly create but selects no. 888 because he is prepared to select no world less than no. 888, has a degree of moral goodness that exceeds Jove’s. By exploring two options---either Thor has a reason for being so prepared or he doesn’t---we question the coherency of Rowe’s Thor.
book reviews
11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Michael J. Murray Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist
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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Michael Bergmann Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of John Hick’s Theodicy
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13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Joshua L. Golding Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal’s Wager
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14. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Lynn S. Joy Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture
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15. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Trenton Merricks Belief Policies
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16. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Charles Taliaferro The God Who Acts
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notes and news
17. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Notes and News
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