Cover of Logos & Episteme
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-20 of 600 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Daniele Bertini The Refutation of Intentionalism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
My purpose is to refute the intentionalist approach to perception. Drawing from mainstream literature, I identify a principle on which any version of intentional theory relies. My paper is a detailed attack on the truth of the principle. In the first section I will introduce terminology and will taxonomize various statements of the intentional view. In the second section I will briefly outline a sketch of the skeletal intentionalist theory that develops from the assumption of the principle alone. Then, in the third section, I will advance my reasons against this theory. In the fourth section, I will set forth anintuitive and definitive counterexample to the adequacy of the principle of intentionalism to accounting for ordinary perception. Moving from this, in the fifth section, I will provide some reasons explaining why intentionalism is condemned at being unsuccessful. Finally, in the last section of the paper, I will give my conclusions.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Mark Anthony L. Dacela, Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr. Collective Epistemic Traits as System Properties
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The essay deals with the issue of how a non-summativist account of collective epistemic traits can be properly justified. We trace the roots of this issue in virtue epistemology and collective epistemology and then critically examine certain views advanced to justify non-summativism. We focus on those considered by Fricker, including Gilbert’s concept of plural subjects, which she endorses. We find her analysis of these views problematic for either going beyond the parameters of the summativism-nonsummativism debate or contradicting common intuitions about epistemic trait ascriptions. As an alternative, we advance the idea that collective epistemic traits are system properties; or that epistemic traits act as system properties when attributed to collectives taken in their own right. Working as a system, the individual members of a collective perform their designated roles or tasks in coordination and cooperation with each other to achieve theirjoint intentions. Being attributes exclusive to systems, collective epistemic traits cannot, therefore, be attributed in the same respect to the individuals comprising these systems, thereby blocking any summative account of these traits. This model also easily sidesteps the problems besetting Fricker’s preferred one.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Mohammadreza Esmkhani The Post-epistemological Inquiry and the Ultimate Fate of Philosophy.: A Critical Discussion
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This essay examines the different fates of philosophy in Bloor’s and Rorty’s post-epistemological inquiries, tracing their sharp disagreement to their distinct conceptions of ‘naturalism’ and ‘language.’ To this end, the first section outlines their main reasons for overcoming the epistemologically-centered philosophy, as well as theirreassessments of key concepts such as objectivity. The second section draws a comparison between their proposed post-epistemological inquiries, i.e., Bloor’s empirically-informed ‘sociologism’ and Rorty’s pragmatist ‘conversationalism,’ emphasizing that while the former implies the ‘end’ of philosophy in a scientific culture, the latter proposes a ‘new role’ for philosophy in a conversational culture. The third section shows how, in contrast to Bloor’s dismissive attitude toward philosophy and the potential of intervocabulary discourse, which can chiefly be attributed to his scientific naturalism and his Wittgensteinian rule-governed view of language, Rorty’s conception of philosophy as a cross-cultural, conversational practice is enabled and sustained by his non-scientific naturalism coupled with his Davidsonian communicative view of language. Finally, as opposed to Rorty’s attempt to completely dismantle the ‘epistemology industry,’ the fourth section briefly explores the extent to which Bloor’s ‘theory’-oriented viewpoint is still affected by it.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Nicolas C. Gonzalez Identification and Appearance as Epistemic Groundwork
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The idea that appearances provide justifications for beliefs—the principle of phenomenal conservatism—is self-evidently true. In the case of cognitive penetration, however, it seems that certain irrational etiologies of a belief may influence the epistemic quality of that belief. Susanna Siegel argues that these etiologies lead to ‘epistemic downgrade.’ Instead of providing us with a decisive objection, cognitive penetration calls for us to clarify our epistemic framework by understanding the formative parts of appearances. In doing so, the two different but inseparable ideas of sensation and intellection provide us with a basis of our appearances. These appearances, in turn, provide us with the objective evidence needed to test our judgements. Thus, the extra-sensory concepts of intellectual identification and the appearances they help form become an epistemic groundwork.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Logos & Episteme: Aims & Scope
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
research articles
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Frederik J. Andersen Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Arnold Cusmariu Is JTB Knowledge Hopeless?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
An argument structure that covers both cases Gettier described in his 1963 paper reinforces the conclusion of my 2012 Logos & Episteme article that the justified true belief (JTB) conception of knowledge is inconsistent. The stronger argument makes possible identification of fundamental flaws in the standard approach of adding a fourth condition to JTB, so that a new kind of skepticism becomes inevitable unless conceptual change occurs.
10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Danilo Fraga Dantas When the (Bayesian) Ideal Is Not Ideal
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. The goal of this paper is to discuss the assumptions of these arguments, including the measure of epistemic value. I have designed AI agents based on the Bayesian model and a nonmonotonic framework and tested how they achieve practical and epistemic value in conditions in which an alternative set of assumptions holds. In one of the tested conditions, the nonmonotonic agent, which is not opinionated and fulfills neither probabilism nor conditionalization, outperforms the Bayesian in the measure of epistemic value that I argue for in the paper (α -value). I discuss the consequences of these results for the epistemology of rationality.
11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Erhan Demircioglu Subjective Rationality and the Reasoning Argument
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is intended by Kolodny both as an argument against bare-bones wide-scopism and as an argument against embellished wide-scopism. I argue that despite its formidable virtue of demonstrating the need for an account of thick subjective rationality, the Reasoning Argument works neither against bare-bones wide-scopism nor against embellished wide-scopism.
12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Andreas Stephens Contextual Shifts and Gradable Knowledge
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Epistemological contextualism states that propositions about knowledge, expressed in sentences like “S knows that P,” are context-sensitive. Schaffer (2005) examines whether one of Lewis’ (1996), Cohen’s (1988) and DeRose’s (1995) influential contextualist accounts is preferable to the others. According to Schaffer, Lewis’ theory of relevant alternatives succeeds as a linguistic basis for contextualism and as an explanation of what the parameter that shifts with context is, while Cohen’s theory of thresholds and DeRose’s theory of standards fail. This paper argues that Schaffer’s analysis is unsatisfactory since it fails to show that thresholds and standards cannot cope with skepticism, as it is ultimately the conversation participants who control how the conversation plays out. Moreover, Schaffer fails to show that gradability is of no importance in inquiries.
13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme: Aims and Scope
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
research articles
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Miguel López Astorga Carnap Versus Popper: What Scientists Actually Do
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Carnap and Popper proposed ways scientists have to work. According to Carnap, they should look for confirmations for hypotheses. In Popper‘s view, what is important is to try to falsify hypotheses. Cognitive science seems to prove that, in real scientific research, both activities play a role. First, people attempt to confirm hypotheses. Second, they seek examples refuting those hypotheses. This paper is intended to show that the theory of mental models can describe the mental processes involved in both tasks: confirmation and falsification. It addresses the mental possibilities individuals consider in both cases. In addition, the paper reveals that, in accordance with both Carnap‘s framework and Popper‘s approach, both mental activities are related to conditional reasoning.
17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Ali Hossein Khani Quine and First-Person Authority
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Blackburn and Searle have argued that Quine‘s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation results in a denial of the sort of first-person authority that we commonly concede we have over our mental and semantical content. For, the indeterminacy thesis implies that there is no determinate meaning to know at all. And, according to Quine, the indeterminacy holds at home too. For Blackburn, Quine must constrain the domain of indeterminacy to the case of translation only. Searle believes that Quine has no other choice but to give up on his behaviorism. Hylton, however, has attempted to defend Quine against these objections, by arguing that Quine‘s naturalistic claim that speaking a language is nothing but possessing certain dispositions to act in specific ways would enable him to accommodate first-person authority. I will argue that the objections from Blackburn and Searle, as well as Hylton‘s solution, are all problematic when seen from within Quine‘s philosophy. I will introduce a sort of Strawsonian-Wittgensteinian conception of first-person authority and offer that it would be more than compatible with Quine‘s naturalistic philosophy.
18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Jimmy Alfonso Licon Why the Heck Would You Do Philosophy?: A Practical Challenge to Philosophizing
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Philosophy plausibly aims at knowledge; it would thus be tempting to hold that much of the value of doing philosophy turns on securing knowledge. Enter the agnostic challenge: suppose that a philosophical agnostic (named 'Betsy‘) wants to discover only fundamental philosophical truths. However, the intractable disagreement among philosophical experts gives her pause. After reflecting on expert disagreement, she decides that doing philosophy, for her truth-seeking error-avoiding purposes, is irrational. In this paper, I argue that the agnostic challenge isn‘t easily overcome. Although there are many reasons to do philosophy, the agnostic challenge implies there is less value to doing philosophy than many philosophers may have believed.
19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Daniel Rönnedal Ought We to Believe the Truth and Nothing But the Truth?: Two Arguments For the Wide Scope Version of the Truth Norm
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
According to the so-called truth norm, we ought to believe that A if and only if A is true. There are many possible interpretations of this norm. What does 'ought‘ in this norm mean? Does 'ought‘ have a wide or a narrow scope, etc.? In this paper, I will investigate one version of this norm and I will discuss two arguments for it. The 'ought‘ in the paper will be interpreted as a kind of 'rational‘ ought that takes wide scope. I will call the first argument for the truth norm 'the extrapolation argument‘ and the second argument 'the abductive argument.‘ According to the extrapolation argument, we 'derive‘ the truth norm from a reflection on what it means to be a perfect believer. According to the abductive argument, the truth norm is supported by the fact that it can be used to deduce many other plausible doxastic norms. If this argument is successful, the truth norm can be conceived as the fundamental norm of (theoretical) rationality (or wisdom).
discussion notes/debate
20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Bálint Békefi Self-Favoring Theories and the Bias Argument
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In a recent article, Bernáth and Tőzsér (2021) defend what they call the Bias Argument, a new skeptical argument from expert peer disagreement. They argue that the best contrastive causal explanation for disagreement among leading experts in philosophy is that they adopt their positions in a biased way. But if the leading experts are biased, non-experts either are also biased or only avoid bias through epistemic inferiority. Recognizing this is expected to prompt one to decrease one‘s confidence in one‘s philosophical beliefs. This paper argues that some beliefs are immune to a key premise of the Bias Argument. To show this, the paper develops the concepts of self-favoring theories, decisive support, and standing-incommensurable disagreements. A plausible example of a self-favoring theory, dubbed Mere Reformed Protestantism, is sketched. Many disagreements over self-favoring theories and over beliefs decisively supported by self-favoring theories are shown to be standing-incommensurable. It is then argued that when non-experts are in standing-incommensurable disagreements with experts, the standards of assessing expertise are themselves controverted. This result undercuts the move in the Bias Argument from expert bias to non-expert bias. Finally, a couple reservations about the role of self-favoring theories in philosophy are addressed.