Cover of Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal
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Displaying: 1-20 of 161 documents


1. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Grace Weber The Plate is Political: A Foucauldian Analysis of Anorexia Nervosa
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In this paper, I investigate why anorexia nervosa emerged in non-Western nations after Western globalization efforts. Using Simone de Beauvoir’s theory of gender from The Second Sex alongside Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of the “docile body,” I argue that the emergence of anorexia nervosa in non-Western nations reflects the Western sovereign’s subordination of women. While patriarchal oppression is not exclusive to the West, I contend that the political ideology behind Western industrialization has allowed new avenues for patriarchal oppression to permeate. To conclude, I demand that mainstream discourse on anorexia nervosa consider the political conditions which are catalytic to its occurrence.
2. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Samuel R. Elliott A Two-Part Defense of Intuitionistic Mathematics
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The classical interpretation of mathematical statements can be seen as comprising two separate but related aspects: a domain and a truth-schema. L. E. J. Brouwer’s intuitionistic project lays the groundwork for an alternative conception of the objects in this domain, as well as an accompanying intuitionistic truth-schema. Drawing on the work of Arend Heyting and Michael Dummett, I present two objections to classical mathematical semantics, with the aim of creating an opening for an alternative interpretation. With this accomplished, I then make the case for intuitionism as a suitable candidate to fill this void.
3. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Emma Ming Wahl Black Women in Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks: The Intersection of Race, Gender, and Oppression
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In this paper, I focus on the representations of Black women in contrast to Black men found within Frantz Fanon’s philosophical work Black Skin, White Masks. I propose that while Fanon’s racial dialectical work is very significant, he often lacks acknowledgement of the multidimensionality of the Black woman’s lived experience specifically. Drawing on the theory of intersectionality, coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw, I argue that Fanon does not recognize the different layers of oppression operating in Black women’s lives to the degree that he fails to include them within his framework of both liberation and resistance from racial oppression.
4. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Micah Phillips-Gary Full-Blooded Conceptual Realism as a Response to Skeptical Relativism
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In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects exist) as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some aspect, then objective knowledge is possible, regardless of how these concepts arose historically.
5. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Seyeong Hanlim Being Moral Isn’t Quite Enough: The Role of Nonmoral Virtues in Moral Sainthood
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Attempts to define morality or stress its importance are the center of ethical debates that aim to provide guidance for human life. Deviating from this goal, Susan Wolf shines a light on the significance of “nonmoral virtues” by discussing how a moral saint’s life, too immersed in morality, could be lacking in other spheres. She states that a moral saint’s life would be unattractive or dull, as one is not able to value or pursue nonmoral activities such as the arts or cooking due to one’s commitments under moral sainthood. I challenge this argument, which belittles moral sainthood in an attempt to give more credit to nonmoral qualities in life, by arguing that nonmoral virtues could be necessary and valuable for a moral saint in carrying out her duties.
6. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Bradley Holder Clashing Consciousness: A Cure for Modern Medicine’s Epistemic Privilege
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In this paper, I consider practical strategies for resolving the epistemic injustice that ill persons face when seeking medical treatment. My arguments will expand upon those initially made by Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd in “Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.” My approach to this problem is twofold. First, I will demonstrate how the phenomenological toolkit, as it currently stands, emphasizes the patient’s experience and leaves the doctor’s experience unadjusted. After this, I will explain how the toolkit can be improved to include the doctor’s perspective.
7. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Ryan Curnow Hegel’s Projected Nihilism: A Study of Orientalized Buddhism
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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s historical analysis of Buddhist philosophy not only fails as a sound interpretation of that tradition, it also well-exemplifies the Western practice of Orientalism as elucidated by Edward Said. I attempt to demonstrate this in three major parts: the nature of Orientalism as a concept and practice, the Orientalist analytical process that Hegel employs in judging Buddhism as well as religions in general, and how Hegel’s understanding does not work against a more charitably interpreted Buddhist defense. Moreover, I argue that the Orientalist erroneousness of Hegel’s reading deeply complicates his hierarchical philosophy of world history.
8. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Megan Wu In Defense of Platonic Essentialism about Numbers
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In defense of anti-essentialism, pragmatist Richard Rorty holds that we may think of all objects as if they were numbers. I find that Rorty’s metaphysics hinges on two rather weak arguments against the essences of numbers. In contrast, Plato’s metaphysics offers a plausible definition of essentiality by which numbers do have essential properties. Further, I argue that Rorty’s argumentative mistake is mischaracterizing Plato’s definition. I conclude that Plato’s definition of “essential” is a robust one which implies that many properties, beyond those we might intuitively think of, can count as essential properties of objects.
9. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Jee Won Choi Avoiding the Swine: A Hedonist’s Dilemma
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What constitutes a good life? A hedonist’s answer to this question is rather simple— more pleasure, less pain. While hedonism was previously a widely accepted belief, it now suffers from several crucial objections. A challenge particularly vexing to hedonists is the Philosophy of Swine: could it be possible that our lives may be less than that of a theoretical swine? In this essay, I argue that lifetime hedonism, the view of hedonism concerned with one’s total lifelong well-being, does not survive this objection. In particular, I will refute the counterarguments that modern-day hedonist, Ben Bramble, presents against the Philosophy of Swine objection.
10. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Even Totland Why the Readiness Potential Does Not Disprove Free Will
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Neuroscientist Benjamin Libet has conducted a series of experiments that reveal the existence of certain neural processes in the brain of human subjects, initiating an action prior to the human subject’s intention to act, thus seemingly threatening our idea of free will. The purpose of this paper is to show how these processes do not disprove any idea of free will one might have as one would, if accepting such a thesis, be committing two distinct mereological fallacies and ultimately, would treat the human subject as inhabiting some of its parts as opposed to being the sum of its parts.
11. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Max Davidson-Smith Post-Hierarchical Race: Reconsidering the Nature of Hierarchy within Haslanger’s Account of Race
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In this essay, I consider Sally Haslanger’s social constructivist account of race and propose a modification to the nature of hierarchy specified. According to Haslanger, race will cease to exist post-hierarchy, given that she builds in a requirement of synchronic hierarchy for the existence of race. While Haslanger maintains that racial identity would linger beyond hierarchical treatment in the form of ethnicity, I will suggest this fails to provide adequate conceptual justice for the cultures and aesthetics which emerged out of past oppression. In response, I propose a modification which would allow us to recognize the possibility of post-hierarchical races.
12. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 14
Brianna Lopez Origin, Impact, and Reaction to Misogynistic Behaviors: An Interview with Kate A. Manne, PhD
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Kate A. Manne is an associate professor at the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University, where she has been teaching since 2013. Before that, she was a junior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows (2011–2013), did her graduate work at MIT (2006–2011), and was an undergraduate at the University of Melbourne (2001–2005), where she studied philosophy, logic, and computer science. Her current research is primarily in moral, feminist, and social philosophy. She is the author of two books, including her first book Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny and her latest book Entitled: How Male Privilege Hurts Women. Manne has also published a number of scholarly papers about the foundations of morality, and she regularly writes opinion pieces, essays, and reviews in venues—including The New York Times, The Boston Review, the Huffington Post, and the Chronicle of Higher Education.
13. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Sarah Cyr Love and Rationality: A Faith-Based Account of Epistemic Partiality in Friendship
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Much work has been done in contemporary epistemology to reconcile our epistemic ideals with our human need for healthy relationships with our loved ones. Ryan Preston-Roedder makes an attempt to resolve the tension between these two goals in his paper, “Three Varieties of Faith.” However, his account lacks the clarity necessary to make a thoroughly convincing argument. In this paper, I expand on Preston-Roedder’s ideas, distilling a novel account of epistemic partiality that allows us to maintain epistemic rationality without sacrificing elements of friendship that have a significant impact on our social and emotional well-being.
14. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Yixue (Anna) Cheng A Proposal for a Coherentist-Constitutivist Account of Normativity
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We operate under norms of evaluating actions as good and bad, right and wrong, or reasonable and unreasonable. What justifies the authority of these norms? Christine Korsgaard takes the constitutivist position and argues that self-constitution, as the standard for what constitutes action, is the source of normativity. David Enoch argues that it is impossible for any constitutivist model to justify normative standards, and that realism is the best solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the best solution to the tensions Enoch raises is not realism, but an original coherentist-constitutivist model of normativity rooted in Korsgaardian constitutivism.
15. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Lel Jones A Philosophical Analysis of AI and Racism
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This paper addresses the problem of racism against Latinx and Black people in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and offers possible solutions. This ethical analysis is necessary because with a dramatic increase in the production of AI, the way we use it is critical in eliminating its current perpetuation of racism. I offer evidence of the current perpetuation of racism through AI by analyzing its use in banking and in law enforcement. I argue that the current way we produce and use AI needs to be seriously reconsidered and reinforce this argument with the use of Rawls’ theories of justice.
16. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Jerome Boyd How to Scrutinize the Market God: Evaluating the Neo-Liberal Market Analogy Through Debates in Philosophy of Religion
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This essay aims to construct and demonstrate an analogical inter-disciplinary methodology. Developing the parallels between the God of classical theism and the modern market illustrated by Harvey Cox, I propose that neo-liberalism may be scrutinized as a philosophically understood entity. Debates within philosophy of religion may act as templates of scrutiny against the postmodern deity that is the neo-liberal market system. I aim to exemplify this method through the bedrock theological issue that is the Epicurean Paradox; just as philosophers produce theodicy, I contend that free‑market fundamentalists need advocate laissez-faire in light of socio-economic suffering.
17. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Allison Gould Not So Skeptical: A Cow’s-Eye View on Optimism for Empathy
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In this essay, I look at two skeptical accounts of empathy that argue against our ability to imagine what it is like to be someone else but present alternative solutions to accomplish the same sort of human understanding. I will demonstrate how these solutions can encompass the imaginative process cattle-equipment-designer Temple Grandin describes undergoing while trying to imagine what it is like to be a cow. I then argue that Grandin’s exercise is a successful imagination of the other and because she uses the approaches described to achieve this, the accounts are not actually skeptical, and policymakers ought to adopt these sorts of practices.
18. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Stephen Perry A Step Toward the Elucidation of Quantitative Laws of Nature
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When we mathematically model natural phenomena, there is an assumption concerning how the mathematics relates to the actual phenomenon in question. This assumption is that mathematics represents the world by “mapping on” to it. I argue that this assumption of mapping, or correspondence between mathematics and natural phenomena, breaks down when we ignore the fine grain of our physical concepts. I show that this is a source of trouble for the mapping account of applied mathematics, using the case of Prandtl’s Boundary Layer solution to the Navier-Stokes equations.
19. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Grace Gecewicz Let’s Talk About the Birds, Not the Bees: Sex Education For a Flourishing Life
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Just as math and history classes aim to prepare students to do math and history well, sex education must prepare students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing. I reject David Archard’s autonomy-centered view of sex education because it fails to address deeply ingrained social inequalities. I deny Paula McAvoy’s mutuality-centered view of sex education because mutuality and consent are not sufficient for good sex. I draw on Quil Kukla’s work on sexual negotiation and claim that for sex to be good, we must engage in communicative sex that goes beyond consent. Therefore, sex education should not only instruct students how to avoid bad sex, but also enable students to participate in good sex that contributes to their overall flourishing.
20. Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal: Volume > 13
Peter Visscher Fanon and Recognition: Finding Hegelian Self-Consciousness Through Struggle
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This paper applies Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to Fanon’s issue of pseudo-recognition discussed in the essay, “The Negro and Recognition,” as a way of establishing a form of self-consciousness. I begin the paper by arguing that in the Hegelian dialectic establishing a self-consciousness is an essential prerequisite to Fanon’s goal of mutual subject-recognition. I then argue that given the position of black people as slaves within the master-slave dialectic, they are denied the recognition required to attain being in-itself for-itself, which in reality can only be obtained if black people establish self-consciousness on their own terms. I then make the case that this required self-consciousness can only be obtained through struggle, essentially reversing the stages of the dialectic to create a new master/slave relation. In particular, I argue that this moment of struggle provides a moment of proto-recognition which can be used to build a new mutual subject-recognition. I then theorize on what form this new relation must take, making the case that it must be a relation where the categories of master and slave are made irrelevant, and where all subjects are capable of mutual recognition.