This paper describes the use of a role-playing exercise to stimulate student interest and understanding in philosophical material. The exercise was designed to work with Hobbes’s articulation of the social contract in the “Leviathan,” but can be modified for any historical illustration of the social contract. The bulk of the paper explains the role-playing exercise, articulates its procedures, characters, and discusses its specific purpose. After explaining the game, the paper offers advice to instructors about the results to be expected from using the exercise and how to relate the game to student assessment.

William James’s lecture “The Will to Believe” presents his pragmatic “defense” of religious beliefs, one aimed at rebutting W. K. Clifford’s famous evidentialist principle that “It is always wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence.” This paper presents a number of classroom tools and techniques for teaching James’s lecture, for contrasting it against arguments for God’s existence, and for positioning his lecture in a broader context of the “ethics of belief.” In addition to a detailed account of James’s “Ought-Implies-Can” argument, the paper provides two tables that detail crucial distinctions in the “Will to Believe” argument. These tables and associated techniques promise to make a more constructive and effective use of class time devoted to James’s lecture.

Where do new philosophy courses come from? Traditionally, the answer to this question has involved generating a new course that fits into one of the following species of philosophy courses: “historical,” “problems-based,” and “skills-based.” This paper gives a more heterogeneous answer to this question and describes a new type of course (“Topics in Philosophy: The University in Society”), which investigates the nature and function of the university and its relation to three important topics: human cloning, the impact of new information technologies, and the changing shape of the American family. In addition to providing an overview of the course, the paper outlines what role the instructor should take, how students were evaluated, what readings were used, and what conclusions students came to concerning the university's role in society.

In critical thinking courses, informal fallacies are often best taught through using myriad examples that illustrate the subtle differences between the different fallacies. However, since a heavy reliance can become tedious for students and instructors, one challenge that teaching a critical thinking course involves is striking an appropriate balance between presenting too many and too few examples. This paper presents a way to introduce informal fallacies through an acted-out dialogue, while reserving more traditional examples for homework or in-class discussion.

This paper argues that Lemmon-style proof systems (those that consist of only introduction and elimination inference rules) have several pedagogical benefits over Copi-style systems (those that make use of inference rules and equivalence rules). It is argued that Lemmon-style systems are easier to learn as they do not require memorizing as many rules, they do not require learning the subtle distinction between a rule of inference and a rule of replacement, and deriving material conditionals is more straightforward. Finally, it is argued that the need for learning provisional assumptions in Lemmon-style rules is not a significant enough reason for choosing the Copi-style system.