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1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Aaran Burns Can I Know that Anything Exists Unperceived?
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It is well known that G.E Moore brought about a revival of Realism with his classic “The Refutation of Idealism.” Three decades later W.T. Stace wrote an unfortunately less famous paper, “The Refutation of Realism.” In that paper, Stace claims that “we do not know that a single entity exists unperceived.” This paper provides an interpretation of Stace's argument and maintains that it has yet to be adequately addressed by contemporary epistemology.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Hossein Dabbagh The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account
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In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding.” I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which is based on the seeming account of intuition. Finally, I show how the seeming account of self-evidence can make the moral intuitionist epistemology more tenable.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Simon Dierig Against Boghossian’s Case for Incompatibilism
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Two major objections have been raised to Boghossian’s discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Proponents of the first objection claim that thoughts about “twin water” are not relevant alternatives to thoughts about water. Advocates of the second objection argue that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is not required for knowledge. Even though it has been shown that these two objections to Boghossian’s argument are misguided, it will be argued in this essay that Boghossian’s discrimination argument is nevertheless untenable. Whereas the two unsuccessful objections mentioned above each focus on one of the discrimination argument’s premises in isolation, the target of my criticism of Boghossian’s argument is the conjunction of its third premise and the standard incompatibilist defense of its second premise.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Frank Hofmann E = K and Non-Epistemic Perception
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Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one non-epistemically perceives a piece of evidence, this can be sufficient for possessing it as evidence. Williamson’s arguments for the necessity of belief will be discussed and rebutted. Interestingly, the view that non-epistemic perception is sufficient for possession of evidence can allow for conceptual or non-conceptual content of perception and it provides the framework for a neo-foundationalist account of epistemic justification.
discussion notes/debate
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Robin McKenna No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’: Response to Simion
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In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger’s “engineering” approach to gender concepts such as ‘woman’ faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—is to represent the world, but Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’ fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesn’t include all women in the extension of the concept ‘woman.’ I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender concepts—and social kind concepts in general—is not (merely) to represent the world, but rather to shape it. I finish by considering the consequences for “conceptual engineering” in philosophy more generally. While Haslanger’s account may escape Simion’s objection, other appeals to conceptual engineering might not fair so well.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
John N. Williams Sosa’s Safety Needs Supplementing, Not Saving: A Reply to Comesaña and McBride
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Juan Comesaña argues that Halloween Party shows that Sosa’s (2002) disjunctive safety condition on knowledge is too strong. Mark McBride agrees, and proposes a modification to that condition in order to evade Halloween Party. I show that that Halloween Party is not a counterexample to Sosa’s disjunctive safety condition. However the condition, as well as McBride’s modification to it, is insufficient for true belief (or acceptance) to be knowledge. Sosa’s condition needs supplementing in some way that would yield a full analysis of knowledge.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
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8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 9 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
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