Cover of Polish Journal of Philosophy
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-17 of 17 documents


1. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk Towards Graham Priest
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
2. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Graham Priest Three Heresies in Logic and Metaphysics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper concerns three heterodox views in logic and metaphysics: dialetheism (the view that some contradictions are true), noneism (the view that some objects do not exist), and the non-transitivity of numerical identity. It explains each of the views, some of their features and applications, and some of the relationships between them.
3. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska Paraconsistent vs. Contextual Solutions to Sorites
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In my paper I argue that a successful theory of vagueness should be able to account for faultless (aka permissible) disagreement concerning borderline cases.Firstly, I claim that out of the traditional (semantic, noncontextual) conceptions of vagueness the best equipped to account for faultless disagreement areparaconsistent solutions (such as Hyde’s subvaluationism and Priest’s dialetheism). One worry concerning dialetheism is that it seems to allow not only for faultless disagreements between different speakers, but also for such ‘disagreements’ between the given speaker and himself. Another worry, at least for some people, is that subvaluationism and dialetheism account for faultless disagreements by allowing contradictions. Next, I go on to argue that contextual conceptions, which are free from this latter worry, are equally well able to account for such disagreements. To this aim I offer a new account of the usage of personal taste predicates and suggest that we model the usage of all vague predicates on them. The idea is that in clear cases “a is F” means “a is F simpliciter”, whereas in borderline cases it means “a is F-to-me”. Since the boundary between borderline and nonborderline cases depends on context, my solution weds content-contextualism with truth-contextualism.
4. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Anna Pietryga Graham Priest and his P-Scheme
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The works by Graham Priest that I'm most familiar with are those of the 1980’s. I understand they belong to the logical part of his writing, as presented by the organizers of the “Towards Graham Priest” meeting at Szczecin University on 20 June, 2012. Myself, I read Priest’s works to be imprecise, to say the least. Thelack of precision is to be traced particularly in his interpretations of Alfred Tarski’s heritage. This applies to Tarski’s main points, namely: semantically closedlanguages, the T-scheme, and the appreciation of natural language. The strange thing about it is that Priest does not mind other people expressing views opposite to his own, but admits he cannot determine which contradictions are true and gives only vague indications about how to judge the criticisms.
5. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Adriana Schetz “Is This a Dagger which I See before Me?” On Objects and Contents of Contradictory Perceptions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The paper is an attempt to answer the question: what kind of philosophical theory of perception may warrant the claim that one can perceive contradictions, that is, undergo visual or other experiences with contradictory contents? Apparently, the conception of perceptual experience endorsed by Graham Priest makes it intelligible that one can truly experience contradictions. Moreover, as we try to argue, Priest’s insistence that one can perceive contradictions is to some extent defensible on the ground of a version of direct realism which identifies content of perception with its object, and underlines holistic character of perceptual experience.
6. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Modal Meinongianism, Russell’s Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The subject of my article is the principle of characterization–the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization and which makes it possible to avoid Russell’s argument. The strategy is based on the distinction between object language and metalanguage, and it applies to modal Meinongianism as well as to other so-called Meinongian theories.
7. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Piotr Warzoszczak Remarks on Graham Priest’s Views on Transworld Identity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In Towards Non-Being Graham Priest proposes an informative criterion of identity across possible worlds. Roughly, the criterion says that whenever two objects satisfy the very same qualitative characteristics in every possible world they are identical. But Priest also maintains that there are qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds. It is argued in the paper that for this reason he should allow the existence of two numerically different but qualitatively identical objects, and that is in tension with the criterion of transworld identity he has proposed. Thus Priest should reject either his criterion of transworld identity, or the thesis of possibleexistence of qualitatively indiscernible worlds.
8. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Graham Priest Replies
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
discussion
9. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Adam R Thompson Debt relief: On Haji's Reason's Debt to Freedom
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Ishtiyaque Haji develops and supports the view that alternative possibilities are a requirement on many morally-relevant facets of our lives. I argue that the main argument he offers for his view fails due primarily to two things. First, Haji employs a Jackson-type case to support a claim that such cases fail to support. Second, Haji offers no reason to think that we must understand the 'can' in certain of his important principles as alethic. These troubles vex the insightful support Haji offers for his many, wide-ranging conclusions.
10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Ishtiyaque Haji No Debt Relief in Sight: Reply to Thompson
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
book reviews
11. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Robert Fudge New Essays on Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy, Wade L. Robison, David B. Suits (eds.)
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
12. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Leopold Hess The Phenomenon of Normativity [Fenomen normatywności] by Anna Brożek, Bartosz Brożek, Jerzy Stelmach
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
13. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Michael Blamauer The Role of Subjectivity in the Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The Principle of Continuity (PC) is a major premise in what can be called the “Continuity-Argument for Panpsychism” (CAP): If we, as complex conscious organisms, are the evolutionary products of originally inorganic components and processes, and consciousness is a metaphysically irreducible feature, thenconsciousness must have already been a feature of these fundamental components, assuming there is continuity between the inorganic and the organic. This argument faces one serious objection, based on the possible vagueness of consciousness: If consciousness is a feature of organisms which is gradually gained at some later phylogenetic stage the conclusion of CAP is false. In my paper I defend the assumption that consciousness cannot be vague with the goal of concluding that CAP is sound.
14. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Joshua Rasmussen From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing propositions. The crux of the argument marks out a pathway to the conclusion that necessary truths cannot themselves be necessarily true unless they necessarily exist. I motivate the steps in the argument and then address several standard objections, including one that makes use of the distinction between ‘truth in’ and ‘truth at’. The purpose of the argument is to generate deeper insights into the nature of propositions and the logic of necessity. The argument also gives us a new reason to believe the traditional answer to the question of why there is anything: there is something because the alternative is impossible.
15. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Nicola Claudio Salvatore Skepticism, Rules and Grammar
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC), Wittgenstein offers a sustained and, at least apparently, fragmentary treatment of skeptical issues. Given the ambiguity and obscurity of some of its remarks, in the recent literature on the subject we can find a number of competing interpretations of OC, particularly of the elusive concept of ‘hinges’, central to Wittgenstein’s last work. In this paper, I will discuss the dominant interpretations of OC in order to show how they fail to represent plausible renderings of his anti-skeptical thought. Finally, I will argue that the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, correctly understood and developed, can represent a plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought and, more importantly, a viable anti-skeptical strategy.
16. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Marco Simionato Reconsidering Metaphysical Nihilism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In contemporary analytic philosophy metaphysical nihilism is the thesis according to which there might be nothing, i.e. a possible world with no concreteobjects in it, but that can contain (or must contain) abstract objects. After summarizing the set of premises from which analytic metaphysics deals with nothing, I propose a set of premises that could fit continental metaphysics. Then I propose a new set of premises for the question of nothing that derives from a synthesis of the two above mentioned sets. By means of this new set, I try to show that nothing as a possible world with no objects at all is not a self-contradictory entity and I propose an argument for proving that an empty possible world exists.
17. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Renata Ziemińska Pragmatic Inconsistency of Sextan Skepticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Skepticism described by Sextus Empiricus faces the persistent charge that it is an inconsistent, self-refuting view. However, recently its consistency hasbeen defended in three important ways: (1) it is a thesis with weak assertion, (2) it is a practice without any assertion, and (3) it is a process developing over time.The first option is not well supported by Sextus’ texts, where even a weak assertion is not allowed. The second option cannot explain the rationality of skeptical arguments. The third option reveals two levels of Sextan skepticism; however, the developing skeptic has to accept the self-refutation charge, and the mature skeptic takes flight from the charge without any rational answer. I claim that Sextus embraces the self-refutation charge. The mature skeptic’s speech acts are pragmatically inconsistent: their content cannot be asserted without contradiction. As a result, the charge of inconsistency is not answered.