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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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James Doyle
Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment
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Moral rationalism is identified as the view that moral constraints are rational constraints. This view seems implausible to many because it seems to involve belief in the fantastic-sounding possibility of egoist-conversion: that, in principle, an argument for moral constraints could be produced which would motivate a rational person who does not yet accept those constraints (i.e., an egoist) to observe them. Furthermore, the Humean want-belief model of motivation---the view that beliefs alone are incapable of motivating---seems to provide a good explanation for the impossibility of egoist-conversion. I argue that the moral rationalist is not in fact committed to the possibility of egoist-conversion, and that an explanation of its impossibility can be given which is compatible with rationalism; so this impossibility counts neither against rationalism nor for the want-belief model. I consider a number of apparent objections to my position and rebut them.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Paul Bloomfield
Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Virtue
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The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure (logos), and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos. possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems (phronesis). as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral knowledge is a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect. Also, the debate between internalists and externalists in epistemology is subversively resolved as moot by adopting this strategy: the locus of justification for a belief is in the nature of skill. Thus, the contingent fact that some skills allow Homo Sapiens an ‘internal access’. while others do not, is theoretically neutral when considering the nature of justification per se.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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David Weberman
A New Defense of Gadamer’s Hermeneutics
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This paper re-examines the central thesis of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event, or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, this paper considers three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the literature on Gadamer, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. The paper rejects this argument as insufficient. Similarly, the paper rejects a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. The paper then articulates a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions in which it is grasped. The paper appeals to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend the position against two objections: i) that it conflates meaning and significance, and ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Scott R. Sehon
An Argument Against the Causal Theory of Action Explanation
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It is widely held that belief explanations of action are a species of causal explanation. This paper argues against the causal construal of action explanation. It first defends the claim that unless beliefs are brain states, beliefs cannot causally explain behavior. Second, the paper argues against the view that beliefs are brain states. It follows from these claims that beliefs do not causally explain behavior. An alternative account is then proposed, according to which action explanation is teleological rather than causal, and the paper closes by suggesting that teleological account makes sense of and supports the autonomy of common sense psychology.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Bergmann
Deontology and Defeat
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It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat---a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge---guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism. Given this compatibility of externalism and deontology, we may safely conclude that deontology by itself doesn’t lend support to internalism.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ruth Garrett Millikan
Representations, Targets and Attitudes
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Robert Cummins
Reply to Millikan
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book symposium: |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Robert Kane
Précis of The Significance of Free Will
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Bernard Berofsky
Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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John Martin Fischer
The Significance of Free Will by Robert Kane
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Galen Strawson
The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Robert Kane
Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Linda Zagzebski
Précis of Virtues of the Mind
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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John Greco
Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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William P. Alston
Virtue and Knowledge
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jonathan Kvanvig
Zagzebski on Justification
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Hilary Kornblith
Linda Zagzebski’s Virtues of the Mind
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Amelie Oksenberg Rorty
Distinctive Measures of Epistemic Evaluation:
Character as the Configuration of Traits
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Linda Zagzebski
Responses
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Barbara Von Eckardt
How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science
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