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Social Philosophy Today

Volume 24, 2008
Race and Diversity in the Global Context

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Displaying: 1-19 of 19 documents


1. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
John Rowan Preface
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2. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Introduction
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part i: globalism and groups
3. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Alistair M. Macleod Universal Human Rights and Cultural Diversity
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I argue that a reasonably comprehensive doctrine of human rights can be reconciled with at least a good deal of diversity in cultural belief and practice. The reconciliation cannot be achieved by trying to show that there is in fact a cross-cultural consensus about the existence of human rights, partly because no valid inference to the normative status of human rights can be drawn from the existence of such a consensus. However, by highlighting the premises rather than the conclusions of normatively persuasive arguments for human rights, I argue that a reasonably comprehensive doctrine of universal human rights can be squared with what is known about the diversity of cultural beliefs and practices. This is because the (empirically plausible) denial that there is in fact a cross-cultural consensus about the existence of human rights can go hand-in-hand with cross-cultural endorsement of the normative considerations that underpin human rights doctrine.
4. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Jan Narveson Racism, “ismism,” and Globalism
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‘Racism’ has become the name of something we are all against. But what exactly is it, and why are we against it? This general account proposes that in many cases and contexts, the making of racial (and other) distinctions in such a way as to give some kind of preference to members of one such group among others is quite acceptable. When isn’t it, then? The answer proposed here is that it’s unacceptable when the kind of behavior done to some such group is independently wrongful behavior—in particular, seriously injurious. Various examples are given. The result is to make racism a clear notion whose unjustifiability is obvious—but to imply that many things often claimed to be racist should not be so regarded.
5. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Mark Navin Fair Equality of Opportunity in Global Justice
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Many political philosophers argue that a principle of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ (FEO) ought to extend beyond national borders. I agree that there is a place for FEO in a theory of global justice. However, I think that the idea of cross-border FEO is indeterminate between three different principles. Part of my work in this paper is methodological: I identify three different principles of cross-border fair equality of opportunity and I distinguish them from each other. The other part of my work in this paper is normative: I argue that we should endorse only two of the three principles of cross-border fair equality of opportunity and that we shouldreject the third. Importantly, I think that we should reject the one version of transnational fair equality of opportunity that most advocates of such a principle appear to endorse.
6. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Anna Moltchanova Group Membership and Morally Risky Epistemic Conditions
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Johann Gottlieb Fichte argues that one semantic presupposition of claims about our entitlements is the idea that others are capable of autonomy. Individuals cannot demand anything from others, even submission, unless they also presuppose—although perhaps without acknowledging this to themselves—that others are free agents. Thus, the autonomy of others is a pre-condition of our exercise of autonomy. Why do individuals and groups often try to justify their own entitlement to rights at the expense of the freedom of others, thereby simultaneously assuming and denying their freedom? This paper investigates what constitution of group agency gives individual members of the group the best chance to develop and sustain a moral character consistent with the ideal of equal autonomy. I argue that liberalism fosters the sort of group agency that improves individuals’ chances to acquire epistemically reliable beliefs about the moral status of others. I apply my findings to the discussion of court decisions in Gaines, Brown, and the race nuisance cases.
7. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Joan Woolfrey Group Moral Agency as Environmental Accountability
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If there is such a thing as a virtuous community, as Aristotle would have it, and if members of communities need to understand themselves in relation to community, then we have a large space from within which to grapple with the issues of social responsibility. Iris Marion Young developed a “social connection model” of justice which requires individuals to think outside of the borders of any one society when considering their responsibility to others. Donald Beggs advocates for a “group moral virtue,” seeing the possibility of the development of virtuous characteristics of groups separate from their individual members.Combining these two ideas, I argue that it is possible to conceive of a society’s responsibility as one of developing such group virtues as will respond to the structural injustices of our interconnected world.
part ii: race, difference, and diversity
8. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Arnold Farr Diversity, Color-Blindness, and Other Hegemonic Discourses
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In this paper I will examine the ways in which concepts and ideas that are used for emancipatory purposes eventually backfire and are used to perpetuate systems of domination. Part of my argument will be based on Herbert Marcuse’s essay “Repressive Tolerance.” In this essay, Marcuse examines the way in which the concept of tolerance, which has its origin in the struggle for liberation, is used by members of dominant social groups to advocate for tolerance of their oppressive views. Following Marcuse’s lead, I will argue that almost all emancipatory ideas, particularly diversity and color-blindness in this context, can be co-opted by the dominant social group and used to further domination. I will argue that even our best emancipatory concepts are formed within the context of a hegemonic discourse that alters their meaning and use.
9. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Jennifer Faust The Ethics of Scientific Research Utilizing Race as a Variable
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Many philosophers have called for elimination of racial taxonomies in biomedical contexts, basing their arguments on one of two claims: that the use of racial terminology is unjust, and that the use of racial terminology in scientific contexts is inappropriate because race is scientifically meaningless. I argue that each of these claims is flawed, because justice sometimes demands the use of racial terminology, and because the utility of race in biomedical contexts makes it scientifically meaningful. I suggest a third argument that eliminativists might utilize: in spite of its usefulness, we should forego racialized medicine because given our long history of racism, any use of race will tend to crowd out other relevant factors. So, instead of continuing to use race as a convenient proxy for unknown “x-factors,” we ought to forego race and insist that researchers name the x-factors. The result will be better science, both morally and epistemically.
10. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Johann A. Klaassen, Mari-Gretta G. Klaassen Humiliation and Discrimination: The Role of Shame in the Politics of Difference among the Sneetches of Dr Seuss
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In this essay, we examine one of our perennial favorites, the story of “The Sneetches” (the first of four stories in Seuss 1961) as an exposition and condemnation of the role of shame and humiliation in maintaining oppressive social systems. We argue that Seuss’s Sneetches vividly demonstrate how we contribute to the unjustified oppression of a disadvantaged group when we allow our shaming behaviors to be guided by stereotypical presumptions about aperson’s moral character based on non-voluntary personal characteristics, rather than by evaluations of character based on the evidence of voluntary behavior.
11. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Jason Mallory A Politics of Carceral Difference
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This paper argues that the difference model provided by Iris Marion Young is useful for clarifying and defending the contemporary radical movement for US former prisoners. First, I examine how ignoring the group difference of ex-prisoners produces oppressive consequences, and second, I show how embracing some group differences can empower ex-prisoners to overcome the obstacles posed by their sociopolitical, economic, and legal marginalization. Lastly, I briefly consider how rejecting sameness, despite the problems associated with “identity politics,” can help former prisoners know and express their needs, thus creating the foundations necessary for building authentic global coalitions against structural oppression.
12. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Kevin M. Graham The Chinese Must Go: The Racial Oppression of Chinese Americans, 1840–1965
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Some labor historians and social historians of race are tempted to try to explain Chinese American racial oppression in the US purely by appeal to economic factors, especially the role that Chinese American men played in the US labor market. In this essay, I argue that such reduction is not possible. I briefly describe the history of Chinese immigration to the US, focusing on key changes in US law governing immigration and citizenship as they affected the Chinese. I then refute two economic reductionist views of Chinese American racial oppression. I conclude by suggesting a third, alternative understanding of this oppression that appeals to economic factors among others.
part iii: creighton peden
13. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Matthew Silliman A Good Mind in a Fickle Intellectual World: Comment on Peden’s A Good Life in a World Made Good
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14. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
William McBride Comments on W. Creighton Peden: A Good Life in a World Made Good
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15. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
W. Creighton Peden Response to McBride and Silliman
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part iv: nassp book award
16. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Joseph Betz Comments on Lucas Swaine’s The Liberal Conscience
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17. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Bernard G. Prusak After Rawls?: Lucas Swaine’s The Liberal Conscience
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18. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Deen Chatterjee Review Essay of Lucas Swaine’s The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism
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19. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 24
Lucas Swaine Politics, Philosophy, and Liberty of Conscience: A Reply to Three Critics
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