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Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents


in memoriam
1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Andoni Ibarra Igor Aristegi 1980-2008: From Literature to Science – through Philosophy
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articles
2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Javier Pamparacuatro Martín La cuestión de la aserción en La Logique ou l’art de penser y la Grammaire générale et raisonnée: (The issue of assertion in La Logique ou l’art de penser and the Grammaire generale et raisonnee)
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Este artículo tiene camo finalidad estudiar la noción de aserción en dos obras del sigla XVII francés: La Logique ou l’art de penser (conocida como Lógica de Port-Royal), de Antoine Arnauld y Pierre Nicole, y la Grammaire générale et raisonnée, de Antoine Arnauld y Claude Lancelot. Se ha dividido el artículo en dos apartados dedicados respectivamente a la concepción de Port-Royal acerca del juicio, y a la teoría del verbo. A lo largo de la reflexión en torno a estos importantes conceptos en la teoría del lenguaje de Port-Royal, pretendemos probar que sus autores efectuaron la distinción entre contenido proposicianal y actitud proposicianal antes de que Frege la estableciera de forma sólida y definitiva.The present paper sets out to examine the notion of assertion within two French 17th century works: Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole’s La Logique ou l’art de penser (known as the Port-Royal Logic), and Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot’s Grammaire générale et raisonnée. This article has been divided into two sections. The first section is devoted to the Port-Royalian doctrine about judgment; the second section analyzes the theory of verb. On our account of these important notions of Porl-Royal’s theory of language, we intend to prove that its authors had made out the distinction btween propositional content and propositional attitude before Frege could set it forth in a solid and definitive way.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Mario Casanueva y Diego Méndez Teoría y experimento en Genética Mendeliana: una exposición en imágenes: (Theory and experiment in Mendelian Genetics: a pictorial exposition)
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En este artículo tratamos sobre los aspectos empíricos y conceptuales en la Genética Mendeliana y analizamos los vínculos entre ellos. Primero discutimos las ventajas de una representación gráfica de las teorías empíricas; luego pormenorizamos la estructura conceptual de la genécica; en seguida, esquematizamos su protocolo experimental, a continuación destacamos los engarces entre ambas representaciones y, por último, proporcionamos una caracterización holista de la práctica genética, donde el representar y el intervenir se encucntran entremezclados.In this article we deal with the conceptual and empirical features of Mendelian Genetics, and analyze the links between them. First we discuss the challenges of portraying empirical theories as graphical representations. We then give a detailed account of the conceptual structure underlying Mendelian Genetics, followed by a schematization of the experimental protocol involved in this line of research. Links between both representations are highlighted. Finally, we provide a holistic characterization of Mendelian practice, where representing and intervening are intertwined.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
José Luis Luján y Oliver Todt Ciencia precautoria y la “fabricación de incertidumbre”: (Precautionary science and the “manufacturing of uncertainty”)
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En este trabajo analizamos una de las propuestas recientes que defienden modificaciones metodológicas en la evaluación de riesgos respecto a los estándares de prueba: el enfoque basado en el peso de las pruebas (weight of evidence). Este enfoque puede interpretarse como un caso de ciencia precautoria en la investigación sobre riesgos. Esto es, se trata de una metodología que pretende proporcionar resultados más protectores de la salud pública y del entorno que las metodologías usuales en la evaluación de riesgos. Sin embargo, existe la posibilidad de que quienes se muestran en contra de la regulación de ciertas aplicaciones tecnológicas introduzcan artificialmente incertidumbre en el cuerpo de la evidencia. En consecuencia, la metodologia del peso de las pruebas no conduce de manera automática a una mayor protección de la salud pública y del ambiente. Por ello es necesario analizar cada innovación valorando los posibles riesgos y los posibles beneficios sociales, y decidir en cada caso cuál de las dos posibilidades, la subregulación o la sobrerregulación, es más aceptable. El conocimiento científico es un elemento necesario para llevar a cabo esta valoración, pero no la determina.This paper analyzes one recent proposal for modifying the metodologies used in risk assessment: the Weight-Of-Evidence (WOE) approach. This approach is an example of precautionary science in risk research, i.e. a methodology which aims at a better protection of human health and the environment. However, some groups opposed to the regulation of certain technologies have started artificially introducing uncertainties into the body of evidence. This means that the WOE approach does not automatically lead to a higher level of health or environmental protection. It is therefore necessary to analyze each innovation on a case-by-case basis in order to evaluateits risks and benefits, and decide if to accept lower or, on the contrary, higher standards for its regulation. Scientific knowledge is a necessary element in this assessment, but not the decisive one.
5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Paloma García Díaz Los límites del principio de indeterminación radical en Latour y el giro político de su filosofía de la ciencia: (The limits of Latour’s principle of radical indeterminacy and the political turn in his philosophy of science)
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Este artículo explora los artilugios conceptuales que utiliza la teoría de Bruno Latour para comprender y explicar la realidad natural y social. Asimismo, se exponen cuáles son los límites a su principio de “indeterminación radical” o principio de simetría generalizado. Este análisis muestra la posibilidad de un estudio normativo de la realidad social y tecnocientífica compatible con la evolución que se encuentra en el mismo Latour respecto del significado y funcíon políticos de la ciencia.This article explores the conceptual tools which philosopher, sociologist and anthropologist Bruno Latour uses to understand and also to explain natural and social realities investigated by the sciences and by the philosophy of science. This text also sets the limits to Labour’s principle of radical indeterminacy, also known as the principle of generalized symmetry. As a result of this, the possibility of a normative study of social and techno-scientific realities is emphasized as a type of technoscientfic and social research, which is compatible with Latour’s own evolution of thought concerning the meaning and function of the politics of science.
discussion
6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Constantin Antonopoulos Einstein’s “true” discontinuity: With an application to Zeno
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The question whether quantum discontinuity can or cannot provide an answer to Zeno’s Paradoxes is reopened. It is observed that what is usually understood by the term “discontinuity”, namely, Einstein’s conception of the photon as described by himself and all others, is unsuitable to the task because, essentially, it reduces to the trivial ‘discontinuity’ of objects scattered in space. By contrast, quantization of energy levels, which are not in space but can only alternate in time, provide the right sort of discontinuity required. Discrete quantized orbits, corresponding to eigen-frequencies, are irreducible, and nothing is allowed to stand in-between them in satisfaction of the quantum postulate, furnishing the requisite, and so far missing, immediate nextness of a point to a certain other. ln this way, Zeno’s Runner need not postpone his first step indefinitely, always waiting upon an infinity of preceding steps, before it can be taken. There is now a point that is next to a point and so a step on that point, which is the first step. It follows that, if one kind of discontinuity, Einstein’s, is incapable of offerring an answer to Zeno, while another kind can, the two are discrepant. One of them, the former, is not a kind of discontinuity properly so called at all, though evidently the consequence of one.
book reviews
7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Piedad Yuste La Aritmética y el libro Sobre los números poligonales
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books received
8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Books Received
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summary
9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Summary
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contents
10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 23 > Issue: 3
Contents of Volume 23
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