論 著 / articles |
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 48
丁福寧
Paschal Fu-Ning Ting
多瑪斯人學的形上基礎
The Metaphysical Foundation of Aquinas’ Anthropology
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人的完整統一性及靈魂不朽是中世紀時期人學最為困擾,也是爭議最多的 兩個問題。哲學家以二元論及普遍形質論來解釋人的完整性。如此二元論的人學思想以不同的方式成為中世紀時期主流的人學思想。多瑪斯反對任何形式的 二元論,他為人學尋找形上的統一基礎。為多瑪斯,人的完整統一性要求實體形式的統一性,靈魂是人的實體形式 及在自身的實體。唯人的靈魂是受造的,它的存有是分享自存有本身(Ipsum esse)。理性靈魂的本性是精神的,它是人的本質,唯非人的完整的種(species)。 精神的靈魂被賦予存有,它是自立的實體,但不在自身分開地存在,理性的精 神靈魂以其存有統一人的靈魂與身體,如此人具有完整的統一性。存有為現 實,是統一性的基礎,它具絕對的優先性。多瑪斯的存有為現實的概念超越亞 理斯多德形式為現實的概念,如此他為精神的理性奠定形上基礎。故在人的本 體結構上有雙重的潛能與現實的組合;在形上層次是存有-現實與本質-潛能 的組合。在物理層次是靈魂-形式(現實)與身體-質料(潛能)的組合。但 理性靈魂因是自立的實體,它是內在地獨立於身體。理性靈魂因其有存有,具 不朽的形上條件。
During the Middle Ages, the two problems which philosophers concern the most are the holistic unity of man and the immortality of soul. In order to explain these basic Christian beliefs, philosophers adopt the dualism and universal hylomorphism. The reason to take such a stance is to ensure the immortality of soul.For Aquinas, the human rational soul is both the substantial form of body and the substance in its own right, and the holistic unity of man requires the unity of the substantial form. Since the rational soul is created by God, its esse (being) participates in Ipsum Esse. Rational soul is the essence of humans, but not its complete species. It needs to be united with a body. It is spiritual by nature. Once the rational soul is created, it has being, it is a subsistent substance, but not exists separately by itself. The being of therational soul then unites the composit man’s soul and body. Being is the unifying principle. It has absolute priority. There are double composition of potency and act in man’s ontological structure. On metaphysical level, the composition of being-act (or actus essendi) and essence-potency. On physical level, the soul (act-form) and body (potency-matter), yet the rational soul is essentially independent from body. The being of the rational soul is its metaphysical foundation of immortality.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 48
鄧克 銘
Keh-Ming Deng
方以智論莊子的逍遙遊
An Analysis of Fang Yizhi’s View on Zhuangzi’s Xiaoyaoyou
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莊子在〈逍遙遊〉以寓言的方式表達高遠的精神世界,其意境及途徑引起 後人不斷地探索。方以智收集大量的古今註解,會通儒釋道三家思想,以獨特 的寫作方法詮解該篇蘊藏的豐富內容。本文從三個層面說明方以智詮釋的重要觀念。第一:關於莊子「小大之辨」 的問題,方以智強調小與大之無差別性與相異性,以消除片面的執著。第二: 方以智從「有」與「無」之對立的觀念,說明兩者相互否定、相互成立的關係; 並主張「不落有無」又「不離有無」,才能在現實生活中得到自在。第三:方 以智會通儒釋道,說明逍遙遊之途徑與形態,正是其自身生活經歷的反映。經 由本文的分析,可以了解方以智主張去除偏執以得心靈自由的詮釋方法與理論 依據。
In his writing, “Xiaoyaoyou” (逍遙遊), Zhuangzi uses parables to express his profound and innermost spiritual world. His artistic conception and approach inspire ongoing research by subsequent generations. Fang Yizhi analyzes numerous ancient and modern interpretations of Zhuangzi’s piece, applies Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist thinking, and uses his unique writing method to interpret the rich content in Zhuangzi’s writing.In the present article, important concepts of Fang Yizhi’s interpretation are analyzed from three different angles. First, regarding Zhuangzi’s argument of “the distinction between micro and macro” (小大之辨), Fang Yizhi intends to eliminate this persistent polarized view by emphasizing that micro and macro are indistinguishable. Second, Fang Yizhi uses the conflict between the concepts of “existence” (有) and “nonexistence” (無) to illustrate the relationship between mutual negation and mutual confirmation. He also advocates that if we “are not biased by or do not insist on either existence or nonexistence” and “do not break away from the confronting phenomena of existence andnonexistence”, then we shall be at ease in our real life. Third, Fang Yizhi applies Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism to illustrate the approach and structure of Xiaoyaoyou. This is precisely the reflection of his own life experiences. Through the analysis of the present article, one can understand the interpretation methods and theoretical basis Fang Yizhi advocates to remove any polarized view in order to obtain freedom of the soul.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 48
張忠 宏
Chung-Hung Chang
莊子論「道」、「技」與「養生」: 以「庖丁解牛」為線索
Dao, Technê and Cultivating Life: Following Cook Ding’s Lead
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本文主張,莊子的「養生」是涵養生命之意,因此它的養生觀包含養親 的要求。「庖丁解牛」不是寓言,而是莊子舉例說明技藝在生命之涵養中扮 演了什麼樣的角色。技藝的重要性,不在於它能帶來心流經驗,而在於它能 將世界揭露為豐富多元、且可悠遊徜徉的場域。欲得養生,就必須擁有良好 的技藝,包括與父母相處、將父母揭露為相互成全、攜手共遊的養親技藝。 基於這樣一種養生觀,莊子雖然高度重視人倫的要求,認為得道者必能養 親,卻並未進一步進行倫理學與政治哲學思考。
According to Zhuangzi, the meaning of Yang-Sheng is all about life-cultivation. This can be seen from the fact that it is one of Yang-Sheng’s requirements to keep good company with one’s parents. The story of Cook Ding, as presented in the book by Zhuangzi, is meant to provide an insight into the importance of technê in life. To put it briefly, technê is important not because it can bring about flow experience, but because it can reveal the world as one in which one can wander about and be playful with valuable things in multiple dimensions. Thus, it is a necessary condition for anyone who wants to cultivate the meaning of life to be able to master at least some skills, especially the ones involved in keeping good company with one’s parents. As a consequence, Zhuangzi is quite successful at giving a daoist twist to filial obedience, though he confineshimself not to pursue further ethical and/or political theorizations.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 48
Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀 鈴
The Semantic Theory and the Availability Principle
語意理論與可及原則
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This paper aims to defend François Recanati’s Availability Principle approach to semantics by illuminating and responding to two major challenges from minimalists, in particular from Emma Borg: the first concerns the notion of intuitive content and “awareness-of” presupposed in the Availability Principle, and the second concerns whether the principle makes a semantic theory unfit with normativity and compositionality. I lead the discussion toward the kernel question--the bearer of the semantic content--and show that the Availability Principle is appropriate if we respect the empirical basis of meaning.
本文試圖替François Recanati 回應以Emma Borg 為主的兩面向批評,而 得以闡明並辯護其所主張的可及原則:其一面向是關於可及原則所預設的 「直覺內容」與「意識到」兩概念,其二面向是關於是否滿足可及原則會使 的語意理論無法滿足語言的規範性與組構性。我將引導此爭論至問題核心 ─即語意內容的承載者─重新審視何以一般咸認為語句本身有其客觀、不受脈絡影響而改變的語意內容,並論證若我們顧及意義的經驗基礎,則可及原則是恰當的。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 48
Tzu-Wei Hung
洪子 偉
Why the Enzyme Model of Modularity Fails to Explain Higher Cognitive Processes
心智模組的酵素模型及其困難
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The enzyme model (EM), inspired by biological enzyme catalysis, is a computational-functional description of information processing and distribution in modular cognitive systems. It has been argued that EM offers advantages in solving both the allocation problem and global computation and thus may play a role in upholding the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH). This paper, however, argues that EM solutions are untenable, as EM avoids the infinite regress of allocation problem only at a high cost and with several critical drawbacks. Moreover, to clarify global processes, EM needs to satisfy two necessary conditions: first to demonstrate that the EM allows cross module communication, and second to be sensitive to not only the syntax but also the semantics of representations. I argue that EM only satisfies the first condition and thus fails to hold.
「酵素模型」指的是借用生物學中酵素催化機制的概念,來說明認知科 學中「大量模組假說」在計算與功能層次上有關資訊處理與分配之模型。酵 素模型的最大優點在於回應了「訊號配置」與「整體計算」兩難題,從而替 大量模組假說提供有利的辯護基礎。但本文之目的,在論證酵素模型的這兩 個回應並不成立。一方面,酵素模型在避免訊號配置的無限後退時會產生新 的困難。另一方面,要說明整體計算至少得滿足兩個必要條件:一是跨模組 的訊號交換是可能的、二在於模組能夠不只是針對輸入訊號的語法結構來處 理訊號。本文將論證酵素模型頂多說明如何滿足第一個必要條件,而沒有釐 清第二個必要條件如何在該模型中實現。換言之,酵素模型對兩難題的回應 不成立。因此,酵素模型無法用以支持大量模組假說。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 47
陳政 揚
Cheng-Yang Chen
王植對《注解正蒙》神化觀之批判 -以「太虛」三層義為進路
A Study of Wang Zhi’s Criticisms of the Deification in the Commentary of the Zhengmeng by an Analysis of the Three Aspectsin the Idea of “Ultimate Voidness (Taixu 太虛)”
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設若研讀哲學家的代表著作,是吾人探究其思想的必要條件之一,則逐句 解析張載思想論述的明清《正蒙》注,顯然是研究橫渠思想在明清哲學之發展 時,所無可忽視的一環。尤其歷來注解《正蒙》者,不乏高攀龍,王夫之等望 重士林,或在哲學史上具有獨創見解者。然而在當代張載學研究中,相關議題 似乎仍較少引起學者間的討論興趣。基於此,本文以清代《正蒙》學研究為論 述起點,旨在澄清李光地在《注解正蒙》中對張載神化觀的詮釋,以及王植在 《正蒙初義》中如何由釐清「太虛」概念,批判李《注》之非。全文共分為四 項研究環節:首先,由於王植以澄清「太虛」概念為解讀《正蒙》與衡定諸注 之關鍵,本文先扼要說明「太虛」之三層義。其次,本文將指出李《注》對「太 虛」之詮釋,以及王植對李《注》太虛義之批判。再者,由於李《注》不僅嘗 試解消「太虛」之本體義,而且以理氣二分的理論架構,詮釋橫渠虛氣一體之 神化觀。本文將指出李《注》對橫渠神化觀之新詮。最後,本文將藉太虛三層 義,指出《正蒙初義》的洞見以及李《注》神化觀的侷限。
In order to understand the content and significance of Zhan Zai’ thought, commentarial works on the Zhengmeng during the Ming and Qing period areindispensable because these works present detailed explications on every conceptual terms. Compared to those commentarial works on the Zhang Zai’s thought by Gao Panlong and Wang Fuzhi who have been regarded as rather creative thinkers, other commentarial works during the Qing period have not drawn sufficient scholarly attention. Bearing this in mind, this article aims to explore the two topics: Firstly, it analyzes Li Guangdi’s interpretation on Zhang Zai’s idea of “deification” through Li’s Commentary of the Zhengmeng. And secondly, it also traces Wang Zhi’s elucidation of the concept of “Ultimate Voidness” (Taixu) in his commentarial work, the Basic Meanings of the Zhengmeng, as well as Wang’s correction of initial mistakes in aforementioned Li Guangdi’s commentary.The discussion of this article consists of the following four sub-topics: (1) Wang Zhi’s exposition of three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness”; (2) Li Guangdi’s interpretation of the term “Ultimate Voidness” and Wang Zhi’s repudiation against it; (3) Li’s argument that the ontological significance of the concept of “Ulitmate Voidness” should be dissolved, and that Zhang Zai’s idea of deification of continuity between vital breath and voidness should be understood by the dualistic framework between principle and vital breath; and (4) Highlighting of Wang’s insight and Li’s limitation of his conception of deification by means of our analysis of the three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness.”
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 47
Cheng-Hung Tsai
蔡政 宏
Technê and Understanding
技藝與理解
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How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practicaltechnê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, inconclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
人是如何獲得「理解」?德性知識論的代表人物Linda Zagzebski 長久 來宣稱「理解的獲得來自於對技藝的掌握」。在本文中,作者闡釋Zagzebski 的宣稱,並指出這宣稱的問題。透過對Zagzebski 之宣稱的批判性檢視,作 者在文後提供另一修改自Zagzebski 的理解獲得觀點。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 47
傅皓 政
Hao-Cheng Fu
非單調推論及預建:評洛特之反例
Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Defaults: On Rott’s Counterexamples
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此篇論文旨在以萊特於1980 年所提出的預建邏輯系統,消除洛特對 AGM 理論的單調性原則提出的反例。相較於古典邏輯,雖然AGM 理論主張 知識狀態具備均衡性,並建構基本函映的預設說明信念變遷,但是許多哲學 家認為該理論有某些基本原則值得質疑,洛特即指出AGM 理論主張原有知 識狀態的某個信念弱化之後,並不會影響原知識狀態的單調性並不成立。然 而,洛特的反例之所以成立,在於可能出現相同語句卻具有不同資訊價值的 情況,不過,洛特也並未提出適當的方式說明處理非單調的信念變遷過程。 因此,我在這篇論文中要以AGM 理論結合預建邏輯的方法消除洛特提出的 反例,亦即主張在AGM 理論中加入預建邏輯的推論規則,可以適當地處理 非單調的信念變遷過程。
This paper aims to dissolve Rott’s counterexamples in terms of default logic proposed by Reiter in 1980. In his counterexample, Rott pointed out that some fundamental principles in AGM theory which meet the property of monotonicity are implausible because it seems unable to handle the processes of nonmonotonic reasoning which are common in our ordinary reasoning. In contrast to classical logic, AGM theory indeed developed a prominent way to deal with belief change, whereas many philosophers still casted doubts on the fundamental principles in AGM theory. For example, there might be some sentences in one’s belief set which are of the same form but different in information value and AGM theory does not commit it. Nevertheless, Rott failed to suggest a plausible way to fix the defect of AGM theory, so I aim to propose a suitable way to dissolve the problem of the processes of nonmontonic reasoning in virtue of the association of AGM theory with default logic.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 47
Caleb Liang
梁益 堉
Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Vision Science
知覺的反個體主義與視覺科學
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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception.
本文從跨領域的角度探討視覺的根本性質,並以Tyler Burge 的「知覺 的反個體主義」(perceptual anti-individualism)為研究對象。根據這一理論,知覺狀態的本質乃是由知覺者與外在環境的互動關係而定。Burge 提出論證 主張:視覺科學(vision science)預設了這個理論。本文反對這個觀點,並 企圖從三方面來論證:「知覺的反個體主義」不是我們理解視覺的唯一理論 選項。首先,我討論「體內恆定」(homeostasis)的概念,並指出這概念會 使我們對Burge 理論中的「知覺規範」(perceptual norms)產生質疑。第二,我以論證指出:許多視覺科學所研究的現象,可以不必預設Burge 理論中的 「正確性」(veridicality)和「單一表徵」(singular representation)也能得到解釋。第三,我討論一些有關視覺的科學理論並論證:許多視覺科學領域中 的看法其實不支持Burge 的理論。本文的結論是:「知覺的反個體主義」並 不是瞭解視覺本質唯一可選的理論架構。
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