Cover of Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
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1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Andoni Ibarra Letter From The Editor: Theoria (2003-2009)
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articles
2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Julian Reiss, Philip Kitcher Biomedical Research, Neglected Diseases, and Well-Ordered Science
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In this paper we make a proposal for reforming biomedical research that is aimed to align research more closely with the so-called fair-share principle according to which the proportions of global resources assigned to different diseases should agree with the ratios of human suffering associated with those diseases.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Cristina Corredor The Reflexivity of Explicit Performatives
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The aim of this contribution is to propose a natural implementation of the reflexive-referential theory advanced by Perry 2001 that aims at accounting for the reflexive character of explicit performative utterances. This is accomplished by introducing a reflexive-performative constraint on explicit performatives.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Erik Weber, Jeroen van Bouwel Causation, Unification, and the Adequacy of Explanations of Facts
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Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.
state of the art
5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Jesús Vega Encabo Estado de la cuestión: Filosofía de la tecnología
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RESUMEN: Este artículo revisa contribuciones recientes a la filosofía de la tecnología tomando como punto de partida una reflexión sobre la naturaleza de los artefactos, su conocimiento y las condiciones normativas vinculadas a su producción y uso. Se discute, en primer lugar, en torno al realismo/anti-realismo respecto a las clases artificiales según la teoría funcional y la teoría histórico-intencional de los artefactos. En segundo lugar, se abordan cuestiones relativas a las peculiaridades del conocimiento funcional y el privilegio epistémico del conocimiento que los hacedores tienen de sus productos. Por último, se retoma el tradicional debate sobre los artefactos como portadores de valor y sobre la dimensión normativa de la técnica.ABSTRACT: In this paper, I review recent contributions to the philosophical reflection on technology. I take as starting point discussions on the ontological nature of artifacts and then discuss questions regarding how we get to know about them and the normative dimensions involved in the making and use of artifacts. Firstly, I introduce the debate between realists and antirealists about the nature of artificial kinds and how the issue is respectively addressed by functional and intentional-historical conceptions. Secondly, I raise some questions about the specificity of functional knowledge as a kind of know-how and discuss about the epistemic privilege of the makers-knowledge. The last section takes up again the traditional debate on artifacts as value bearers and the normative dimensions of technology.
obituaries
6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
José Lázaro, Andrés Pandiella, Juan C. Hernández-Clemente Carlos Castilla del Pino (1922-2009)
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7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
José Manuel Aroca Alberto Dou S.J. (1915-2009)
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book reviews
8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Juan V. Mayoral de Lucas The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions
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9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Jordi Valor Relative Truth
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10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Andrés Rivadulla Knowing the Structure of Nature. Essays on Realism and Explanation
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11. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Julián Velarde Lombraña Investigaciones sobre la actividad lingüística. Obras escogidas
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12. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Chiara Ambrosio Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science
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13. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Summary
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14. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Contents of Volume 24
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monographic section
15. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez Introduction
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16. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Catherine Z. Elgin Construction and Cognition
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The Structure of Appearance presents a phenomenalist system, constructing enduring visible objects out of qualia. Nevertheless Goodman does not espouse phenomenalism. This is not because he considers his system inadequate. Although details remain to be filled in, he considers his system viable. And he believes his constructional methods could readily yield extensions to other sensory realms. Why isn’t Goodman a phenomenalist? This paper suggests an answer that illuminates Goodman’s views about the nature and functions of constructional systems, the prospects of reductionism, and the character of epistemology. These non-standard views present attractive alternatives to currently popular positions.
17. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Marcus Rossberg, Daniel Cohnitz Logical Consequence for Nominalists
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It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman andW.V. Quine’s which they developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in a nominalistically acceptable way.
18. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Karl-Georg Niebergall On 2nd Order Calculi of Individuals
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From early work of N. Goodman to recent approaches by H. Field and D. Lewis, there have been attempts to combine 2nd order languages with calculi of individuals. This paper is a contribution, containing basic denitions and distinctions and some metatheorems, to the development of a general metatheory of such theories.
19. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Marek Polański Goodman's Extensional Isomorphism and Syntactical Interpretations
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The aim of the present paper is to provide a model-theoretic explication of Nelson Goodman’s concept of extensional isomorphism. The term "extensional isomorphism" has been informally introduced by Nelson Goodman in the beginning paragraph of his The Structure of Appearance. After some conceptual clarications Goodman’s concept of isomorphy turns out to be closely related to some variant of set-theoretic denability and some variants of syntactical interpretability.
20. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 24 > Issue: 2
Xavier De Donato-Rodríguez Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman's Pluralism
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Goodman’s style may be elusive sometimes, so that it may result difficult to interpret what he really has in mind. This is a consequence of his masterful use of irony and metaphorical language. This difficulty of interpretation affects important parts of his philosophical thoughts and had led to misunderstandings. In the present article, I discuss the significance of Goodman’s pluralism, one of his most relevant theses. I try to show that Goodman’s pluralism does not lead to skepticism or the relativism of “anything goes”. One of the most common arguments directed against Goodman’s pluralism is that his attempt to provide a genuine standard of “rightness” fails, leaving us without a conception of truth or an appropriate substitute. I will argue that the conclusion of this argument is false, trying to show that Goodman’s aim of defending an irrealist pluralism is perfectly coherent and defensible against the common interpretation of his critics.