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Displaying: 1-20 of 32 documents

1. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Niklas Luhmann Observing Re-entries
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Rationality can be defined as a re-entry of a distinction in itself and in particular as a re-entry of the distincition between system and enviroment in the system. This is a paradoxical and, for practical matters, utopian concept. It has the advantage that one can show that different "unfoldments" of the paradox are possible and that choosing one of them depends upon historical conditions of plausibility.
2. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Nicholas Rescher Reason and Reality
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The project of inquiry into the nature's modus operandi faces extensive and deeprooted difficulties. In particular there are four major problems: (1) data undetermine theories, (2) theories undetermine facts, (3) reality transcendes the descriptive resources of language, and (4) reality transcendens the explanatory resources of language. The lesson of these delierations is not a sceptical despair but a healthy dose of cognitive humility. In pursuing the aims of science we can expect improvement but not completion: however deeply we push our inquiries into nature, we cannot get to the bottom of things.
3. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Ellery Eells Bayesian Epistemology: Probabilistic confirmation and rational decision
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This paper distinguishes between "descriptive" and "normative" conceptions of Bayesian principles of rationality, both in the context of inference and in the context of decision (which of course are not unrelated). I emphasize an idea according to which, "You have to work with what you have to work with" - that is, that rationality is a relation among old beliefs, new information, and new beliefs (in the case of inference) and among beliefs, desires, preferences, and choices (in the case of decision). According to this conception of rationality, one's current beliefs and desires are not themselves subject to evaluation as to their rationality (except for some minimal, basically logical and "coherentist" constraints). From this perspective, rationality is about how we move from old beliefs (whatever they are) to new beliefs when confronted with evidence, and about how our preferences are structured given what we believe and what we want (whatever we currently happen to believe and want). I present some formal details of this perspective and discuss several criticisms of it.
4. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Erwin Rogler Ist Carnaps Philosophie reflexionslos?
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According to some critics Carnap's philosophy is "reflectioness", i.e. without epistemic content. In contrast to this assertion this essay will show that in the writings of Carnap's semantical period, especially in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", the fundamentals of an epistemology are developed. It may be called linguistic internalism. The exposition of frameworks are interpreted as an epistemological foundation of semantics. Several problems within this project are discussed, e.g. the determination of domains of frameworks, ontological existence sentences, the relation between theories and frameworks and limits of rationality.
5. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Dale Jacquette Intentionality and the Myth of Pure Syntax
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The assumption that it is possible to distinguish pure syntax from any semantic interpretation is common to contemporary extensionalist approaches to philosophy of language, mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. The origin of the term 'pure syntax' is traced to Carnap's distinction between pure and applied syntax and semantics, and to formalist analyses of mathematical systems as uninterpreted token manipulating games. It is argued in opposition to this trend that syntax can never be purified entirely of semantics, that there can be no such thing as meaningless syntactical tokens or uninterpreted symbols, but that tokens must always betoken and symbols always symbolize something. The implications of the myth of pure syntax in rule-structured and connectionist artificial intelligence, semantic network processing, and their philosophical-psychological rationales, are explored. The fact that rule-structured artificial intelligence in principle can simulate any connectionist model, and that rule-structured artificial intelligence presupposes the myth of pure syntax links the myth to traditional approaches and new paradigms in cognitive engineering.
6. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Peter Gärdenfors The Social Stance
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I argue that it is necessary to go beyond Dennett's notion of the "intentional stance" and adopt a social stance to certain phenomena. I introduce the notion of a social intention, which is an intention that cannot be replaced by individual intentions. The assumption of such intentions are helpful for understanding language and other social conventions. At the end of the article, I also discuss the relation between social intentions and social values.
7. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Julian Nida-Rümelin Die Vielfalt guter Gründe und die Theorie praktischer Rationalität
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There is a plurality of good reasons for action. An adequate theory of practical rationality has to be compatible with it even if it requires certain modifications of our everyday practices of reasoning. Usual theories of practical rationality do not pass this test. It is envisaged how to revise adequately our understanding of practical rationality.
8. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Stefan Gosepath Eine einheitliche Konzeption von Rationalität
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This article argues for the thesis that there is only one basic form of rationality, which is applied in different areas. First of all, there is one meaning of the term "rational" which applies to all situations in which the term is used: "justified." If "rational" means simply "justified", then rationality can be broken down into as many types as there are kinds of justification. Two distinctions between kinds of justification seem particularly plausible: 1. relative vs. absolute justifications and 2. theoretical justifications of opinions vs. practical justifications of actions. Taken together, these two distinctions yield a division into four types of rationality. I maintain, however, that these two distinctions collapse upon more careful examination. In this article I will simply assume that no form of ultimate justification is convincing; thus, the first distinction does not apply. Against the second distinction I try to argue in this paper that theoretical rationality represents a form of practical rationality. The idea of an optimal choice of aims, actions, and opinions, which nonetheless differs from the orthodox model of practical rationality, thus proves to be the comprehensive central ingredient of the concept of rationality.
9. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Gerhard Preyer Die Rationalitätsbegriffe des Handelns Eine Grundlegung zu einer Typologie sozialen Handelns
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For understanding human action rationality is a fundamental poin of point. A prototheory of social science elaborate the types of social action under the conceptualization of rationalization and human freedom in societies. On this way it must be distinguished two - not interchangeable - concepts of rationalization: the rationality of purpose e.g. the rational choice of means (Zweckrationalität) and the rationality of understanding (Verständigungsrationalität). Language behaviour has for this conceptualization the status of the frametheory. But actions are not identical with language behaviour and are based on language external ressources. The conceptualizations of concepts of rationality are basic-assumptions for the construction of a structure-model of societal rationalization.
10. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Timo Airaksinen, Katri Kaalikoski Instrumental Rationality
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The standard view of rationality distinguishes between instrumental rationality and the rationality of ends. We discuss this conception briefly before introducing an alternative theory. According to it, means and ends are interconnected so that the means will produce the ends. In other words, the means are used to shape our ends. We describe and discuss this view, asking whether it can be called rationality. It is clear that this alternative view has many irrational features. But at the same time it is clear that much of our technological culture is based on this view so that also it is hampered by the emerging irrationality. We conclude by discussing the case of genetic engineering as a technology we cannot possibly accept. Its characteristic ends may be of a wrong type.
11. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Dieter Mans Argumentation im Kontext
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Some principles of logic-oriented theories of argumentation are discussed. A sharp distinction is drawn between arguments in formal contexts and arguments in non formal contexts. It is argued, that the analysis of colloquial arguments cannot be based on the logic-oriented theories of argumentation. The outline of a more realistic theory of argumentation is given, by using defeasable inferences as a starting point. The model is applied to some everyday arguments.
12. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Georg Meggle Das Universalisierungsproblem in der Moralphilosophie
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Moral judgements have to be universalizable. There are many problems with this thesis (U). The problems to be dealt with here, are: (i) What is the connection between U and justifiablility? (ii) Is U a logical thesis? (iii) Is U analytically true? (iv) Is U adaquate? (v) Is utilitarianism a logical consequence of U?
13. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Thomas McCarthy Legitimacy and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Analytical Distinctions
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In general, Habermas has more readily accommodated conflicts of interst in his discourse theory of democracy than he has conflicts of values, ways of life, and worldviews. Though he has continouously elaborated upon notions of "ethical-political" discourse, culture, and identity since 1988, his treatments of diversity, pluralism, multiculturalism, and multinationalism have left agreement at the center and disagreement in the margins of his conception of legitimacy. This essay examines the development of that conception from the early 1970s to the present and argues that "the consent of the governed" cannot be given so cognitive an interpretation as Habermas gives it.
14. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Gerald L. Eberlein Logik der Sozialwissenschaften: 150 Jahre nach J. St. Mills System of Logic
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J. St. Mill's System of Logic (1843) is reexamined from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy of the social sciences. His naturalistic epistemology, "state", "general/universal laws", "social statics/dynamics" are discussed, as well as his four methods. His nomological-behavioral position is analysed, along with his theoretical approach.
15. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Ulfrid Neumann Begriff und Geltung des Rechts
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16. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Axel Wüstehube The Nature of Rationality
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17. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Anna Riek Political Liberalism
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18. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Daniel Schoch Die Wahrheit über den Lügner
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19. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Michael Quante Das Realismusproblem in der analytischen Philosophie. Studien zu Carnap und Quine
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20. ProtoSociology: Volume > 6
Uwe Wirth Philosophische Aufsätze
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