It is often supposed that the example of Socrates makes the taking of payment for philosophical services problematic. This supposition is examined on the basis of the evidence available in Plato's Apology and Xenophon's Memorabilia. These texts suggest that Socrates certainly had reservations about the desirability of receiving payment in return for philosophical services. However, these reservations do not amount to an outright and unconditional condemnation. Furthermore, some of the reservations derive from the particular values of the culture in which Socrates lived and should not be seen as binding on all. Similarly, whatever specific objections Socrates may have had to the activities of the Sophists should not be seen as applicable to all philosophers who accept payment in return for their services.

For Plato, one mark of the difference between sophistry and philosophy is that the sophist takes fees for service. His Socrates does not. However, this paper points out that Socrates' attitude to money reflects his unique indifference to things bodily, and a more satisfactory understanding of Plato on money needs to turn to his discussion of the love of money or avarice, especially in the Republic. Plato locates money-loving in appetitive soul along with physical cravings like hunger and lust; why he should do so is explained if avarice is seen as a primary instance of a more pervasive possessiveness that is ultimately somatic in nature. I argue that though his remedies are too severe, Plato is right to warn against avarice and its possible effects upon the practice of philosophy. And following Plato I conclude that philosophy is best understood as enquiry unconstrained by the interests of the market and carried out in the context of academic freedom.

This essay argues that there is no obvious reason not to make money doing philosophy. Whether philosophical counselling is justified, however, dependson the practitioners of this service defining the benefit of that service.

This article raises the question of whether or not a "neutral" stance can be found from which to engage in philosophical counseling. By drawing on the debate between absolutism and relativism, it is argued that no such neutral ground exists. The foundational premises of the transcendentalist tradition involve different assumptions than those of the materialist and relativist traditions. Such a distinction goes back to the earliest days of philosophy and today the new profession of philosophical counseling must address the multiplicity of assumptions upon which philosophic discourse can be built. The paper concludes with a call for philosophical counseling to move beyond the focus on Socrates, and to embrace a wide variety of different positions within its domain.

Philosophical counseling recommends to its clients the activity of philosophical dialogue. The process of thought in dialogue differs from private thought in the greater physical constraints placed upon dialogue. We as yet do not have an understanding of the embodied activity of philosophy sufficient to make viable the marketing of philosophical counseling as a service. The paper is a contribution to such an understanding. The paper considers the notion of a philosophical life and criticizes the possibility of a profession of philosophical counseling. It ends with a tentative defense of philosophical counseling as a marketable service.

This paper claims that the edifice of philosophical practice bears prima facie resemblance to other counseling-dispensing professions—e.g. medicine, law, psychology, accountancy. It defends virtues of professionalism in philosophical practice against accusations of sophism, and also rejects social constructivism as a politically extreme form of sophistry. It concludes that, notwithstanding prima facie resemblance to other counseling professions, philosophical practice is foundationally distinct from them. When elaborated, this distinction complicates the notion of inculcating virtue in philosophical practice.

The market seems to have substituted politics as a coordination model in modern societies. While philosophy's complementarity to politics is well-acknowledged, its importance for economic markets can be questioned. Economics deals with optimization, but as markets are constituted by real persons with individual beliefs and normative values the economic tool box is not sufficient to describe market behavior. This is especially true whenever technologicalinnovations challenge established market rules. Philosophy supplies analytical instruments for a better, more complete description of markets including theirnormative aspects. For this complementary function philosophy should be placed at the core of any theory of markets.