This article explores the importance of mental expression in understanding the phenomenon of inner speech. Most accounts of inner speech assume from the outset the common idea that the expressions of a subject (e.g., a smile) and their mental states (e.g., joy) are two different types of items somehow related to each other. This relational view of expression is challenged in this article. Firstly, it is argued that relational views of expression cannot explain some features of inner speech. Secondly, a non-relational view of expression is developed, according to which mental states are patterns of expressive behavior. Thirdly, it is argued that only from the framework of non-relational expressivism is it possible to explain the main features of inner speech. Finally, it is concluded that non-relational expressivism emerges as a prominent contender among contemporary views of the mind, as it provides the only account of inner speech that can fully explain the phenomenon.

The cognitive basis of geometry is still poorly understood, even the ‘simpler’ issue of what kind of representation of geometric objects we have. In this work, we set forward a tentative model of the neural representation of geometric objects for the case of the pure geometry of Euclid. To arrive at a coherent model, we found it necessary to consider earlier forms of geometry. We start by developing models of the neural representation of the geometric figures of ancient Greek practical geometry. Then, we propose a related model for the earliest form of pure geometry – that of Hippocrates of Chios. Finally, we develop the model of the neural representation of the geometric objects of Euclidean geometry. The models are based on the hub-and-spoke theory. In our view, the existence of specific models opens the possibility of addressing the relationship between geometric figures and geometric objects, in a novel way, in terms of their neural representation.

We propose to take advantage of the computational methodologies of formal concept analysis and network visualization to represent and study the internal structure of axiomatized theories. This exercise was put into practice by comparing more than 44 theoretical models of space-time and gravitation. The lattices can be explored with interactive visualizations known as macroscopes that highlight relations of specialization, theorization, hierarchical orderings, communities and classes of components. In this text we exemplify with the reconstruction of classical particle mechanics, theories of space-time and gravitation.

The interpretation and justification of Earman’s symmetry principles (stating that any spacetime symmetry should be a dynamical symmetry and vice-versa) are controversial. This is directly connected to the question of how certain structures in physical theories acquire a spatiotemporal character. In this paper I address these issues from a perspective (arguably functionalist) that relates the classical discussion about the measurement and geometrical determination of space with a characterization of the notion of dynamical symmetry in which its application to subsystems that act as measuring devices plays an essential role. I argue that in order to reformulate and justify Earman’s principles, and to provide a general account of the chronogeometrical character of some structures, the existence of a coordination between two notions of congruence, one mathematical and one dynamical, must be assumed for the interpretation of physical theories. This coordination provides the basis on which we can understand spacetime in physical theories as the codification (representation) of certain features of the access ideal observers have to experience.

Arguments and explanations are two kinds of speech that have not always been properly distinguished. Currently, emphasis has been placed, both in the pedagogy of science and in argumentation studies, on the necessity of differentiating them in order to properly grasp the nature of explanations and arguments. Demarcation criteria between both of them have been most explicitly proposed in argumentation theory. However, here I will argue that the criteria that are typically used in argumentation theory to distinguish between an argument and an explanation (which I call the “standard distinction”) suffer from several problems. On the one hand, in certain relevant cases the criteria provide no guidance or yield questionable results. On the other hand, the criteria of distinction have been limited to the domain of theoretical argumentation, ignoring the peculiarities of the practical domain.

This text aims to clarify what and what kind of commitments are acquired by a speaker in assertion; assertive commitments are characterized as practical attitudes directly related to reasons. The text has three moments: in the first one, the development of the idea of assertion as a speech act is presented and it becomes evident that from its first conceptions, the speaker’s commitment plays an important role; in the second one, by means of a comparison with promise, it is clarified what kind of commitments a speaker acquires when making an assertion–the notions of primary and secondary commitments are introduced and applied specifically to the case of assertive commitments–; finally, in the third one, it is shown how assertive commitments can be understood as practical attitudes.