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commentaries
1. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Mark Silcox Comments on “A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory Dispositions” by Zak Kopeikin
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2. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andrew Russo Comments on “Six Arguments against ‘Ought Implies Can’”
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3. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
John Harris Hypothetical Consent’s Unnecessary Shuffle
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4. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Robyn Gaier Comments on Bryan Smyth’s “De-Moralizing Heroism: Ethical Expertise and the Object of Heroic Approbation”
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5. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Paul Carron Emotion Regulation and the Cultivation of Virtue: Comments on “The Broader Threat of Situationism to Virtue Ethics”
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6. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Daniel Carr Comments on Tim Lord’s “Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind”
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7. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
C.E. Abbate Commentary on Deborah Heikes’s “Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility”
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8. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Richard Galvin Maxims, Contraries, Contradictions and Kant’s Universal Law Formula
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9. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Nathan Jackson Ameliorative Potential in the Relational Autonomy Debate
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10. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez On the Category of Nonconsensual Sex: A Reply to Shannon Fyfe and Elizabeth Lanphier
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11. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Bob Fischer Comments on J. P. Andrew’s “The Insignificance of Taste”
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12. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andy Piker Comments on Alastair Norcross’s “The Impotence of the Causal Impotence Objection”
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13. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Julie Kuhlken The Virtuous Artist: A Commentary on “Is Art a Virtue”
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14. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Stefan Sencerz “Epistemic Goods”: A Reply to Jerry Green
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15. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Dave Beisecker The Consequences of Falsehood: Comments on Nikolaus Breiner’s “Charles Peirce on Assertion: Assuming Liabilities as Offering Evidence”
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open submission articles
16. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Heidi Savage The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Non-Literalism and The Habits of Sherlock Holmes
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Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ is true. However, this attitude confl icts with speakers’ assignment of the value true to this sentence. Furthermore, making these assignments seem in no way distinct from the process that leads speakers to assign true to other sentences, sentences like ‘Bertrand Russell smokes.’ I will explore the idea that when speakers assign the value true to the first sentence, they are not making any kind of confused mistake — that we ought to take these assignments at face value. I show how the alternative view is inadequate for explaining various examples of fi ctional discourse. In addition, evidence that these truth value assignments to sentences are tracking semantic content, rather than pragmatic effects, is offered.
17. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jeremy Fischer Why are You Proud of That?: Cognitivism About “Possessive” Emotions
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Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).
18. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Tebben The Paradox of Patience
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Some normative theories—act utilitarianism and rational decision theory among them—both designate some range of outcomes as particularly important, and, with an eye towards securing those outcomes, provide agents with advice concerning what is to be done. In this paper I argue that there are situations in which these two aspects of such theories are in tension. I provide a handful of conditions that, when jointly satisfi ed, pick out situations in which these theories recommend that agents act in ways that do not contribute to the outcomes on which they place value.
presidential plenary session: philosophy and wine
19. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Julie Kuhlken Confessions of a Recovering Philosopher: Introduction to Panel on Philosophy and Wine
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20. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Michelle Williams Spirituality and the Wine’s Soul
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