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1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Rodrigo Borges How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge
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The Gettier Problem and Moore‟s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in aMoorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Thomas Hall In Defense of the Compossibility of Presentism and Time Travel
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In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist's model of time leaves nowhereto travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of the objections fail.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Ned Markosian Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain in a Vat?
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The topic of this paper is the familiar problem of skepticism about the external world. How can you know that you are not a brain in a vat being fooled byalien scientists? And if you can't know that, how can you know anything about the external world? The paper assumes Evidentialism as a theory about justification, and then argues that you are justified in believing that you are not a brain in a vat, in virtue of the fact that your evidence supports that belief. The paper also considers a number of different objections to this proposal. The upshot is that you do know that you are a not a brain in a vat, and that you also know lots of things about the external world.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Rinat M. Nugayev Maxwellian Scientific Revolution: A Case Study in Kantian Epistemology
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It is exhibited that maxwellian electrodynamics was created as a result of the old pre-maxwellian programmes reconciliation: the electrodynamics of Ampere-Weber, the wave theory of Young-Fresnel and Faraday‟s programme. The programmes‟ meeting led to construction of the whole hierarchy of theoretical objects starting from the genuine crossbreeds (the displacement current) and up to usual mongrels. After the displacement current construction the interpenetration of the pre-maxwellian programmes began that marked the beginning of theoretical schemes of optics and electromagnetism real unification. Maxwell‟s programme did supersede its rivals because it did assimilate some ideas of the Ampere-Weber programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programmes of Young-Fresnel and Faraday. Maxwellian programme‟s victory over its rivals became possible because the core of Maxwell‟s unification strategy was formed by Kantian epistemology looked through the prism of William Whewell and such representatives of Scottish Enlightenment as Thomas Reid and William Hamilton.It was Kantian epistemology that enabled Hermann von Helmholtz and his pupil Heinrich Hertz to arrive at such a version of Maxwell‟s theory that could serve a heuristical basis for the radio waves discovery.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Shane Ryan A Humean Account of Testimonial Justification
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I argue that a Humean account can make sense of the phenomenology associated with testimonial justification; the phenomenology being that in standard cases hearers regularly simply accept a testifier‟s assertions as true – hearers don't engage in monitoring. The upshot is that a Humean account is in a better position dialectically than is usually supposed. I provide some background to the debate before setting out two challenges facing accounts of testimonial justification. The first challenge is to provide an account that accords with the phenomenology of testimonial reception; the second challenge is to provide an account that can make sense of some testimonial beliefs enjoying greater justification than others. I show the credulist position to be vulnerable to the second challenge and the Humean position to be vulnerable to the first challenge. I argue that a Humean account, by drawing on dual process theory, can overcome thefirst challenge.
debate
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Michael Huemer Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi
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I address Moti Mizrahi‟s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends that other epistemologicaltheories can be supported by parallel self-defeat arguments. I argue that the self-defeat arguments for other theories either (a) are compatible with PC and thus present no problem, or (b) have a false premise, unlike the self-defeat argument for PC.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
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8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aim and Scope
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
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