The topic of “reason and faith in God” has challenged philosophers and theologians since the beginning of their disciplines, and it has left many inquirers confused. The key notions of faith and reason are often left unclear, and this complicates inquiry about faith in God. Many inquirers end up puzzled about the significance of the distinction between reason and faith. This paper outlines an approach to reason and faith in God that explains how faith in God can be well-grounded in reason as evidence, even if reason as an argument does not apply in a case. It identifies distinctive roles for experience and defense in an account of faith in God.

This essay addresses the question, in what sense can and should philosophy be Christian? After considering some views according to which philosophy should not and cannot be Christian, the ideas of three prominent Christian philosophers on the topic are surveyed, and in the light of this some conclusions are formulated.

Many Christians seek to understand how their Christian faith relates to what goes by the name “philosophy.” They eventually see that no single well-defined subject goes by the name “philosophy.” It does not help matters that the term “philosophy” is among the most variably used terms in the English language, even among academic philosophers. This raises the question of how a Christian philosopher should proceed with inquiry about the relation between Christian faith and philosophy. This paper offers an answer in terms of “Christ-shaped” philosophy, and replies to some criticisms from William Hasker.

Paul Moser claims that there is no evidence for my attribution to him of certain views in my essay, “How Christian Can Philosophy Be?” Here I review the evidence presented in my essay and reconsider its import. I also reflect further on our respective views concerning philosophy, and Christian philosophy.

In this paper I have had two aims. One was to describe a number of pantheist or near pantheist religious attitudes, including the influence of many worlds theories. The other was to indicate some of the ways we might arrive at Pantheism.One final remark: when assessing religious positions the intellectual grounds for accepting or rejecting them should, I suggest, be whether they make sense of things, that is, enable us to understand. The ways to Pantheism, or to near Pantheism, should therefore be interpreted as part of a comparison between ways of understanding.

I examine three accounts of divine freedom. I argue that two recent accounts which attempt to explain God’s freedom without appealing to alternative possibilities fail. I then show how a view of divine freedom based on Robert Adams’s idea that God’s grace means he has no obligation to create the best world is able to explain how God can be free while also being perfectly good and perfectly rational.

In Secularism and Freedom of Conscience Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor distinguish two models of a secular state: a republican and a pluralist-liberal one. Whereas the former displays a tendency to relegate religious beliefs from the public sphere for the sake of its postulated neutrality, the latter emphasizes the importance of freedom of conscience and, consequently, the right of individuals to manifest their religious commitments also in public. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s views on religion cannot provide a general framework that would warrant the pluralist-liberal kind of secularism. To that effect, focusing on Kant’s distinction between the private and the public use of reason, introduced in his 1784 essay on enlightenment, I claim that the public sphere construed along the Kantian lines could not provide a space in which a plurality of different, heteronomously grounded beliefs, could coexist with one another. Comparing Kant’s theory with Spinoza’s—particularly with regard to their critique of revelation and the proposal to reinterpret the Scripture in the light of universal moral principles—I also suggest that, as a rationalist about religion, Kant comes close to the secularizing tendency of the ‘radical Enlightenment.’

In this paper I take a closer look at Fr. Georges Florovsky’s original view on the relation between philosophy and theology. I argue that he tried to formulate an approach based on patristic experience and opposed to the dominating secular paradigm of philosophy. In some sense he wanted to reverse the traditional account. As Teresa Obolevitch aptly suggested, he wanted to replace the principle fides quaerens intellectum by the rule intellectus quaerens fidem. In that first default case the faith needs to be justified or proved by the reason, in the second, unobvious one, the faith has an absolute priority and illuminates itself the natural thought. According to Florovsky, philosophy should not attempt to ground the theology, formulating arguments for the existence of God or proving the coherence of theism, but rather should accept theology as a fundamental premise and then develop a new, non-secular account for the old philosophical topics.

I argue that Taylor’s engagement with secularity demonstrates his deep concern for preserving key humanist insights, an abiding commitment to moral pluralism, and the sincerity of his religious faith. Taylor insists on transcendence as the best hope for securing the continued commitment to the moral legacy of humanism in the west, but while he personally advocates a renewed Christian humanism, his notion of transcendence is amenable to other interpretations, including non-religious options, and so allows for a potential overlapping consensus on humanism from what Taylor calls the “transformation perspective.”

Przedmiotem artykułu jest pojęcie wolnej woli zaprezentowane przez św. Augustyna w niektórych jego pismach. W pierwszej części artykułu przedstawiam pogląd Augustyna dotyczący struktury ludzkiej duszy. Kładę nacisk na fakt, że według Augustyna nasza wolna wola jest jednocześnie czymś różnym od rozumu i pamięci, ale również jest identyczna z duszą oraz podmiotem moralnym. W drugiej części przedstawiam wybrane charakterystyczne cechy związane z ludzką wolą i wolnością, na przykład: chcenie, bycie sprawcą, odpowiedzialność, autodeter- minacja. Następnie omawiam dwie interpretacje augustyńskiej koncepcji grzechu pierworodnego (W.S. Babcocka i Scotta C. MacDonalda). Próbuję pokazać, że pierwsza z nich przyjmowała zbyt mocne pojęcie ciągłości między dyspozycjami, intencjami podmiotu a aktami jego woli, z kolei druga traktowała wolność w zbyt intelektualistyczny sposób. Ostatecznie omawiam woluntary- styczne wątki w augustyńskiej teorii szczęścia.The subject matter of this article is the concept of free will presented in some of Saint Augustine’s works. In the first part, I present Augustine’s view about the structure of the human soul. I emphasize that, according to Augustine, our free will is both distinct from reason and memory, and identical to the soul and the moral agent. In the second part, I provide an overview of the selected features that are connected with human will and freedom, for example: (1) wanting, (2) being an agent, (3) responsibility, (4) auto-determination. Next, I investigate two interpretations of Augustine’s concept of the original sin (by W.S. Babcock and by Scott C. MacDonald). I try to demonstrate that the first one assumed a too strong concept of the continuity between the dispositions, intentions of the agent and his/her acts of will, while the second one treated freedom in a too intellectualistic manner. Eventually, I discuss the voluntaristic components of Augustine’s theory of happiness.

There are often mentioned specific features of human consciousness and culture: metaphysical reflection, ability of self-consciousness, moral sensitivity, aesthetical and religious experience. One can express the role of the similar contents, stressing the role of modern sciences in the human development or the worth of altruism in the acts of man, who—existing for others— transcends the biological struggle for existence revealing in such a way the rich world of culture that gives right to assert his unique role in the nature. On the other hand, man still remains the element of nature, by the corporeality subordinated to its physical and biological rules. Taking this fact into account, we are not permitted to speak about the absolute transcendence of man over nature but only about relative one. The latter consists in the biological bond of man with the rest of nature and his cultural openness toward supernatural values.There is also methodologically accepted confirmation for the thesis concerning the coexistence of physical continuity with ontological discontinuity in the evolutionary interpretation of nature. The ontological thesis surely can’t be definitively justified. Therefore, the opposite thesis will be also able to enlist new sympathisers. On the one hand, they would come from the groups that don’t acknowledge the difference between ontological and scientific form of evolutionism; on the other, they would occur among the thinkers capable of the future formulation of a new version of monism making the contemporary opposition between materialism and spiritualism totally pointless.Apart from above mentioned aspects of the debate, the statement emphasizing that man transcends nature is still being criticized by some intellectual circles depending on methodological presuppositions or ontological declarations. Nevertheless, the basic problem of these explanations consists in the lack of an interpretation of features of the human psyche, adequate to the actual data, that express the relative autonomy of the contents of the human psyche in reference to biological determinants.

Artykuł opiera się na analizie kazania CCXVI Ubi est, qui natus est, rex Iudaeorum? Mikołaja z Kuzy. Wskazuje na jego dużą zależność od Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem Mistrza Eckharta i omawia obecną u obu autorów koncepcję Boga jako locus omnium, która nawiązuje z kolei do myśli Jana Szkota Eriugeny. Kazanie CCXVI dowodzi znaczenia problematyki chrystologicznej dla myśli Kuzańczyka oraz jest przykładem, jak gatunek kazania wpływa na organizację i eksplikację treści filozoficznych. Wśród nich Mikołaj z Kuzy umieścił problem relacji między Bogiem a stworzeniem, a także koncepcję czasu i miejsca. Podejmując analizę pytań o wieczność świata i o Boga przed stworzeniem, Kuzańczyk zawarł również w kazaniu ukrytą obronę tez Eckharta potępionych w papieskiej bulli In agro dominico.The article contains the analysis of Cusanus’ Sermon CCXVI Ubi est qui natus est rex Iudae- orum?, describes its dependence on Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem by Meister Eckhart and discusses the idea of God as locus omnium, present in both authors, as well as in the thought of John Scotus Eriugena. Sermon CCXVI demonstrates the importance of christology in Cusanus’ work and is an example of how the sermon genre affects the organization and explication of philosophical issues, such as the problem of the relationship between God and creation and the concept of time and space. Moreover, Nicholas of Cusa analyses the questions of the eternity of the world and of God’s place before creation. In this way, he defends some of Eck- hart’s teaching, condemned in the papal Bull In agro dominico.

Artykuł przedstawia biografie i filozoficzne poglądy dwojga niemieckich myślicieli XX wieku — Hannah Arendt i Martina Heideggera. Dwie wojny światowe za życia jednego pokolenia, nieuwieńczone ani ostatecznym trumfem pokoju, ani wytchnieniem, uformowały, ale w sposób bardzo odmienny, tych dwoje ludzi. Stąd i filozofia, i polityka rozpisała im życiowe ścieżki, wybory, decyzje i bóle. Jak to się jednak stało, że Hannah Arendt przebyła drogę od filozofii teoretycznej do filozofii polityki, stając się jednym z najważniejszych głosów filozofii politycznej w XX wieku, a Martin Heidegger, choć podjął dramatyczną próbę stworzenia w swojej filozofii fundamentów dla polityki, utknął w swym hermetycznym języku, nie mogąc (a po wojnie nie mając ku temu życiowego uprawomocnienia) analizować na gruncie filozofii zagadnień politycznych? Podjęta refleksja jest próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego żydowska myślicielka stała się filozofem polityki, a niemiecki filozof, mimo że pragnął metafizyki jako dziejowej metapolityki narodu, nigdy nie miał do tego prawa. Co było źródłem odmienności tych dwojga myślicieli? Czy tylko względy charakterologiczne? A może gdzieś u podstaw ich życiowych wyborów leżały przede wszystkim idee, którymi żyli i które głosili? Może dlatego Heidegger po wojnie wybrał ucieczkę, nie chcąc czy nie potrafiąc zmierzyć się z tym, kim okazał się Adolf Hitler, czym było ostateczne rozwiązanie, Auschwitz, ludobójstwo, Arendt zaś pozostała wierna myśleniu i miłości, ukazując ludziom XX wieku prawdziwe korzenie totalitaryzmu.The article presents the biographies and philosophical views of two German thinkers of the twentieth century — Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. Two world wars during the lifetime of one generation, not crowned neither with the final triumph of peace nor respite, formed, but in a very different way, these two philosophers. Hence the philosophy and politics influenced their life path, choices, decisions and pains. How did it happen, however, that Hannah Arendt came the way from theoretical to political philosophy, becoming one of the most important voices of political philosophy in the twentieth century, while Martin Heidegger, although made a dramatic attempt to create in his philosophy the foundations for a policy stuck in his hermetic language, unable (and after the war, not having had validation of life) to analyze on the basis of philosophy the political issues? Taken reflection is an attempt to answer the question of why the Jewish thinker became a philosopher of politics, and the German philosopher, although he wanted the metaphysics as a historical metapolitics of the nation has never had the right to do it. What was the source of the variability of these two thinkers? Was it only a difference of characters? Or maybe somewhere at the roots of their life choices lied the ideas they have lived and preached? Maybe that's why Heidegger after the war, chose the escape, unwilling or unable to deal with who Adolf Hitler turned out to be, what was the final solution, Auschwitz, genocide, while Arendt remained faithful to thinking and love showing people of twentieth century the origins of totalitarianism.

Jaegwon Kim w swoim artykule dokonuje krytycznej analizy „Epistemologii znaturalizo- wanej” W.V. Quine’a. Stwierdza, że uprawianie epistemologii przy odrzuceniu aspektu normatywnego jest niemożliwe, gdyż zostaje ona zredukowana wyłącznie do opisu procesów psychologicznych odpowiadających czynności poznania. Aby w ogóle móc mówić o uzyskiwaniu nie- powątpiewalnej wiedzy, konieczne jest zastosowanie takich kategorii, jak uzasadnianie, które posiadają charakter wartościujący. Kim uważa, że koncepcja Quine’a jest trudna do zaakceptowania w świetle jakiejkolwiek teorii epistemicznej, stawiającej poznanie prawdy za swój cel.Jaegwon Kim in his article undertakes a critical analysis of W.V. Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized.” He states that it is impossible to practice epistemology without taking into consideration the normative aspect, for without it, it becomes reduced to merely a psychological description of cognitive processes. In order to speak of the acquisition of undoubtable knowledge, it is necessary to avert to such categories as justification, which are of an axiological nature. Kim considers Quine’s concept difficult to accept in accordance with any epistemic theory which requires truth as the object of knowledge.

Esej przedstawia w krótkiej formie główny argument książki Thomasa Nagela Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (Oxford University Press 2012). Zgodnie z tym argumentem nauki fizykalne w obecnej postaci nie są w stanie podać zadowalającego wyjaśnienia świadomego życia i w związku z tym są niezupełne. Nie powinno nas to jednak skłonić do przyjęcia jakiejś formy teizmu, ale raczej do poszukiwania szerszej, adekwatniejszej koncepcji przyrody.The essay outlines the main argument of Thomas Nagel’s influential book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (Oxford University Press 2012). According to the argument the physical sciences in their present form cannot adequately account for our conscious life and are thus incomplete. This should not lead us to accept some form of theism, however, but to a search for a broader, more adequate conception of nature.

Pokazujemy, że formuła CLpEqLq aksjomatyzuje logikę modalną Łukasiewicza i nie istnieje krótszy aksjomat dla tej logiki.

Celem artykułu jest analiza Józefa M. Bocheńskiego zabobonów występujących w logice w odniesieniu do żywo współcześnie dyskutowanej w filozofii logiki problematyki pluralizmu logicznego. Koncentruję się na jednym zabobonie, nazwanym hasłowo „relatywizm w logice”, który pojawił się w związku z powstaniem nieklasycznych rachunków logicznych. Rozważam problem, czy pluralizm w logice, rozumiany jako współistnienie wielu (nieskończenie wielu) systemów logicznych, przekreślajedność logiki i sprzeciwia się jej normatywnemu charakterowi oraz czy z tego faktu można wyprowadzić wniosek o relatywizmie w logice.