The paper brings a concise analysis of the content contained in the book Filozoficzne interpretacje faktow naukowych [Philosophical interpretations of scientific facts] (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2009) written by Jozef Turek. Considerations concern the metascientific theory of philosophical cosmology, especially the relations between natural sciences and the so called classical philosophy of nature. Procedures of philosophical interpretation of scientific facts are postulated to ensure methodological and epistemological correctness of all philosophical theses. Basic operations in this branch of philosophy include conceptualization, defining, inferring especially in the form of explaining and justifying. Such cognitive operations constitute the whole process of interpretation, insists Jozef Turek.

It seems that work and rest are two fundamentally different ways of human functioning. When acting we believe we are needed and we can find meaning of live. Rest is rather referred to a passive attitude, when man doesn’t perform any operations but regenerates his physical or spiritual forces. These seemingly independent phenomena, however, can be regarded as two “sides of the same coin”. Christian teaching stresses that both of them represent the ways for human development and growth of the relation with God.By analogy, I want to show that in the context of reflection on human work it’s worth to present complementary cognitive perspectives. Contemporary knowledge about our evolutionary ancestors reveals the picture of hominids who acquired basic livelihoods by physical work. Nevertheless, individual efforts became gradually involved in social group’s existence. Moreover, human will to survive had been completed with the search of non-pragmatic aims of engagement when work generated basic questions concerning the meaning and value of human cooperation. Integral anthropological thought, therefore, demands not only analysis from the natural sciences point of view but also humanistic reflections on the unique status of man who creates culture and puts deep metaphysical questions.

The purpose of this paper is to point out the epistemological and methodological limitations of the procedures aimed to make the theology scientific. These limitations result from commonly accepted in the philosophy of science principles, namely autonomy and homogeneity of the particular scientific disciplines. These principles in such cognitive acts as: inferring, explanation, interpreting, proving, defining and justification of clamed thesis require the situation in which both parts of these acts belong to the same cognitive plane. Otherwise we would have to deal with the attitude of the cognitive liberalism, which leads in its final consequences to the cognitive chaos.

The article shows why the Big Bang should not be identified with the moment when God created the Universe. The methodological objections arise from the accepted conception of autonomy of different disciplines (science, philosophy and theology), and from the principle of methodological and epistemological uniformity which is derived from that conception. On the subject plane these objections arise from the analysis of cosmological and theological knowledge. Cosmology does not give any ground for asserting that the Big Bang is an absolute temporal beginning of the Universe. Theology provides no argument for the creation in some specific time. On the contrary, its representatives warn against identifying the act of creation with the Big Bang.

The article concerns the distinction between monistic and pluralistic positions in philosophical ontology. I present a formal scheme, which, on the one hand, consistently describes historically recognised versions of this distinction, and which, on the other hand, shows some conceptual perspectives for new versions thereof.

One of Fr. Joseph Turek’s scientific interests was history of the 20th century cosmology. These short remarks on the subject we dedicate to his memory. After briefly presenting first historical surveys of the early relativistic cosmology, and mentioning those devoted to Georges Lemaitre and Alexander Friedman, we focus on two scientific congresses, one held in Bologna (1988) and another in Valencia (2000), the aim of which was to review historical developments of modern cosmology. In the second half of the 20th century, history of science matured as an academic discipline and elaborated new style in doing history. Rapid progress in cosmology after the discovery of the microwave background radiation in 1965 still awaits its more comprehensive historical elaboration.

The paper investigates the category of religious faith, religion and God presented and criticized by leading British atheist – Richard Dawkins. He is a biologist but his writings on faith and religion are highly popular all over the world. Dawkins argues that any form of faith in supernatural reality is opposite to rational and justified scientific investigation. One cannot be a scientist and believe in God at the same time because science is based on rational premises and religious faith is not. He claims that religious faith is a source of all evil in the world. In his criticism Dawkins does not undertake serious discussions with any contemporary philosophers of religion or theologians but he invents his own notion of religious faith. It seems that Dawkins’ atheistic position is a sort of belief which does not differ essentially from religious faith defined by him as a belief in spite of, even perhaps because of, the lack of evidence.In the paper some particular views of Dawkins are considered critically: a) a notion of religious faith, b) religious faith as a source of evil, c) a problem of existence and nature of God.

The idea of sapiential governance of science is articulated with regard to the autonomy of science. It is contrasted with P. Kitcher’s proposal of establishing global Science Forum as an institution delivering global tutored preferences regarding the stratification of the goals of research. S. Kamiński’s proposal is to uncover elements of wisdom inherent in the very nature of the enterprise of science and it fosters individual’s researcher autonomy in the focus of science governance. The opposition is also illustrated with the index cases of Uraniborg, New Atlantis and A. Comte’s reception thereof within the ideal of instrumentalized science.

This paper seeks to show that there is a continuity of the intellectual tradition that started in the nineteenth century and is present now. It depicts the relation between science and religion (reason and faith) in a new light, therefore in the spirit with which the rationalistic approach had been modified. This approach had narrowed reason to speculative intellect and reduced religion to a naturalised principle of social order. The main heroes in the paper are the following authors: John Henry Newman, Lord John Acton, Alfred North Whitehead oraz Michael Novak. In this chronological order, one can observe how different historical contexts may lead to similar conclusions.The milieus of the so-called secular humanists have claimed that there is an irremovable conflict between science and religion, whereas the authors under study argue that the case is not so, that we may easily find a peaceful solution. It appears that neither reason can dispose of faith, nor faith is safe without reason. Additionally, scientific procedures often call for a similar attitude that one finds in religion. The authors under discussion practically apply the principle fides quaerens intellectum and justify its application.

The origin of anthropic trend in cosmology is connected to the, so called, large number coincidence, which was observed by Eddington. Dicke, Hoyle and Whitrow developed the anthropic notion of the universe, which made Carter formulate the anthropic principles. These principles may be used as qualitative cosmological tests. In the anthropic thought there were also found procedures of anthropic explanation, used, e.g., by theists and criticized by the followers of the multiverse concept.This article will be devoted to the history of anthropic thinking in cosmology, from large numbers to the concept of multiverse, stressing prof. Jozef Turek’s contribution to the development of this matter.

In the paper the main models of the universe are presented, and the role of the infinity in these models is outlined. The infinity appears as the definitive justification for the existence of the universe.

Van Fraassen’s distinction between observable and non-observable objects and his pragmatic conception of observation is presented and discussed. There is already huge literature where constructive empiricism is criticized or defended. The critical argumentation focuses on inconsistencies between the observable/non-observable distinction and the principles of constructive empiricism. My main argument against Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism comes down to the thesis that contrary to what is declared by him it does not remove metaphysics from science but lets it to endure in the form of the theory of experience.

In the article I present the logical structure of apologia of Catholic religion. This apologia is multi-layered and heterogeneous in its epistemological and methodological aspects. The apologia consists of: independent from Revelation justification of some doctrinal propositions of Catholicism; showing the rationality of faith in Divine Revelation; pointing at the explanatory power of Catholic doctrine; pragmatic argumentation and techniques of persuasion.

Based upon the example of geometrical optics and geometrical optics of electrons, as well as the theory of the electric field and the theory of the flow of the perfect liquid in two dimensions, the analogy of the laws of physics have been discussed. In the awareness of physicists, the analogy is a syntactical identity, of the physically interpreted mathematical formulas, describing the laws of physics. In the paper, it has been presented some relevant laws of the two pairs of the theories being compared. For the three cases, it has been provided the appropriate photographs presenting the results of the empirical tests of some of the relevant laws.

The paper concerns the inseparable, in my opinion, connection between communication and the philosophy of nature. Studies on communication, which are growing expansively, neglect, to a bigger or lesser degree, its biological dimension. Instead, they focus on the cultural, sociological, and political aspects. Furthermore, philosophers are relatively rarely concerned with communication, since they treat it, not without good reasons, as one of many cognitive processes. Problems of communication are almost entirely non-existent in the philosophy of nature, too. Admittedly, the situation is slowly changing. More and more scholars and philosophers recognizing that in the research practice the problems of philosophy and science are intertwined notice the relevance of the issues of communication and communicating. However, the research on communication is still dominated by humanists, who either neglect or completely ignore its biological component.In the article I try to show that communication is an ideal object of common research for scientists and humanists, as well as philosophers and philosophers of nature. Communication is an ontologically complex being containing the biological and cultural component. Omitting either of these components leads to a one-sided, and thus false, view on communication.

The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the knowledge revision that occurred in the process of explanation an abnormal phenomenon in cardiology. S. Bromberg’s description of abnormic laws will provide the point of departure for the present analysis. It will be shown here that in the example the revision of knowledge resulted in formulating an abnormic law that deviated from the empirical law in cardiology. T. Kuipers’ and A. Wisniewski’s ideas of explanation by specification will be used for reconstructing the example in question

We criticize oscillating models of the Universe from the point of view of their structural instability. Moreover we show that parameters of a cycle depend on initial conditions in standard models of an oscillatory type in cosmology. Therefore these oscillating models do not solve the problem of initial condition. We argue that the special type of oscillating cosmology represented by a limit cycle in the phase space is a natural candidate for solving the problem of initial conditions. The programme of formulating oscillatory cosmology as a global structurally stable oscillator is formulated. The short review of models in science, where a limit cycle type of behavior appears, is given. It is also proposed to compare the oscillating models with the concordance cosmological model by using the Akaike criterion of simplicity. Advantages and disadvantages of oscillating cosmology are discussed in the framework of the philosophy and methodology of cosmology.

In my paper – the paper in memory and honour of Rev. Professor Jozef Turek – I describe the following strategies that can be developed by the theologian for his discussion with the natural sciences: (i) isolationism – theology avoids any connections with science; (ii) interactionism – theology searches for some points in common with science; (iii) subordinationism – theology becomes the part of science. Next I explain how the representatives of these strategies try to interpret the fundamental thesis of theism ‘God created the world (from nothing)”. I also argue that if you prefer interactionism you must find a conceptual bridge between theology and science. The philosophical content of this bridge can be constituted by the concepts of contingency, rationality and mystery which are critically analysed in the last parts of the paper.

The main purpose of the paper is analysis of some problems referred to methodological understanding of the process to naturalize philosophy of science. This process can be considered as justification of philosophical thesis by scientific facts, and also as application of the methods of justification, which are effective in natural sciences, to philosophy of science. These procedures are often called the philosophical interpretation of scientific facts, and their methodological validity is taken under consideration. This problem is analysed on the two examples, which are related to realism-antirealism controversy. One of them is the final argument for scientific realism. The second is the Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitudes.