The propriety of expert ethics testimony in the courtroom is as contentious in academic scholarship as any typical ethical debate could be. Some of the main objections to expert ethics testimony stem partly from fears that it could unduly influence judicial thinking or judgments, or foist prejudicial or idiosyncratic moral views or opinions on judicial decisions. This prospect is perceived as contrary to the tenets of a liberal, pluralistic democratic society, where moral and ethical values should ideally be shared and not dictated. Another crucial argument against expert ethics testimony is the ethicists’ propensity to assume the stance of ‘moral advocates’ bent on pitching clients’ agenda, without regards to any merits in the opponents’ moral judgments. Yet another anti-expert ethics testimony posits that reliance on it will foster moral laziness. This paper joins the debate by critically analyzing the arguments for and against expert ethics testimony in the context of relevant literature and standard evidentiary rules governing judicial evaluation and admissibility of expert ethics evidence. With a discourse on the nature of moral expertise and the dynamics of expert ethics testimony as a backgrounder, the paper evaluates the validity of the hypothesis that expert ethics testimony could encourage moral tardiness, unduly influence judicial proceedings or imprint narrow, elitist, or prejudicial moral viewpoints on judicial reasoning and judgments.

The advances that have been made in the area of genetic technology over the past several years have caused a reflection into the grounds for emerging policy decisions that have emerged as a result of these stunning scientific breakthroughs. Inevitably, controversies have emerged as a result of these rapidly developing genetic discoveries. Recent British judicial decisions in this area have appeared to avoid directly dealing with the accompanying ethical issues. Instead they have appeared to take an ad hoc approach, by looking to statutory authority in aid of the outcome perceived as being the most favorable. This paper tries to outline the problems associated with this and argues instead, on behalf of what has been termed as Dworkinian principalism.