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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 34
鄭凱 元
Kai-Yuan Cheng
意義與意向是次性嗎?──萊特的依賴判斷理論之評析
Are Meanings and Intentions Secondary Properties? ──On Wright’s Judgment-Dependence Account
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萊特(Crispin Wright, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998)在近 年來提出一個重要的立場,認為意義與意向在形上本質上應被視為次 性(secondary property)。萊特的立場建立在一個所謂的「判斷依決理 論」(Judgment-Dependence Account)上,其基本主張為,如同某物是 否屬於某顏色概念之外延,須得取決於認知主體對此物所做之相關反 應或判斷,人所使用文字之意義與人所擁有心理意向之內容,亦須由 人對它們所做的相關判斷所決定。柏哥席恩(Boghossian, 1989)在後續的討論裡,對萊特理論提出 一個重要的批評。柏哥席恩指出,萊特的理論無法滿足一個內部的限 制條件,即獨立性條件,因而此理論無法成立,對意義與意向之解釋 而言,亦是一個無效的理論。筆者首先釐清柏哥席恩批評的要旨、以 及其效力,並進一步指出,萊特的判斷依決理論在理解上有模糊性, 一旦釐清此模糊性,我們發現,萊特理論的其中一個理解版本會受到 柏哥席恩的攻擊,然另一個理解版本將可恰當地避開。本文的主要目 的在藉由上述之討論,給出一個較為可行與合理的判斷依決理論之版 本,並以此版本,闡明萊特理論的基本精神與內容,並於結論裡,評 析將語意與意向定位為次性在哲學上的意涵與前瞻性。
Crispin Wright (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998) has recently proposed that meanings and intentions be metaphysically construed as secondary properties. Just as what falls under the extension of a color concept is dependent on how a perceiver’s relevant responses or judgments made under suitable conditions, the contents of what a person means by a term or of what a person intends cannot be determined independently of the person’s relevant judgments. Wright’s position is called “Judgment-Dependence Account”, given the judgment-dependence nature of meanings and intentions.Paul Boghossian (1989) has pointed out that Wright’s judgment-dependence account violates an internal constraint, i.e., the “independence” condition, imposed by the theory itself. Consequently, Wright’s theory is fundamentally flawed as an account of meanings and intentions. In this paper, I argue that Wright’s judgment-dependence account is ambiguous. As a result, Boghossian’s criticism is effective against one version of Wright’s account, but it can be avoided on another version of Wright’s account. The aim of this paper is to clarify what Wright’s judgment-dependence account amounts to, by giving it a more plausible and reasonable version than some other versions such as the one under Boghossian’s attack. This paper ends with some comments on the significance and prospects of Wright’s proposal, based on the more plausible version of Wright’s judgment-dependence account, that meanings and intentions be characterized as secondary properties.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 34
孫效 智
Hsiao-Chih Sun
人類胚胎之形上與道德地位
The Metaphysical and Moral Status of Human Embryos
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本文探討人類胚胎具有怎樣的形上與道德地位,是許多生命倫理 議題共同的基礎問題。文分四部分,首先,先說明問題的背景與重要 性,指出本問題無論是對傳統的墮胎課題,或對當今最熱門的胚胎幹 細胞研究或人類複製的倫理探討,都是不可規避的問題。其次,本文 在討論這個問題之前,將先界定問題的精確意涵。這裡其實有兩個息 息相關但卻不太一樣的問題,一個是胚胎形上地位的問題,一個是胚 胎道德地位的問題。形上地位的問題要問的是胚胎是否是位格,而道 德地位問題則是胚胎是否因而具有位格的尊嚴。由於位格尊嚴仍是相 當籠統的觀念,本文將問題聚焦在一個具體的問題上,亦即在正常情 境下是否可以為了醫學研究而殺害胚胎?界定好問題意涵後,本文最 主要的論述在第三部份。這裡先探討位格是什麼,然後以此為基礎來 處理「人類胚胎是否是位格」這個根本問題,最後再輔以「謹慎論證」 指出:人類胚胎是位格,或至少,在沒有充分證據顯示它不是位格的 情形下,應將之視為位格。第四部分是結論,根據前一部分之討論, 若人類胚胎應被當成位格來看待,那麼,在正常情境下,為了促進醫 學研究與人類福祉而殺死胚胎是不合乎倫理的。
Exploring the metaphysical and moral status of human embryo, one of the most fundamental questions underlying many significant bioethical issues, this essay is divided into four parts. It is firstly to be shown that not only the traditional moral controversy surrounding abortion but also that of the most cutting-edge researches of embryonic stem cell and human cloning can not be properly dealt with without first addressing the question of the metaphysical and moral status of human embryo. Secondly, the meaning of the question will be precisely defined so that the discussion can be rightly focused. The metaphysical part of the question is concerned with the issue whether human embryo is an entity with personhood, i.e. whether it is at the same time a human person. The second part is accordingly the moral question whether a human embryo has the dignity of a person and therefore shall be treated as an end by itself and not as only a means, which again means whether it is morally wrong to kill human embryos for the sake of the welfare of humankind. The main arguments for and contra the personhood of human embryos are presented in the third part after a comprehensive account of personhood is offered as a basis for the discussion. Different arguments such as speciesism, identity, continuity, potentiality and, last but not least, benefit of thedoubt-argument are evaluated and appealed to. The thesis arrived at is that human embryos are persons or at least shall be treated as persons when the antithesis is notsufficiently and well grounded. The fourth and last part concludes the essay with the claim that in normal situations it is immoral to kill human embryos for the progress of the medicine and the welfare of the mankind.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 34
佐藤將之
Masayuki Sato
荀子哲學研究之解構與建構:
以中日學者之嘗試與「誠」概念之探討為線索
Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the Xun Zi Research
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本文之目的在於經由對當代學者理解《荀子》哲學的兩組框架── 「性惡論」和「天人之分」的解構之嘗試,來探索建構荀子哲學之另一 種可能性。本文的探討主要分為兩個部分。在前半,先評述針對此問題 的日本荀子研究成果,再與目前開創著《荀子》研究的新視野之三位臺 灣學者──蔡錦昌、王慶光、以及劉又銘先生──的主要見解進行對 話,將「性惡論」與「天人之分」兩項此核心主張之「核心」一詞放入 括弧之後,進行以此兩大核心主張為主要內容的《荀子》哲學之解構。 在後半,本文將以「性惡論」與「天人之分」的觀點無法掌握的《荀子‧ 不苟》中的「誠」概念為例,試圖發現《荀子》思想的整體性面貌,藉 此探索重建更具有綜合性的《荀子》哲學體系之可能性。
This article aims to “deconstruct” the two approaches which have overwhelmingly influenced the history of the research on Xun Zi’s philosophy. In the first approach scholars have stuck to the idea of “Human nature is bad” as of the core of Xun Zi’s philosophy. In the second approach, scholars have urged that Xunzi had separated the sphere of men from that of Heaven. This article introduces critical viewpoints by three scholars on these two approaches, and then attempts to search for the third way to illuminate the characteristics of Xunzi philosophical system more systematically as a synthesizer of the pre-Qin Warring States’ thoughts. For this purpose, it focuses on the significant role of the concept of cheng (truthfulness) in Xunzi’s philosophical system on Heaven-human relationship, which has left in the dark by aforementioned two approaches. It delineates the analogical linkage by the concept of cheng between the expansion of virtue and the creation of all livings on earth. In Xun Zi’s thought, an ideal ruler can assimilate himself into the process of its natural providence by means of his promoting virtuous power of cheng. Here, Xun Zi’s image of ideal rules is an analogical synthesizer of these two spheres of Heaven and men, in stead of separating them into two different worlds.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 34
Caleb Y. Liang
梁益堉 *
Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character
概念論與現象特性
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Consider two of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind: the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, and the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism about the content of experience. The former, the qualia debate, centers on whether the phenomenal character of conscious experience is exhausted by its representational content. The latter is about whether conceptual capacities are constitutive of the representational content of perceptual experience such that the only kind of content that perceptual experience possesses is conceptual content. Most philosophers consider these two debates as unrelated, or at least should be treated separately. In this paper, I argue that there is an obvious and important sense in which the two issues are related. More specifically, if one accepts conceptualism, it would impose a significant constraint on what position one is allowed to take in the qualia debate. First, I suggest that once it is made clear that conceptualism can be considered as a particular version of representationalism, the conceptualist would have to take a certain stance on whether there are nonintentional qualia. The reason why the conceptualist needs to worry about the qualia issue is that if in addition to intentional content perceptual experiences also contain nonintentional qualia as constituents, then perceptual experiences cannot be fully conceptual. Second, I argue that although in McDowellian conceptualism the content of perceptual experience is construed in terms of Fregean sense rather than internal mental representation, it still faces challenges from the Inverted Earth argument against representationalism. My goal is not to show that conceptualism fails, but to show that it is a serious issue that the defenders of conceptualism have to take into consideration.
當代心智哲學有兩個重要爭議:一是關於意識之現象特性 (phenomenal character)的表徵論(representationalism)與反表徵論 ( anti-representationalism) 之爭; 另一是關於經驗內容的概念論 (conceptualism)與非概念論(nonconceptualism)之爭。第一個論爭, 可稱為感質之爭(the qualia debate),討論意識的現象特性是否能完全 被表徵內容所窮盡。第二個論爭的焦點在於,知覺經驗的內容是否由 我們的概念能力(conceptual capacities)所參與構成,以致於完全是概 念性的內容(conceptual content)。大部分哲學家認為這兩個爭論互不 相干,或認為應該分開處理。在本文中,我指出這兩個爭議其實有一 明顯且重要的關連。那就是:在第二個論爭中若採取概念論的立場, 那麼在第一個論爭中就非得採取表徵論不可。更進一步說,本文要論 證兩件事:第一,概念論可以視為是一種特殊版本的表徵論。一旦釐 清這點, 持概念論者就需要提出理由來反對非意向性感質 (nonintentional qualia)的存在。原因是:如果知覺經驗除了意向性內 容之外,還具有非意向性的感質為其成分的話,那麼知覺經驗的內容 就無法完全是概念性的。第二,雖然McDowell 的概念論將知覺經驗 的內容理解為一種Fregean sense,而非理解為某種心理表徵(mental representation),這樣的立場仍然得面對「顛倒地球論證」(the Inverted Earth argument)的攻擊。概念論並不一定因此失敗,但任何為概念論 的辯護都必須設法回應這項攻擊。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 34
Melissa Zinkin
Melissa Zinkin
Kant’s Concept of Force: Empiricist or Rationalist?
康德之力的概念: 經驗論者或理性論者?
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This paper explores Kant's account of force, a topic that was of central philosophical concern in his day, but which he does not explicitly address in any of his Critiques. Just as with the nature of space and time and the nature of the human will, the nature of force was under dispute by the philosophers and natural scientists to whose legacy Kant was responding. Yet, Kant does not make force an explicit topic of his Critiques, and thus provides no explicit transcendental account of force. Nevertheless, I will argue that one can indeed find in Kant a transcendental account of force, one that is a synthesis of empiricist and rationalist accounts, but in an unexpected place; the third Critique, in the discussion of the principle of purposiveness
本論文探討康德對於力的說明。這個題目在康德所處的時代中,位於哲學關懷的核心地位,但在他的各種《批判》裡,他卻沒有明示 地處理過這個題目。正如同時間與空間的本質以及人類意志的本質, 康德回應有關哲學家與自然科學家爭論力的本質之成果。然而,康德 並沒有在他的《批判》中,將力作為一個明示的主題,因而並沒有針 對力的概念,提供一個明示的先驗說明。不過,我論證,吾人的確可 以在康德哲學中尋獲一個有關力的先驗說明,而且這是一個經驗論與 理性論說明的綜合,只不過在一處意想不到的地方:在《第三批判》中,有關合目的性原則的討論裡。
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