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Displaying: 1-20 of 692 documents

1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Daniel Mario Weger Is Representationalism Committed to Colour Physicalism?
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The circularity problem states that the representationalist about phenomenal consciousness gives a circular explanation if she adopts the classic view about secondary qualities, such as colours, that characterises them as dispositions to produce experiences with a specific phenomenal character. Since colour primitivism faces severe difficulties, it seems that colour physicalism is the only viable option for the representationalist. I will argue that the representationalist is not committed to colour physicalism because she can adopt an anti-realist theory of colour. My diagnosis is that the alleged commitment to colour physicalism rests upon the acceptance of colour realism which is due to the approval of externalist versions of representationalism, such as tracking representationalism. I will argue that the representationalist can deal with the circularity problem by adopting figurative projectivism, which holds that colours are contingently non-instantiated properties that only figure in the representational contents of colour experiences.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Joby Varghese Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research?: A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science
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A general criterion for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic values is that the former promotes the attainment of truth whereas the latter does not. Daniel Steel (2010, 2016) is a proponent of this criterion, although it was initially proposed by McMullin (1983). There are at least two consequences of this criterion; (i) it always prioritizes epistemic values over non-epistemic values in scientific research, and (ii) it overlooks the diverse aims of science, especially the aims of regulatory or policy-oriented science. This criterion assumes the lexical priority of truth or lexical priority of evidence. This paper attempts to show a few inadequacies of this assumption. The paper also demonstrates why epistemic priority over non-epistemic values is a problematic stance and how constraining the role of non-epistemic values as ‘tiebreakers’ may undermine the diverse aims of science.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Sandy C. Boucher Cladism, Monophyly and Natural Kinds
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Cladism, today the dominant school of systematics in biology, includes a classification component—the view that classification ought to reflect phylogeny only, such that all and only taxa are monophyletic (i.e. consist of an ancestor and all its descendants)—and a metaphysical component—the view that all and only real groups or kinds of organisms are monophyletic. For the most part these are seen as amounting to much the same thing, but I argue they can and should be distinguished, in particular that cladists about classifi cation need not accept the typically cladist view about real groups or kinds. Cladists about classification can and should adopt an explanatory criterion for the reality of groups or kinds, on which being monophyletic is neither necessary nor sufficient for being real or natural. Thus the line of reasoning that has rightly led to cladism becoming dominant within systematics, and the attractive line of reasoning in the philosophical literature that advocates a more liberal approach to natural kinds, are seen to be, contrary to appearances, compatible.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Pavel Arazim Identity of Dynamic Meanings
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Inferentialism has brought important insights into the nature of meanings. It breaks with the representationalist tradition that sees meanings as constituted primarily by representing some extra-linguistic reality. Yet the break with tradition should be pursued further. Inferentialists still regard meanings as static, and they still do not entirely abandon the idea of fully determined meaning. Following Davidon’s ideas about meanings as constituted only in the course of a specific conversation, I propose a dynamic account of what meanings are. They are described as entities belonging to the dynamic realm of Henri Bergson’s duration. The inhabitants of this realm live in constant movement and development which is more essential to them than the stages that this development goes through. My account brings about a rejection of the notion of strict literal meaning and therewith also of the contrasting notions such as ambiguity. Meaning is understood as a dynamic entity that is characterized rather by its history than by its nature.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Sinem Elkatip Hatipoglu Empty Higher Order States in Higher Order Theories of Consciousness
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According to higher order (HO) theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious when there is a HO state about it. However, some HO states do not seem to be about other existing mental states. It is possible to resolve this problem since targetless HO states resemble HO states that misrepresent but the assumption that HO states always target other existing mental states is at odds with the theory since HO states are not only necessary but also sufficient for phenomenal consciousness according to the theory. Given the sufficiency of the HO states for consciousness, there is a need to understand the emergence of HO states as a non-random phenomenon to avoid the difficulties caused by targetless HO states. I suggest it is possible to develop such an understanding by thinking of HO states as predictive states in accordance with the predictive processing theory of the mind.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Bojan Borstner, Niko Šetar Non-Stupidity Condition and Pragmatics in Artificial Intelligence
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Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) (Harnad 1990) is commonly considered one of the central challenges in the philosophy of artificial intelligence as its resolution is deemed necessary for bridging the gap between simple data processing and understanding of meaning and language. SGP has been addressed on numerous occasions with varying results, all resolution attempts having been severely, but for the most part justifiably, restricted by the Zero Semantic Commitment Condition (Taddeo and Floridi 2005). A further condition that demands explanatory power in terms of machine-to-human communication is the Non-Stupidity Condition (Bringsjord 2013) that demands an SG approach to be able to account for plausibility of higher-level language use and understanding, such as pragmatics. In this article, we undertake the endeavour of attempting to explain how merging certain early requirements for SG, such as embodiment, environmental interaction (Ziemke 1998), and compliance with the Z-Condition with symbol emergence (Sun 2000; Tangiuchi et al. 2016, etc.) rather than direct attempts at symbol grounding can help emulate human language acquisition (Vogt 2004; Cowley 2007). Along with the presumption that mind and language are both symbolic (Fodor 1980) and computational (Chomsky 2017), we argue that some rather abstract aspects of language can be logically formalised and finally, that this melange of approaches can yield the explanatory power necessary to satisfy the Non-Stupidity Condition without breaking any previous conditions.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Jan Heylen, Leon Horsten Strict Conditionals: Replies to Lowe and Tsai
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Both Lowe and Tsai have presented their own versions of the theory that both indicative and subjunctive conditionals are strict conditionals. We critically discuss both versions and we find each version wanting.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Matko Gjurašin John Perry, Frege’s Detour: An Essay on Meaning, Reference, and Truth
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9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Paolo Labinaz Argumentation as a Speech Act: A (Provisional) Balance
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This paper investigates whether, and if so, in what way, argumentation can be profitably described in speech-act theoretical terms. I suggest that the two theories of argumentation that are supposed to provide the most elaborate analysis of it in speech-act theoretical terms (namely van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst’s Pragma-Dialectics and Lilian Bermejo-Luque’s linguistic normative model of argumentation) both suffer from the same two flaws: firstly, their “illocutionary act pluralism” assumption and secondly, a lack of interest in where arguing belongs in the classification of illocutionary acts. I argue that these flaws derive from the authors’ reliance on an intention-based speech-theoretical framework. Finally, I adopt a deontic framework for speech acts in order to propose an alternative way of accounting for argumentation which seems to overcome the two limitations outlined above. According to this framework, argumentation may be conceived as a speech act sequence, characterized by the conventional effects brought about by the communicative moves (as illocutionary acts) of which it is composed.
10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Danilo Šuster Arguing about Free Will: Lewis and the Consequence Argument
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I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is power necessity (“no choice” operator), while Lewis analyses the version where the central notion is the locution “cannot render false.”Lewis accepts closure of the relevant (in)ability operator under entailment but not closure under implication. His strategy has a seemingly strange corollary: a free predetermined agent is able (in a strong, causal sense) to falsity the conjunction of history and law. I compare a Moorean position with respect to radical skepticism and knowledge closure with ability closure and propose to explain Lewis’s strategy in the framework of his Moorean stance.
11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Martina Blečić Implicitness, Logical Form and Arguments
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In the paper I suggest that a loose notion of logical form can be a useful tool for the understanding or evaluation of everyday language and the explicit and implicit content of communication. Reconciling ordinary language and logic provides formal guidelines for rational communication, giving strength and order to ordinary communication and content to logical schemas. The starting point of the paper is the idea that the bearers of logical form are not natural language sentences, but what we communicate with them, that is, their content in a particular context. On the basis of that idea, I propose that we can ascribe logical proprieties to what is communicated using ordinary language and suggest a continuum between semantic phenomena such as explicatures and pragmatic communicational strategies such as (particularized) conversational implicatures, which challenges the idea that an implicatum is completely separate from what is said. I believe that this continuum can be best explained by the notion of logical form, taken as a propriety of sentences relative to particular interpretations.
12. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Luigi Pavone On Formalizing Logical Modalities
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This paper is in the scope of the philosophy of modal logic; more precisely, it concerns the semantics of modal logic, when the modal elements are interpreted as logical modalities. Most authors have thought that the logic for logical modality—that is, the one to be used to formalize the notion of logical truth (and other related notions)—is to be found among logical systems in which modalities are allowed to be iterated. This has raised the problem of the adequacy, to that formalization purpose, of some modal schemes, such as S4 and S5 . It has been argued that the acceptance of S5 leads to non-normal modal systems, in which the uniform substitution rule fails. The thesis supported in this paper is that such a failure is rather to be attributed to what will be called “Condition of internalization.” If this is correct, there seems to be no normal modal logic system capable of formalizing logical modality, even when S5 is rejected in favor of a weaker system such as S4, as recently proposed by McKeon.
13. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Matej Sušnik The Intuition behind the Non-Identity Problem
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This paper examines a well-known non-identity case of a mother who chooses to conceive a blind child instead of a sighted one. While some people accept the non-identity argument and claim that we should reject the intuition that the mother’s act is morally wrong, others hold onto that intuition and try to find a fault in the non-identity argument. This paper proposes a somewhat middle approach. It is argued that the conclusion of the non-identity argument is not necessarily in conflict with our intuitive response to this case.
book reviews
14. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
David Grčki Jonathan Gilmore, Apt Imaginings, Feelings for Fictions and Other Creatures of the Mind
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15. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Iris Vidmar Jovanović Wolfgang Huemer and Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Beauty: New Essays in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art
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16. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Iva Martinić Ivan Cerovac, Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy
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17. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Acknowledgement to Referees
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18. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 3
Table of Contents of Vol. XXI
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19. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Thom Brooks Are Capabilities Compatible with Political Liberalism? A Third Way
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This article explores the relationship between capabilities and political liberalism. There are two views about how they might be compatible: Sen claims capabilities should be seen as a revision of primary goods while Nussbaum argues capabilities should form part of an overlapping consensus. It is argued they are both right—and incorrect. Whereas Sen identifies where compatibility might best be found, it is Nussbaum’s conception of capabilities that is able to overcome Rawls’s objections to Sen’s proposal. This provides a new third way of conceiving how capabilities and political liberalism might address these concerns that is more compelling for how Sen and Nussbaum claim. The two rivals can come together, but not in the way that either of its most well known champions have argued.
20. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 21 > Issue: 2
Tim Beaumont J. S. Mill on Higher Pleasures and Modes of Existence
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The passage of Mill’s Utilitarianism that sets out the condition in which one pleasure has a superior quality than another stokes interpretive controversy. According to the Lexical Interpretation, Mill takes one pleasure, P1, to be of a superior quality than another, P2, if, and only if, the smallest quantity of P1 is more valuable than any finite quantity of P2. This paper argues that, while the Lexical Interpretation may be supported with supplementary evidence, the passage itself does not rule out qualitative superiority without lexical dominance, as it only requires P1 to be more valuable than any quantity of P2 that it is possible for someone to experience. Some will object that this concession to opponents of the Lexical Interpretation still renders Mill’s condition for qualitative superiority too demanding to be plausible. However, if Mill’s qualitative rankings apply to higher-order pleasures taken in modes of existence as such rather than to the pleasures of different activities chosen from within these modes, the objection loses much of its force. One upshot is that Mill may have more to contribute to debates in contemporary population axiology than is usually acknowledged.