Taking up the case of Jane Gallop, this paper explores whether an eroticized pedagogical style can be truly effective for teaching feminist philosophy and to what extent there exists the possibility of consensual romantic relationships between teachers and students. In a book published five years after accusations of discriminatory sexual harassment, Gallop argues that an eroticized pedagogy more effectively delivers a feminist message than non-eroticized pedagogies because it provides a context in which sexual norms can be foregrounded, challenged, and even broken. By extension, Gallop argues that if any relationship between a student and a teacher can be consensual, it is one that takes place between a student and teacher who both identify as feminists since their studies so often focus on sexual norms. The author challenges this view, arguing that the vulnerability which attends being subject to evaluation structures the initial terms of engagement such that students can’t possibly enter into a romantic relationship on equal terms with their professor. In light of this imbalance of power, the author argues that eroticized pedagogies may also threaten students, giving the impression that their evaluations depend on their responses to the erotic element of their professor’s pedagogical style.

In this paper, the author reflects on why students so frequently have the false intuition that statements like (i) “If someone is a criminal then he comes from a single parent family,” imply their converse, namely (ii) “If someone comes from a single parent family then he is a criminal.” The author argues that this intuition is not baseless. In everyday speech, conditional statements very often refer to finite populations, meaning that while (i) does not imply (ii), (i) stands in an evidential relationship to (ii). That is, given a finite population, (i) implies that if someone comes from a single family home, it is more probable that he is a criminal. While teaching first order logic, however, conditional statements are treated as referring to infinite samples, which renders the evidential relationship insignificant. The author concludes by addressing why these differing interpretations of conditional statements should be taken into account when teaching logic.

This paper details research which investigated a probable causal connection between taking an introductory logic course and significant improvement in logical skills. The authors first detail the setting (a two-year, open-access unit of the University of Cincinnati), the student body (the authors note that many students enter the college with several notable types of academic disadvantage), and the content of an introductory logic course. Following this, they summarize and defend their research protocol and the results of their study. Findings include a statistically significant increase in students’ logical skills after enrollment in a one-quarter introductory logic course. After a statistical analysis of their findings, the authors discuss several possible applications, extensions, and improvements of their research protocol, concluding that the generalizability of their study is limited due to the myriad variables that attend teaching.

In this paper, the author presents a lengthy class handout on moral relativism. The author treats in depth and disambiguates several senses of “moral relativism,” distinguishing between "cultural relativism," "situational relativism," "normative relativism," "metaethical relativism," "moral skepticism," and “irrationalism”. On the basis of the close attention given to these terminological differences, the author moves into a discussion of the question, “Is moral relativism true?” The author argues that while some forms of moral relativism (situational, cultural) are clearly true, others (normative) are clearly false, and that the answer to the question cannot be simply “yes” or “no”. Special attention is given to metaethical relativism, which is framed as the most philosophically challenging and interesting version of moral relativism.

This paper addresses several reasons why students may be uninterested or unwilling to engage with the problem of evil and discusses a method of teaching it which overcomes these difficulties. This strategy, first, distinguishes between evil and gratuitous evil. This prevents students from thinking that the task of theodicy is fulfilled by a reconciliation of God with mundane evil (e.g. immunizations). Second, the goal of theodicy is framed as the reconciliation of God with the appearance of evil. Emphasizing appearance in this way clearly frames the work of arguments from evil and theodicies as arguments for or against the reality of this appearance. Third, it is made explicit that all candidate theodicies must attempt to cover all evil and that the reasons supporting their conclusions must compass morally sufficient reasons (a moral reason which justifies suffering) and the greater good (a good which is sufficiently good to justify the evil necessary for its achievement).