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Displaying: 1-9 of 9 documents

research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Leandro De Brasi, Jack Warman Deliberative Democracy, Epistemic Injustice, and Epistemic Disenfranchisement
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In this paper, we explore some links between deliberative democracy, natural testimony, and epistemic injustice. We hope to highlight the exclusionary effects of some cases of testimony-related epistemic injustice within the deliberative democratic framework and, in particular, two subtle ways of epistemic injustice that are not often highlighted in the political domain. In other words, we hope to highlight two specific mechanisms of epistemic exclusion within the democratic deliberative process that are not explicitly noticed in the relevant literature. In section 1, we present the deliberative model of democracy and the deliberative process. We then introduce the notion of epistemic (dis)enfranchisement, which we distinguish from formal enfranchisement, and explain the role that natural testimony plays in establishing citizens‘ epistemic enfranchisement. In section 2, we introduce Fricker‘s notion of testimonial injustice and two further testimony-related forms of epistemic injustice which seem to have been largely neglected in the debate so far, namely, discursive injustice and testimonial void. We also point out negative epistemic consequences of positive identity-prejudicial stereotypes. In section 3, we argue that these testimony-related forms of epistemic injustice can lead to epistemic disenfranchisement, which, we note, is an obstacle to deliberative democracy that warrants serious consideration.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Rauf Oran Lie for the Other: A Socio-Analytic Approach to Telling Lies
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It is a widely held view that lying is defined in the traditional tripartite model as the conjunction of a statement, the false belief, and the intended deception. Much of the criticisms have been levelled at the third condition—intended deception—with contemporary counterexamples. My main criticism of the traditional and contemporary model of lying centres on that philosophers discard the social existence of the hearer. Schutz‘s phenomenological sociology gives a sheer inspiration to redefine the third condition by taking the hearer as a consciously social being into account. Lying should be an intersubjective action for the Other from the perspective of the liar; it might be, thus, reasonable to assume that there should be commonsense awareness between the speaker and the hearer. This paper, by focusing on this commonsenseness and its typifications , introduces a new approach to the third condition: S must intend that H be induced to believe that p, where p is false. In this regard, once you lie, by being subjected to the taken-for-granted commonsenseness in our daily life, you must try as hard as possible to succeed in deceiving the hearer by stating that p. You, as a typical person, tell a typical lie in typical contexts for typical Others. The focus of attention, therefore, is on the hearer and it is the key to understanding that mere intent to deceive is too broad and unpragmatic for a social human being who always intends to flee the negative consequences of the context in which she has to lie. Making the extension narrower necessitates a new term, anti-social bullshit generally being replied rhetorically as "how can you expect me to believe that?" comprises the excluded cases.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Timothy Perrine Prejudice, Harming Knowers, and Testimonial Injustice
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Fricker‘s Epistemic Injustice discusses the idea of testimonial injustice, specifically, being harmed in one‘s capacity as a knower. Fricker‘s own theory of testimonial injustice emphasizes the role of prejudice. She argues that prejudice is necessary for testimonial injustice and that when hearers use a prejudice to give a deficit to the credibility of speakers hearers intrinsically harm speakers in their capacity as a knower. This paper rethinks the connections between prejudice and testimonial injustice. I argue that many cases of prejudicial credibility deficits do not intrinsically harm speakers. Further, I suggest that prejudice is not necessary for harming speakers. I provide my own proposal on which testimonial injustice occurs when speaker‘s capacity as a giver of knowledge is interfered with in important ways. My proposal does not give prejudice any essential role.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Balder Edmund Ask Zaar Dispositional Reliabilism and Its Merits
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In this article I discuss two counterexamples (the New Evil Demon Problem and Norman‘s Clairvoyance) to reliabilism and a potential solution: dispositional reliabilism. The latter is a recent addition to the many already-existing varieties of reliabilism and faces some serious problems of its own. I argue here that these problems are surmountable. The resulting central argument of the article aims to demonstrate how viewing reliabilism as an intrinsic dispositional property solves many of the issues facing reliabilism to date.
discussion notes/debate
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Eric Raidl Neutralization, Lewis‘ Doctored Conditional, or Another Note on "A Connexive Conditional"
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Günther recently suggested a 'new‘ conditional. This conditional is not new, as already remarked by Wansing and Omori. It is just David Lewis‘ forgotten alternative 'doctored‘ conditional and part of a larger class termed neutral conditionals. In this paper, I answer some questions raised by Wansing and Omori, concerning the motivation, the logic, the connexive flavor and contra-classicality of such neutralized conditionals. The main message being: Neutralizing a vacuist conditional avoids (some) paradoxes of strict implication, changes the logic essentially only by Aristotle‘s Thesis, makes strong connexivity impossible, and remains in the realm of non-contra-classical logics.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Erratum Notice
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7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
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8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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