Short history of cosmology is given. The example of so called cosmological paradoxes is quoted to show that if one can logically think of anything, by the same he knows something about it. This makes it possible to know some properties of the Universe even if it is infinit. The influence of philosophy on the results of cosmological investigations is explained on the example of the Hubble’s law. Four different cosmological principles are discussed (the copernican, the strong, the old-indian and the antic ones).Important mile stones of developement in the contemporary cosmology are 1° the awarness that any investigation of the deceleration parameter q0 cannot be performed without solution of the large scale evolution of extragalactic objects and 2° the appointment of the so called standard model of the Universe.A contemporary cosmologist — observer is willing rather to look for some unexpected phenomena than to establish parameters of theoretical models. The preparation of new observational technics (submilimeter radiotelescopes, orbital astrometric telescopes, neutrino telescopes of new generation) makes observations an adventure. It is possible to discover new physical laws. For example, observed superluminal velocities in radiosources can be explained: 1° in every separate case by specific suitable optical or relativistic effect, 2° all together — as a very un- probable conjunction of rare specific cases or as the existence of an unknown physical phenomenon.A cosmologist — theoretician looks today for solutions obtained without acceptance of the copernican cosmological principle. Possibility of new cosmological principles are briefly discussed. Perhaps biological concepts of ontogenesis and filo- genesis introduced last year to cosmology and/or so called anthropic principle show a direction where the future cosmological principle is to be searched for.

The article aims at reconstructing metascientific views of Georges Lemaître — a well known Belgian cosmologist. His views may contribute a lot to more detailed analyses in the philoosphy of science since they are authetntic and not overburdened with too many speculations.The article discusses epistemological aspects of science, some problems of the philosophy and methodology of science as well as some details of cosmology. Methodological rigorism deserves particular attention. Lemaître points to the extremes of human knowledge of the world and human tendency to thoroughly explain not only the knowledge itself but also the fact that the world is cognizable and Man is able to grasp it cognitively.

The article tries to systematize various ideas of causality. The principle of causality sounds as follows:a) in metaphysics: “If the accidental being exist, there is the necessary being, too”;b) in philosophy of nature: “Every changable being hat its cause” or else “Every event has its cause”;c) in physics: “Every phenomenon has its cause”;The above principles point to the unity of the real world (no object is entirely isolated). Modern physics does not reject these principles.While oriented to the future, causality is called determinism:a) philosophical: “the same elements of the material world in the same circumstances always cause the same effects”;b) physical: “If the state Si and the apriopriate law L are well known, the state S2 can be calculated for any moment in the future”.Though physical indeterminism has to be admitted in micirophysics, philosophical determinism can be accepted in the inanimate world. Moreover, philosophical determinism explains the effective use of the inductive method in physics.The theory of information suggests that the information itself (a nonmaterial element) can also be considered a cause.

The article describes the most important properties of elementary particles from the epistemological point of views. The first part presents the evolution of the notion of “an elementary particle” and points to the set of the designates of this notion. The second part presents the evolution of the notion of “an image of an elementary particle” and analyses complexity of particles. Besides, some arguments against identity features of particles and for indifferentiation of identical particles are cited. Finally, an “elementary particle” is defined as an material object which is characterized by:a) a set of quantum numbersb) pointnessc) lack of internal structured) lack of identity and indifferentiatione) ability to reactf) occurranoe both in the form of free and bounded particles.

Mathematics is considered “open” and continually developing science. It is widely understood as the language of science, the deducative science (it semms to be the most common view), the quasi-inductive and quasi-experimental science and the science of reality. None of the above aspects of mathematics can be ommited and none can be treated separately. Thus, the problem of truth should deal with all of the above aspects. Therefore, mathematics should be considered a posteriori (that is “from the ranks”), wth regard to its development (e.i. evolutionally) and in connection with other problems of the philosophy of mathematics (i.e. systemicly).It seems to be the only way to achieve some partial but still real, convincing and realiable results while considering the problem of truth in mathematics. 28

The evolution of spatio-temporal structures, from Aristotle to General Relativity, reveals unexpected logic and beauty (see D. J. Raine and M. Heller, The Science of Space-Time. Pachart 1981). Tow to reconcile this fact with an opinion, shared by the majority of contemporary philosophers of science, that science evolves in a discontinuous and catastrophic manner? To answer this question a model of nonlinear evolution of science is developed. This model is based upon the mathematical theory of dynamical systems, especially as it is applied to the nonlinear thermodynamics, which is a physical theory explaining the origin and grow of stable structures far from equilibrium states. During these processes information is generated. It is assumed that the evolution of science belongs to this class of processes and it can be described by a corresponding conceptual machinery. In the nonlinear evolution there are stationary or “normal” phases separated by the bifurcation or “revolutionary” stages. During a stationary phase, an “internal logic” of scientific development is clearly visible and reliable predictions can be made about the general trend of the evolution. Bifurcation stages introduce elements of indeterminism and probability. However, the picture is different from that propagated by Kuhn. In Kuhn's picture there is no “internal logic” at all, in the nonlinear evolution picture catastrophic changes turn out to be an essential component of the “internal logic”.The hypothesis of nonlinear grow of science is not only a kinematical model, reconstructing an order or a succession of scientific theories (as for example research Programms considered by Lakatos) but a true dynamic model pointing out toward mechanisms responsible for the actual evolution (it is based on the theory of dynamical systems). It is true, however, that because of the high degree of complexity one meets in the process of the science development the model may be treated only as a qualitative proposal.Some suggestions are made concerning the approaching revolution in physics, namely the Grand Unification and Superunification as they are viewed in therms of spatio-temporal structures.

The article presents some present discussions concerning the leading contemporary trend in methodology of empirical sciences called structuralism. W. Stegmüller is a typical representative of structuralism. His latest publications beginning with “Theorie und Erfahrung, II, 2 (1973)” have been numerously criticized (by M. Bunge, B. Habermehl, K. Hübner, P. K. Feyeraibend, I. Niiniluoto, V. Rantala, D. Pearce). Response to this critics contributed a lot to the development of structuralism. It can be observed in the works of J. D. Sneed, W. Stegmüller, U. C. Moulines, W. Balzer, D. Mayr. First, some false interpretations of the new concept of empirical theory and false assumptions of the criticism are presented. Then, some basic ideas of the later theory-net phase of structuralism are intuitively analysed. Next, controversies between the statement and non-statement views and the ways of understanding them are presented. Philosophical implications of structuralism (both ontological and epistemological) are also taken into account.

The author discusses the problem of scientific progress from the structuralistic point of view. All the consideration are informal; the examples are taken from the history of physics though some new presentations begun by J. D. Sneed are also taken into account.The first part presents some basic assumptions of structuralism and principal notions of the non-statemet conception of the theory.Besides, it is explained how to understand the physical theory, present its structure, development and conditions of its identity. Some existing solutions have been corrected.The second part shows what was the influence of the non-statement view on the problem of progress. It turned out that this conception neither excludes the traditional idea of truth from the considerations on modern physics nor the conception of progress. It forbids, however, to join the idea of truth with the physical theories. Further, all the existing solutions to the problem of progress are presented. It occurred that despite the correction of the basic ideas of J. D. Sneed,, W. Balzer, W. Stegmüller and C. U. Moulines the solutions reamin unsatisfactory. The ideas of the above authors (especialy the idea of macrological reduction) can be made use of as long as they are connected with the new understanding of progressiveness which is not an absolute value and depends on the choice of scientific results that are considered basic for evaluation. The suggested conception 1) explains regularities in the history of science which were difficult to explain in the earlier conceptions, 2) does not lead to the epistemological relativism, 3) is not a theory of the scientific rationalism, 4) is used in philosophical and historical considerations on science.

The Paper discusses three interpretations of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. According to one of them, initiated by D. Shapere and I. Scheffler, incommensurability it to be a result of untranslatable languages of rival paradigms. Another interpretation, proposed by G. Doppelt, holds that incommensurability is defined by partly different sets of problems of successive paradigms. According to the third interpretation, proposed and defended by the author of the present paper, Kuhn advocates a multi-level incommensurability relation obtaining between paradigms. This relation holds in scientific problème, ontology, language, values, theoretical standards and observations. The article claims that incommensurability results from different sets of paradigmatic problem-solutions, termed “exemplars”. The exemplars generatp the so-called tacit knowledge and ontological beliefs which affect language, values and standards as well as observations. Although Kuhn can, in a sense, be called a relativist, he should not, by any means, be regarded as an irrationalist, as it is commonly believed.

The author took up the idea of A, Szent-Gyöngyi in 1967 and developed it into a whole system of biology. Life should be observed not only from the £>pint of view of organic chemistry but also from the electronic aspect. Having empirical facts as the basis; the author suggested a new electronic model (1967) which is complementary to a chemical one. The smallest functional element of this binary process is called a quant link of life. These two quant processes (i.e. chemical and electronic) are mutually dependent. They are genetically transmitted. Thus, a quant link of the binary process would be a gene of life.New biology has to admit a two-fraction energetic process (i.e. electronic and chemical). The electronic fraction sets dislocated electrons of the protainaceous semi-conductor in motion. These electronic states emit the quants of light which feed chemical reactions. The chemical fraction, on the other hand, is characterized by chemiluminescent phenomena. These photons stimulate the dislocated electrones of the semi-conductor to the induced states. In this way the conjugate chemical and electronic processes are mutually activated by the quants of the autogenetic light.After 17 years of research, the author is going to publish the “Compendium of Bioelectronics”. Simultaneously, he discusses other problems that follow from the electronic model of biology. The work will consist of the following nineteen chapters each of which has already been published on its own:1) historical outline, 2) new facts fundamental for the electronic model, 3) bioelectronics — a new system of understanding of life, 4) bioelectronics versus biochemistry, 5) the smallest functional element of life, 6) heuristic conclusions from bioelectronics, 7) quant emission of photons, 8) biological optoelectronics, 9) bioplasma, 10) collective phenomena of biological systems, 11) resonance phenomena, 12) electromagnetic bioinformation, 13) electric surface phenomena, 14) quant acoustics, 15) electromagnetic theory of life (outline of wave biology), 16) prospects of relativistic biology, 17) outline of quant anthropology, 18) electro-chemical genesis of life, 19) practical prospects of the application of bioelectronics.Bioelectronics is a step forward connected with a new vision of life and new biology.

In der philosophischen Anthropologie kann man zwei Arten der Betrachtung des Menschen unterscheiden. Die erste nimmt schon die volle Geistigkeit des Menschen zum Ausgangspunkt, also sein Denkvergmögen und seinen freien Willen. Als Ebene, auf der man den Menschen adäquat betrachten kann, nimmt sie die ontologische Ebene. Eine solche Stellung nimmt die sagenannte philosophische „Anthropologie von oben” ein. Die zweite Weise der Betrachtung des Menschen nimmt die Daten der biologischen Anthropologie zum Ausgangspunkt, also die Genese des Menschen aus der natürlich Evolution und seine Sonderstellung in der Natur, die sich durch das Schaffen der Kulturwelt vollzieht. Eine solche Stellung nimmt die sogenannte philosophische „Anthropologie von unten” ein.Auf die Notwendigkeit der Ableitung des Menschen aus den Daten der biologischen Anthropologie in der philosophischen Betrachtung weisen heute einige Gründe. Es sind dies der Trend zu Interdisziplinarität und Komplementarität der Wissenschaften, die schnelle Entwicklung der biologischen Forschung und die neu entstandene evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie.Die philosophische „Anthropologie von unten” realisiert ihre Aufgabe in zwei Etappen. Der biologischen Anthropologie folgend, weist sie erstens darauf hin, daß der Mensch aus der natürlichen Evolution ausgegangen ist und alle ihre Errungenschaften bewahrt, auch den sensitiven tierischen Psychismus. In der zweiten Etappe weist sie darauf hin, daß der Mensch die biologische Evolution überschritten und, ohne die Verbindungen mit der Natur abzubrechen, die geistige Welt geschaffen hat. Die Tranztendens der biologischen Seite vollzieht sich innerhalb der Natur des Menschen, durch die Schichtung seiner einzigen Substanz auf das materielle und geistige Niveau, und so entsteht das leiblich-geistige Wesen.

Harold Clayton Urey (1893-1981) is one of the most outstanding naturalists of the 20th century. Being the Noble Prize winner, he initiated the research of organic cosmology and comparative planetology. He is known of his works on the evolution and physico-chemical nature of the solar system, planets, meteorites and the Earth and Moon in particular.The article critically discusses some less known Urey’s views that arose from his main study of the history of the Earth and her atmosphere. Namely, the following problems of the origin of the organic life are analysed:1) physico-chemical conditions of abiogenesis2) composition and structure of the original atmosphere3) nature and origin of the organic matter of meteorites4) origins of free energy.Finally, some ever-lasting values of Urey’s work are emphasized and his contribution to the disciplines he dealt with is presented. It is done on the basis of current criteria of scientific progress.

Das Gedankengut Teilhards erfreut sich heute nur noch eines geschichtlichen Wertes. Dabei beinhaltet dieses genau das, worum es den heutigen interdisziplinären Bemühungen geht: eine einheitliche, trotzdem aber inhaltlich nicht verkürzte Sicht des Menschen. In ihr wird sowohl das naturwissenschaftliche als auch das philosophisch-theologische Wissen vom Menschen berücksichtigt und darüber hinaus mit dem Wissen vom Leben und von der Materie in Einklang gebracht. Gerade dies sicherte seinerzeit Teilhard den großen Erfolg, daß er zugleich Biologe, Philosoph und Theologe war. Warum spielt er also beim heutigen Streben, die ethisch neutrale Naturwissenschaf durch eine Wissenschaft von Werten und Zielen zu ergänzen, keine Rolle mehr?Um diese Präge zu beantworten, muß eine andere gestellt werden. Warum hatte Teilhard selbst so vehement jedes „Philosophieren” von sich gewiesen, warum so hartnäckig behauptet, alle sene Ausführungen seien rein naturwissenschaftlicher Art? Und wie konnte er sich sogar dann noch auf der Ebene der Naturwissenschaften sehen, als er von der beseiten Materie, von der Notwendigkeit der Liebe oder von dem personalen Omegapunkt sprach?Die eigentliche Stütze solcher Behauptungen bildete für Teilhard das in den Naturwissenschaften gängige Wahrheitskriterium. Demnach gilt eine Theorie als wahr, wenn sie kohärent und fruchtbar ist. Mit seiner Theorie der universalen Evolution lieferte Teilhard eine kohärente Erklärung der ganzen unbelebten und belebten Natur. Aus dieser Theorie konnte er auch menschlich fruchtbare Schluß folgerungen ziehen. Somit konnte er seine Theorie as eine wahre und zugleich rein wissenschaftliche präsentieren. Doch gerade die bis ins Moralische und Religiöse gehenden Schlußfolgerungen, die er aus dieser Theorie zog, beweisen, daß er dem Begriff der Wahrheit keinen naturwissenschaftlichen, sondern einen durchaus ontologischen Inhalt gab. Sonst hätte er die Evolution nicht als einen realen und den Menschen absolut verpflichtenden Tatbestand dargestellt.Wenn nicht auf der Grundlage, so doch mit den Methoden der Einzelwissenschaften, vor allem der Physik, wollte Teilhard eine die ganze Wirklichkeit umfassende und erklärende Theorie aufbauen. Dieser Wunsch ist z.T. mit einer typisch positivistischen Abneigung gegen die Philosophie, vor alem aber mit einer gleichermaßen positivistischen Begeisterung für die Erkenntnismöglichkeiten der exaken Wissenschaften zu erklären. Inzwischen ist aber von dieser Begeisterung wenig geblieben. Die heutigen Betrachtungen über die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos werden im Bewußtsein der Beschränktheit des naturwissenschaftlichen Wissen angestellt. Deshalb ist die Synthese Teilhards die nur aus diesem Wissen schöpfen wollte, heute nicht mehr gefragt.