According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith (2000), “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s (1989).

RESUMEN: Este trabajo ofrece una lectura de la Paradoja de Moore que pone énfasis en su relevancia para nuestra comprensión de la racionalidad y de la interpretación lingüística. Mantiene que las oraciones que dan origen a la paradoja no necesitan entenderse en términos de ausencia de una contradicción, sino más bien en términos de ausencia de racionalidad, entendida esta como un término más amplio que el de coherencia y consistencia lógica. Se defenderá tal posición por medio de tres tesis, dos de las cuales se derivan de los enfoques dominantes (aunque insuficientes) a la paradoja: el de Moore, el de Wittgenstein y el de Shoemaker.ABSTRACT: This paper offers an interpretation of Moore’s Paradox that emphasizes its relevance for our understanding of rationality and linguistic interpretation. The sentences that originate the paradox do not need to be thought of in terms of the absence of a contradiction, but in terms of absence of rationality, where rationality is understood as a broader notion than coherence and logical consistency. This is defended through three theses, two of which stem from the dominant (but insufficient) approaches to the paradox: Moore’s, Wittgenstein’s and Shoemaker’s.

Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar (2003), who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs’s approach and then take up the task of rebutting Hagar’s charge by demonstrating the internal coherence of Fuchs’s realism.

RESUMEN: En este artículo pretendo desmantelar la opinión generalizada según la cual una interpretación relacional del espaciotiempo no es posible. Centro mi atención en el hecho de que las variables dinámicas usualmente están asociadas a objetos materiales en las teorías físicas. El tensor métrico de la Teoría General de la Relatividad (TGR) es un objeto dinámico así que —sostengo— este debe ser mejor entendido como un campo material en toda regla. Este argumento me lleva a vincular la naturaleza relacional del espaciotiempo a las dificultades para formular una genuina ley de conservación de energía-momento en la TGR.ABSTRACT: I will try to dismantle the widespread impression that a relational account of spacetime is not possible. I concentrate on the fact that dynamical variables are usually linked to material objects in physical theories. The metric tensor field of GR is a dynamical object so, I claim, it should be viewed as a matter field. The argument links the relational ontological status of spacetime to the failure to provide a genuine law of energy-momentum conservation within General Relativity.

RESUMEN: La idea de selección interna, propuesta originalmente por Lancelot Whyte, no sólo sirve para entender el papel causal que los constreñimientos del desarrollo tienen en evolución; sino que además puede hacernos comprender de qué modo esos factores organísmicos o internos, cuya importancia la Biología Evolucionaria del Desarrollo hoy quiere rescatar, son pasibles de ser considerados desde una perspectiva variacional o seleccional compatible, pero no asimilable, a la Teoría de la Selección Natural. Así, considerado como un concepto autónomo y diferente al de selección natural, el concepto de selección interna puede permitirnos comprender de qué modo eso que Wallace Arthur llama developmental bias constituye una causa, efectiva y positiva, de transformacionesevolutivas irreversibles y acumulables.ABSTRACT: The idea of internal selection, originally proposed by Lancelot Whyte, not only helps to understand the causal role that the developmental constraints have in evoltion, but it can also show how these organismic or internal factors, which relevancy the Evolutionary Developmental Biology remarks today, can be considered from a variational or selectional perspective that is compatible with, but not reducible to, Natural Selection Theory. Thus, being considered as a concept autonomous and different from natural selection, the concept of internal selection can allow us to understand how that phenomenon that Wallace Arthur calls developmental bias constitutes an effective and positive cause of irreversible and cumulative evolutionary changes.

RESUMEN: En este ensayo presento un análisis comparativo entre los diversos procedimientos creados, respectivamente, por los matemáticos babilonios y Diofanto de Alejandría para resolver ecuaciones de segundo grado. Observaremos cómo los primeros recurrieron a la composición de diagramas mientras Diofanto aplicó un algoritmo abstracto que no consiguió generalizar.ABSTRACT: In this paper I present a comparative analysis among the diverse procedures invented respectively by the Babylonian mathematicians and Diophantus of Alexandria to solve quadratic equations. We will observe how the first ones appealed to the composition of diagrams while Diophantus applied an abstract algorithm that he was not able to generalize.