The topic of sex change in our bisexual society touches upon not only main basis of human existence but also questions of evolution as a whole, of humankind persistence. Is sex change a humane act or do we herewith sacrifice the culture and health of human population for the sake of individual principles? Today, theproblem of sex change has turned from purely medical to a sociocultural one. It brings up a number of important and complex issues for physicians, and for society as a whole. It is necessary to undertake the efforts upon their solution on miscellaneous levels ‐ from practical to general philosophic one. What is the principal difference in surgical sex change and other body changes, such as plastic operations etc? Is a person free to make decisions about changing his or her body like he or she is when changing hairstyle, clothes etc? Who is responsible for answering these questions? We offer another, in comparison with traditional, approach to determination of the indication to change sex in case of various dissociations of sexual identity (for instance, transsexualism). The presented strategy is designed with some elements of synergetic modeling. A different cultural and ideological approach to the problem of sex change lies in the foundations of this strategy. Since we are referring not just to sexual, but also sexual.

Kant has often been criticized for holding a very negative vision of women, according to which they are less rational and less morally valuable than men. In this paper, I shall argue quite the opposite. I will show that, in spite of some minor pejorative comments, Kant held that women fit better the ideal of a moral person than men. This is due to some qualities of the female sex, mainly the women capacity for self-control and the capacity for having moral feelings like sympathy and compassion. Moreover, women show their master of emotions and passions when they are able to use their emotional sensitivity and self-control to master thefeelings and passions of men.

The concept ‘personhood’ lies at the center of contemporary disputes concerning whether certain biological interventions are ethical. Thus, if ‘personhood’ could be located or its existence evidenced by observations available to biologists, then each of these controversies could be resolved in biology’s own terms. I argue that this is a fruitless task. The attempt to track down a material object, ‘personhood,’ reveals ignorance of an important metaphysical presupposition underlying contemporary culture’s Cartesian/Kantian concept of ‘personhood.’

The study of the Chinese feminism rose in 1980s. Its theoretical premise is that Chinese woman has divided into different groups and has gotten the uneven development, caused by the command economic system into the market economic system. By this premise, the given questions of Chinese feminism only accordwith the given woman groups, namely, each woman group has its own problems. All of the problems have shown that the key question in the study of the Chinese feminism is why the unequal between sexes occurs in such a society of the equal between sexes in law as China. This paper will analyze this question through three aspects: (1) study the present condition of the Chinese woman groups and the cause for the occurrence; (2) analyze the causes that the unequal between sexes occur in china; (3) rethink the practice and theory of the Chinese woman movement.

In this paper, I provide a critique of Rawls’ non-ideal theory by arguing that in as much as background assumptions about what non-ideal conditions mean are derived from his idealized theory, not from existing actual conditions, his non-ideal theory is also idealized and flawed, similarly to his ideal theory. Thus, first, I argue that idealized assumptions which are used in the justification of justice principles are not neutral to members in non-ideal conditions; and second, such accounts systematically exclude some sort of actual injustice claims, in particular, justice claims from neo-liberal globalization.

My starting point in the exploration of the two subjects’ dialectics would be something what is perceived by Luce Irigaray, namely, that the humane nature is two, but the two is not represented in the philosophical discourse and the woman has always been symbolised as the other or lack. In Irigaray philosophy the crucial otherness is the other belonging to the other gender. The dialectical process now is in the service of intersubjectivity. Luce Irigaray argues that the recognition of the other as sexuate other offers the possibility to overcome the master – slave dialectics, because between woman and man, man and woman, recognitionrequires the labour of the negative. Irigaray sees in the recognition process the moment of acceptance of one’s own limits and of the limits of the other. Renouncement of the opposition activity / passivity is crucial for Luce Irigaray concept of the two subject’s dialectics. Luce Irigaray’s contribution to the contemporary discussions of the role of passivity and activity in subject’s relationship to the other (Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas) is crucial.

It is a welcoming feature that today women are improving in grounds of health and education. But they are still lagging behind in political and economic spheres and hence they continue to be the victims of high level of violence and abuse. These disadvantages are not due to sex differences but are the result of gender discrimination.

Feminist and post-colonial epistemologists, philosophers of science, and thinkers more generally may find themselves in a distinct form of difficult situation regarding their access to and authority over knowledge within the academic world. Because feminist and post-colonial approaches to knowledge require an acute awareness of relations of domination and the ways in which these pervade the social and epistemic world, it is often difficult to know how to proceed in making theory. These theorists are in particularly ripe positions to benefit from what philosopher-physicist Karen Barad offers us. In this paper, I engage with parts of Karen Barad’s theory of agential realism, both critically and self-reflexively. I assert that allowing Barad’s theory to inform and structure our thinking and language makes knowers better able to meet certain requirements of epistemological responsibility, particularly with regard to the ways we make theory. Moreover, I attempt to assert this in a way that is mindful of how her theory speaks to and accounts for my doing so.

The paper will revolve around Shulamith Firestone’s claims that women’s biology is the root cause of prejudices against women and at the same time the basis for solutions that seek to end such prejudices. In the rational attack to these claims, it is argued that Firestone does not really debunk the patriarchal view but actually agrees with it. The attack focused on her avowed solution to the women problem that turns out to be defeatist in nature. In the attempt to prevent, if not end discrimination against women, the paper carefully offers possible solutions to consider.

How to read the canonical texts of the male philosophical tradition has been an ongoing question for feminist philosophers. This paper wants to investigate Luce Irigaray’s notion of mimesis so as to offer an alternative reading practice for traditional philosophical texts. The paper will consist of two parts: in a firstsection, Irigaray’s concept of mimesis will be discussed in its affirmative as well as its transformative version; the second part attempts to apply the concept of mimesis to contemporary feminist readings of the philosophical canon. It will be shown that most existing feminist scholarship in philosophy follows the pattern of an affirmative mimetic approach while Irigaray’s own readings of male philosophers offers a stylistic example for the use of a transformative version of mimesis. It will be claimed that both approaches are necessary since they complement each other in significant ways, one interpreting traditional texts, the other re-writing them.

Coming from Germany in Europe I am starting with Feminism from a Western point of view but with a perspective of dialogue with Feminisms in other parts of the World. My inquiry deals with problems of the present time, especially how to make Feminism interesting not only to a philosophical or academic public, but to people from all professional fields and disciplines. The political perspective of feminist philosophy can be underlined with the central definition the Austrian philosopher Herta Nagl Docekal gives. According to this definition freedom of women is the main issue of each feminist interrogation. With regard to the development of women’s liberation in Europe and the USA three different movements of feminism can be distinguished: the main issue of the first is the notion of equality, it is also called humanist feminism according to Iris Marion Young; secondly we have the feminism of difference or gynocentrism; the third wave can not so easily be defined, a wide range of variety exists, which may lead to the impression that no more general aim is left. Sometimes it is also called postmodern feminism. But what does this mean: postmodern feminism? Far from an arbitrary attitude, which does not accept any order, postmodern feminism – as postmodern and poststructural philosophy – may be understood as a lesson on how to be different and not to loose the aims women share all over the world. The most important challenge is to find a new balance between the different aims and groups of feminism as well as between feminism in different societies and cultures. Feminisms from the beginnings wanted to overcome step by step the prejudices about men and women, about sex and gender, one of the heritages of our Western tradition. My interpretation of Third Wave may be seen as another step on this way.

The American environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott argues that we human beings are ethically obliged to promote and protect the environment as an intrinsic value. To do so, we should adopt a scientifically and philosophically informed postmodern land ethic which protects and nurtures the great chain of being (pyramids of energy) from soil to civilization. The practice of this Leopoldian land ethic requires that we transform our modernist utilitarian and Cartesian ethics which instrumentalize and alienate nature. Two key works by Callicott outline his position as a mainstream academic deep ecologist: Earth’s Insights (1994) and Beyond the Land Ethic (1999). The French cultural and political philosopher, Luc Ferry, argues that deep ecological ideologies, such as Callicott’s, threatenthe historical enterprise of modernist humanism. The appeal of deep ecologists lies in their romantic and anti-Cartesian ideologies. In his book, The New Ecological Order (1995; Le nouvel ordre écologique, 1992), Ferry criticizes the deep ecologists (and he includes Callicott in this group) for their unjustified attacks on the traditions of humanism. In the conclusion to his book, deep ecological radicalism is equated with an anti-cosmopolitan “barbarism”. Ferry feels that the ideals of the European enlightenment and its modernist anthropocentrism which privileges human autonomy, freedom, and democratic ideals, have been undermined by the forces of the political left.

Until now post-structuralism is widely regarded as an opposite to phenomenology. This is also true for the relation of Butler’s post-structuralism and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to show how close they are to each other. For this purpose, I will focus on Butler’s poststructuralist theory of performativity to confront it with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory of expression. While Butler accuses theories of expression of being essentialist, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of experience resists such a criticism. “Expressivity” and “performativity”, and thus phenomenology and post-structuralism, are not opposites but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist concept.

Mit dem oben genannten Thema will ich darstellen, dass Jaspers’ Philosophie, die ehemals in Korea sehr beliebt war, aber heute fast in Vergessenheit geraten ist, mit ihren Ansätzen in Bezug auf die philosophische Praxis ihre philosophische Bedeutung in Korea wieder unter Beweis stellen kann.

Mythological art of the world population variously demonstrates the appearance and interaction of sexes. But more often it is connected with the beginning of the world from the world egg. Religions views tell about the creation of a first single man by God. The latest biological studies have not yet solved this problem,the idea of dividing vegetable and animal kingdoms being disputable enough. To outline ways of solving this problem was made possible from the dualism point of view. The origins of sexes are found on the base of multicellularity, on the border of vegetable and animal kingdoms, The appearing of sexual reproduction results in a new quality and unity of opposites, preserving its further inner contradiction. The main direction of development – changeability is fixed by the male, while unchangeability is fixed by the female. The understanding both of historical direction in the development of each sexes and its inner contradiction will allow to build proper gender relations in the society. The problem of selecting strategy of gender research still remains disputable.