In The Force of Nonviolence, Judith Butler argues that nonviolent movements must replace a dominant neurotic identitarianism with a commitment to preserving relational life. However, Butler also argues that because relationality is volatile, freedom and equality cannot be accomplished through a simple negation of separation. Instead, nonviolence must be directed at moments of relational volatility precisely when violence is compelled. Drawing on Klein’s theory of subjectivity—in which imagining ourselves as other is a precondition for imagining ourselves independent—and on Benjamin’s vision of conflict resolution in encountering the other without instrumentality, Butler asks that we meet such moments by honoring interdependence. While affirming much in Butler’s analysis, this article locates (1) a tension between Butler’s poststructuralist and psychoanalytic commitments, (2) the reification of a non-relational liberal subject as hegemonic, and (3) a tendency towards theoretical exclusivity. Through addressing these weaknesses, we can retain more of a positive role than Butler affords to traditional elements of the nonviolent toolkit such as love, morality, and upholding human rights prefaced on the integrity and dignity of the individual, to augment their theory as one among many resources for a diverse and multicultural nonviolent pursuit of social and political progress.

In The Force of Nonviolence, Judith Butler presents five key interventions to the field of nonviolence philosophy: (1) a critique of social contract theory for the way it imagines human beings as independent, (2) an approach to nonviolence based in the preservation of life within a context of social action, (3) the advancement of Butler’s alternative framework of equal grievability, (4) the claim that violence is difficult to define independently of social context, and (5) a Freudian analysis of the death drive that offers a strategy for disrupting violence. In response to each of these interventions, this article argues that: (1) social contract theory is a heuristic for justifying the existence of a state, (2) Gandhi’s concept of truth provides a more comprehensive approach to nonviolence that concerns the whole self and all beings, (3) a concept of function would make a better guide to human responsibility, (4) violence can be defined independently of social framework, and (5) without reliance on the concept of a death drive, there are nonviolent remedies for social attitudes of aggression as found in the work of Jane Addams and William James.

In this article, I put Judith Butler’s thought of nonviolence in dialogue with that of M. K. Gandhi to show how, for both thinkers, a defense of nonviolence must be grounded in interdependency and equality, which consequently entails a displacement of the individual self and its interests as the focus of ethics. Although Butler’s and Gandhi’s accounts of nonviolence differ in some important respects, both base their defense of nonviolence on a recognition of interdependency in opposition to Western individualism. This critique of individualism as an adequate ethical framework leads each author to question the concept of self-defense and to reject the preservation of individual life as the goal of ethical and political action.

This essay develops a renewed conception of autonomy through an explication of Judith Butler’s critique of liberal individualism in The Force of Nonviolence. I argue that while rejecting liberal individualism requires abandoning the fantasies of mastery and self-sufficiency, such a rejection need not imply a renunciation of autonomy. Instead, an ethics of nonviolence that is committed to equality demands a relational understanding of autonomy that affirms our radical interdependency. I contend, moreover, that for an account of the self to acknowledge this interdependency, the body must be conceived as a threshold rather than an end. Put differently, to be a relational self means to be give over to others from the start. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I explore Butler’s critical analysis of liberal political thought, while emphasizing the key role that the state-of-nature fantasy plays in the Western social and political imaginary. Next, I show how dependency, interdependency, and vulnerability are closely related but also distinct. Specifically, I argue that a relational understanding of autonomy is consistent with Butler’s emphasis on our interdependency and the social obligations that bind us to one another. Finally, I show how the social model of disability lends further support to a relational understanding of autonomy. Drawing on Butler’s brief discussion of instruments for support in The Force of Nonviolence, I propose that we think more closely about the everyday ways in which we are sustained by various modes of support. The fact that we never stop relying on this support, even when we disavow it, suggests that autonomy is not a given but rather an achievement.