Hung Yao-Shun (1903-1986), one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in the Japanese ruled period, whose research deserves more attention today. My intention in this paper is twofold: First, to clarify some basic concepts of his “absolute dialectics of alethiological dialectics”, and secondly to indicate some possible developments of his logic. The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of my paper (section one), I focus on his main philosophical work “Being and Truth - A Study of Schalwa Nuzubidse’s Alethiology” published in April 1938 (totally 145 pages). Nuzubidse attempts to explicate the traditional metaphysics as an aletheological realism, aiming at the disclosure of the truth-in-itself. Some of the basic concepts of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and Hung’s interpretation are discussed here (sections two, three, four). Through these discussions, we can see that Hung goes deeply into the core of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and radicalizes his alethiological realism step by step to an “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”. Finally, Hung’s critique on Nuzubidse is discussed in the last section (section five). Hung’s project remains an unfinished ideal, which makes some of his creative thoughts still obscure. By explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments, some of the possible contributions and new perspectives that Hung provided to philosophy will be expounded in this section.

本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先，本文將以Emma Borg 為極小主義之代表，釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化的核心意義，並被賦予三種特色：直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變，因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其次，本文論證，抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物，因此難以有真假值可言。

本文嘗試重塑有關《莊子》巵言之研究。近年來，學界大多將巵言視為《莊子》中特殊文體形式，如兩難問題及悖論。本文對於是否能輕易地將這些形式視為巵言存疑，進而試圖論證巵言基本上是簡單形式的言辭，其特色為明確但暫時性的，作用於日常互動與共存上。於此層面，特殊文體形式可謂無用武之地；然而，於探討並進而提倡巵言之時，特殊文體形式便成為不可或缺的一環。正是於此後設之層次─就《莊子》而言，則是寫作之層次─我們發現特殊文體形式之運用。基於結構上之相似度，我們或能將此等文體稱為「巵言」，但同時不應忘記，其乃從屬於與他者共存時所運用之語言。

A commonly held view concerning moral responsibility is that someone has a moral responsibility for some action if and only if someone makes actions freely. In other words, if someone cannot avoid doing actions to be morally condemned, it is not attributable to moral responsibility. Can Zhu Xi’s theory of mind and ethical thoughts─xin-tong-xing-qing 心統性情─respond to the attribution of moral responsibility? Scholars have different opinions and to what extent their disagreement ranges is the focus of this paper.The conclusion of this paper is that the intertwining of these research approaches can be regarded as philosophical problems of the Chinese style concerning compatibilism and incompatibilism. This problem cannot be solved unless its metaphysical problem is dealt with in the first place. However, in addition to the above solution, perhaps we can see xin 心 as emergence of xing-qing 性情, and imagine a special vision of ontological gong-fu 工夫 and experience, taking care of thoughts like han-yang-xing-cha 涵養省察, ge-wu-zhi-zhi 格物致知, ke-ji-zhu-jing 克己主敬. We then adapt the famous statement of Peter van Inwagen as follows: “there is mysterious gong-fu between xin and xing-qing.”