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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2009 >
Issue: 38
顧史 考
Scott Cook
上博簡〈凡物流形〉初探
A Trial Exploration of the Shanghai-Museum Bamboo Text “All Things Flow into Form”
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隨著郭店楚簡〈太一生水〉、上博楚簡〈恆先〉等文本的出土,中 國先秦形而上學的研究乃多有新資料及新範疇可探討。然資料仍是不 斷公布,適才出爐的《上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書(七)》中,即有題為 〈凡物流形〉的一篇(有甲、乙兩本),饒具形而上學的意義,對先秦 思想史研究的價值極其珍貴。如《楚辭•天問》所提:「遂古之初,誰傳道之?上下未形,何由考之?」等名句相類,〈凡物流形〉亦多以疑 問句成篇,如:「凡物流形,奚得而成?流形成體,奚得而不死?」等,並且處處押韻,兩書之間的關係頗饒興味。此外尚有與《莊子》、《淮 南子》等書中形而上學方面的段落相近的章節,然其間亦多有出入可 談。本文擬先就〈凡物流形〉前半篇提出若干釋讀方面的意見及約略 的解說,以供大方之家參考指正,作為學者進一步探討其形而上學意 義的基礎。
With the recent unearthing of such Warring States bamboo manuscripts as “Taiyi sheng shui” of Guodian and “Heng xian” of the Shanghai Museum corpus, thestudy of Chinese metaphysics has gained a wealth of new materials and concepts for exploration. Yet new materials continue to come forth, such as the recentlypublished Shanghai Museum v. 7 manuscript “Fan wu liu xing” (in two copies), a text rich in metaphysical significance and of tremendous value to the study ofpre-Qin intellectual history. In a form similar to the Chuci text “Tian wen,” this text is made up of a series of fundamental questions—all in rhymed stanzas—such as“By what means are all things able to take form?” or “Once things take form, by what means do they survive?” It constitutes an important early example ofmetaphysical inquiry in the Chinese tradition, with interesting similarities to and differences from major received philosophical texts from the same time period and region. This essay aims to provide a credible reading of the first half of this important new document and make a brief inquiry into its metaphysical significance.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2009 >
Issue: 38
張雪 珠
Maria Chang Hsüeh-chu
黑格爾論知上帝
Hegel on the Cognition of God
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對黑格爾來說,上帝是「哲學的唯一對象」,意思是,哲學要在上 帝內認知一切,將一切引向祂,從祂來說明一切;因此哲學即是神學,也是對上帝的崇拜。在他的哲學裡,上帝是哲學的結果也是其預設,是其目標也是它的開始。黑格爾的思辨哲學是在與其他哲學觀點的對話中形成。對於上帝 之知,他強烈反對的是啟蒙時代的三種不可知論:沃爾夫代表的理性 主義的神學、康德的批判哲學與雅各比開始的感覺神學。理性神學的 不可知論建立於客觀觀點,批判哲學與感覺神學則是出自主觀理由否 認人認知上帝的可能性。這三種不可知論,黑格爾認為,它們的共同 點是,都是建立於知性的認知,不是真正出自理性的認知。他論述,理性不僅能夠認知上帝存在,而且能夠認知祂是什麼。
In Hegel’s philosophy God is “the sole object of philosophy”, in other words, philosophy has to attain in God the complete knowledge, to relate everything to God and to explain everything through God; thus philosophy in essence is a theology and is a worshiping of God. In the context of Hegel’s philosophy, God is considered to be both the final result and the precondition of philosophy, both its final goal and its starting point.The speculative philosophy of Hegel has been formed in the context of the dialogue between various philosophical theories. Regarding knowledge aboutGod, Hegel rejects the validity of the “three agnosticisms” of the Enlightenment: the rationalist theology of Wolff, the critical philosophy of Kant and Jacobi’stheology of feeling. The agnosticism of Wolff’s rational theology was founded on objective view, whereas Kant’s critical philosophy and Jacobi’s philosophy offeeling refuted the possibility of knowing God based on subjective standpoints. Hegel held that these three theories are all based on the faculty of intellect ratherthan on the one of reasoning. He argued that reasoning can attain knowledge not only of the existence of God but also about God Himself.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2009 >
Issue: 38
何志 青
Jih-Ching Ho
推論證成與遵循規則
Inferential Justification and Rule-Following
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傳統知識論接受推論之證成概念:一信念的證成是藉由其他的信 念(或狀態)合理推出該信念。推論證成立即導致「無限後退」的問 題,因為具證成能力的信念(或狀態)本身亦需要被證成。本文嘗試 提出不會無限後退的推論證成。首先分析傳統推論證成理論具有三原 則:狹義推理理論,形式主義的推理概念,以及單線後退的證成方向。此三原則必須被修正,並取代之以新原則:廣義推理理論、實質主義、平衡互動的證成方向。這些原則所組成的新推論證成理論不再有無限 後退的問題。
Traditional epistemology embraces an inferential concept of justification: a belief is justified just in case it can be reasonably inferred from other beliefs. Inferential justification immediately incurs the problem of infinite regress, since the justifying beliefs themselves are in need of further justification. In this paper I will try to explicate a new idea of inferential justification that does not regress indefinitely. I will begin by analyzing the traditional notion of inferential justification as involving three principles, namely narrow inferentialism, formalism, and linear regress justification. All three principles are critically examined, and in their place, three new ones are proposed: broad inferentialism, materialism, and interactive justification. The principles constitute a new inferential approach which admits of no infinite regress.
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